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Abstract
This dissertation proposes an approach for testing of safety-critical systems.
It is based on a behavioral and a fault model. The two models are analyzed for
compatibility and necessary changes are identified to make them compatible. Then
transformation rules are used to transform the fault model into the same model
type as the behavioral model. Integration rules define how to combine them. This
approach results in an integrated model which then can be used to generate tests
using a variety of testing criteria. The dissertation illustrates this general framework
using a CEFSM for the behavioral model and a Fault Tree for the fault model. We
apply the technique to a variety of applications such as a Gas burner, an Aerospace
Launch System, and a Railroad Crossing Control System. We also investigate the
scalability of the approach and compare its efficiency with integrating a state chart
and a fault tree. Construction and Analysis of Distributed Processes (CADP) has
been used as a supporting tool for this approach to generate test cases from the




I would like to express my deep gratitude to my adviser, Dr. Anneliese An-
drews for her unlimited precious guidance, motivation and direction throughout my
research work and in preparation for this dissertation.
I would like to thank Dr. Gareth Eaton (Department of Chemistry & Biochem-
istry) for accepting my request to be the examining committee chair and for his
valuable comments. I would like also to thank the examining committee members:
Dr. Matthew Rutherford and Dr. Rinku Dewri for their participation in the com-
mittee and for their excellent comments.
I would like to thank my friends and colleagues whom I met and worked with
during my PhD journey. Special thanks for Salwa Elakeili whom I worked with on
case studies and on the end-to-end testing methodology. I would also like to thank
Mahmoud Abdelgawad with whom I worked closely on modeling the environment
and with whom I exchanged ideas. It was a pleasure to work with Seana Hagerman
on some publications and I thank her for providing me with the description for
the launch vehicle system which I used as a case study. I would like also to thank
Andrei Roudik, our system administrator at the Department of Computer Science,
for providing the technical support whenever we asked for it. I would like to thank
NSF/SSR-RC for supporting this dissertation.
My thoughts and deepest gratitude go straight to my mother, sisters, and broth-
ers for their love, encouragement, and support throughout this journey.
Last but not least, I would like to express the most profound gratitude for my wife
for being patient, supportive, and amiable no matter what. No gratitude would be
enough for my children, Yousef, Dania, Omar, and Randa who tolerated my student
life in which they wanted me when I was not there.
iii
Contents
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
1 Problem Statement 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 The Cost of Software Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Safety Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Software Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.5 Testing Problem for Safety-Critical Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.6 Model Based Testing (MBT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.7 Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.8 Contribution to Team Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 Background 13
2.1 Safety-Critical System Lifecycle (SCSL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Hazard Analysis Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 Model Based Testing (MBT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.3.1 Unified Modeling Language (UML) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.3.2 Finite State Machine (FSM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.3.3 Extended Finite State Machine (EFSM) . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.3.4 Communicating Extended Finite State Machine
(CEFSM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.4 Combined Behavioral and Fault Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4.1 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3 Approach 56
3.1 Test Generation Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.1.1 Behavioral Model: Communicating Extended Finite State Ma-
chine (CEFSM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.1.2 Fault model: Fault Tree (FT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.1.3 Compatibility Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.1.4 FT́ model Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.1.5 Transformation Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
iv
3.1.6 Transformation Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.1.7 Integration Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.1.8 Concurrent Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.1.9 ICEFSM Coverage Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.1.10 Test Case Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4 Validation 81
4.1 Scalability and Comparison to Sánchez et. al.’s [127] . . . . . . . . . 82
4.1.1 Simulator Experiment Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.1.2 Comparison of the Number of Nodes and Transitions . . . . . 82
4.2 Applicability: Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.2.1 Gas Burner System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.2.2 Application: Aerospace Launch System . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.3 ICEFSM as Part of an End-to-End testing Methodology . . . . . . . 141
4.3.1 Test Generation Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.3.2 Phase1: Generate Failures and Failure Applicability . . . . . . 142
4.3.3 Construction of the Applicability Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
4.3.4 Phase2: Generate Safety Mitigation Tests . . . . . . . . . . . 146
4.4 End-To-End Case Study: Railroad Crossing Control System (RCCS) 154
4.4.1 Phase1: Generate Failures and Failure Applicability . . . . . . 154
4.4.2 Construction of the Applicability Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
4.4.3 Phase2: Generate Safety Mitigation Tests . . . . . . . . . . . 173
5 Other Uses for Integrated Model 192
5.1 Additional Analysis Capabilities through Construction and Analysis
of Distributed Processes (CADP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
5.1.1 CADP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
5.1.2 Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
5.1.3 Deadlock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
5.1.4 Livelock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
5.1.5 Test Generation with Verification (TGV) . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
6 Conclusion 204




1.1 Project Contribution Commonality Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1 Hazard Analysis Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Fault Tree Gate Types [143, 40] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Model Based Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4 Semantic Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.5 Comparison of the Integration Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.1 Failure Types Table Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2 Event-Gate Table for Leaf Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.1 Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.2 Simulation Data and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.3 CEFSM model for a Gas Burner System Transitions . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.4 BFClass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.5 Event-Gate Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.6 ICEFSM model for a Gas Burner System Transitions . . . . . . . . . 106
4.7 Gas Burner System Test Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.8 CEFSM Model for a Launch System Transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.9 Event-Gate Table after Transforming FT in Figure 4.21 . . . . . . . . 126
4.10 Event-Gate Table after Transforming FT in Figure 4.22 . . . . . . . . 127
4.11 Event-Gate Table after Transforming FT in Figure 4.23 . . . . . . . . 128
4.12 Event-Gate Table after Transforming FT in Figure 4.24 . . . . . . . . 130
4.13 ICEFSM model for a launch System Transitions . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.14 Aerospace Launch System Test Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
4.15 Applicability Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
4.16 All Position, All Applicable Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
4.17 All Unique Nodes, All Applicable Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
4.18 All Tests, All Unique Nodes, All Applicable Failures . . . . . . . . . . 149
4.19 All Tests, All Unique Nodes, Some Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
4.20 Structure of Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
4.21 Failure Types Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
4.22 Failure Types Table After Compatibility Transformation Step . . . . 162
vi
4.23 Event-Gate Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
4.24 Failure Types Table After Model Transformation Step . . . . . . . . . 167
4.25 Failure Types Table After Model Integration Step . . . . . . . . . . . 169
4.26 Railroad Crossing System Test Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
4.27 Failure Types Table After Test Generation Step . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
4.28 Applicability Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
4.29 Test Paths Through CEFSM Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
4.30 C1: All Positions, All Applicable Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
4.31 C2: All Unique Nodes, All Applicable Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
4.32 C3: All Tests, All Unique Nodes, All Applicable Failures . . . . . . . 177
4.33 C4: All Tests, All Unique Nodes, Some Applicable Failures . . . . . . 178
4.34 Mitigation Requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
4.35 Safety Mitigation Tests for Criteria 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
4.36 Safety Mitigation Tests for Criteria 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
4.37 Safety Mitigation Tests for Criteria 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
5.1 Test Purpose for the Example in Figure 4.60 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
5.2 Complete Uncontrollable Test Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
vii
List of Figures
1.1 Overall Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Team Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.1 Overall Safety Lifecycle[IEC 61508] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 Statechart Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3 Activity Diagram Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4 Statechart for Microwave System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.5 FTA for Microwave Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.6 Applying Transformation Rules on Exposure of Microwave . . . . . . 46
2.7 The Statechart Gate for Exposure of Microwave Event . . . . . . . . 46
2.8 Statechart Gate for Microwaving Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.9 Modified Statechart for the Microwave Oven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.10 Fault Tree for Exposure of Microwave . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.11 Transformed Statechart Diagram without Information from the Orig-
inal Statechart diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.12 Transformed Statechart Diagram with Information . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.13 Fault and Behavioral Models at the V-model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.1 Safety-Critical System Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2 Test Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3 Behavioral and Fault Classes Combination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.4 Fault Tree Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.5 Air Valve Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.6 Gas Valve Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.7 AND Gate Representation in FT and GCEFSM . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.8 XOR Gate Representation in FT and GCEFSM . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.9 Priority And Gate Representation in FT and GCEFSM . . . . . . . . 69
3.10 OR Gate Representation in FT and GCEFSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.11 Event Timer GCEFSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.12 Timing Continuous Intervals GCEFSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.13 Transformation Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.14 Integration Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
viii
4.1 EFSM and CEFSM Approaches Model Growth for 13 S and 15 T BM
(Full simulation data) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.2 EFSM and CEFSM Approaches Model Growth for 13 S and 15 T
Behavioral Model (up to 8 leaves) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.3 EFSM and CEFSM Approaches Model Growth for 15 S and 19 T BM
(Full simulation data) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.4 EFSM and CEFSM Approaches Model Growth for 15 S and 19 T
Behavioral Model (up to 8 leaves) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.5 EFSM and CEFSM Approaches Model Growth for 21 S and 39 T BM
(Full simulation data) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.6 EFSM and CEFSM Approaches Model Growth for 21 S and 39 T
Behavioral Model (up to 8 leaves) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.7 EFSM and CEFSM Approaches Model Growth for 50 S and 60 T BM
(Full simulation data) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.8 EFSM and CEFSM Approaches Model Growth for 50 S and 60 T
Behavioral Model (up to 8 leaves) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.9 Gas Burner Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.10 FT for a Fire Occurrence in a Gas Burner [40] . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.11 Bclass, Fclass, and BFclass for AirValve Entity . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.12 Bclass, Fclass, and BFclass for GasValve Entity . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.13 Igniter and Observation Classes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.14 Event Timing GCEFSM for Gas Leaks > 4s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.15 GCEFSM for Gas Observation Interval < 30s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.16 GCEFSMs for Excess Of Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.17 GCEFSMs for Unsafe Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.18 GCEFSMs for Gas Explodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.19 ICEFSM Model for a Gas Burner System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.20 CEFSM Model for a Launch System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.21 Initialization Fail FT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.22 Fire Occurrence FT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.23 Preflight Fail FT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.24 Launch Fail FT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.25 Network Connection Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.26 Countdown Clock Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.27 Hazard Lights Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.28 LO2 Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
4.29 Helium Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.30 LH2 Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.31 Battery Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.32 Initiating Fueling Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.33 Battery Switching Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.34 Air Conditioning Initiation Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
ix
4.35 Nitrogen Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.36 Instruments Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.37 Cryo Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.38 Chill Down Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.39 GCEFSM for the FT in Figure 4.21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.40 GCEFSM for Fire Occurrence FT in Figure 4.22 . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.41 GCEFSM for the Preflight Failure FT in Figure 4.23 . . . . . . . . . 128
4.42 GCEFSM for an OR Gate in Figure 4.24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.43 GCEFSM for the Second OR Gate in Figure 4.24 . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.44 GCEFSM for Flight Fail FT in Figure 4.24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.45 ICEFSM Model for a Launch System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
4.46 End-To-End Test Generation Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
4.47 Applicability Matrix Construction Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
4.48 Try Other Alternatives: Mitigation Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
4.49 Railroad Crossing System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
4.50 Fault Tree for Accident . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
4.51 Train Approaching and Crossing Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
4.52 Train Controller Class Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
4.53 Gate Events Class Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
4.54 Warining Light Class Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
4.55 An OR Gate for the Left Most Event in the FT . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
4.56 The Second Transformed Gate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
4.57 GCEFSM for Gate Number 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
4.58 GCEFSM for Gates 1 to 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
4.59 GCEFSMs for the Whole FT’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
4.60 The ICEFSM Model of the RCCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
4.61 Fix and Stop: Mitigation Model MM2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
4.62 Fix and Proceed: Mitigation Model MM3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
4.63 Compensate: Mitigation Model MM4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
5.1 BitAlt Sender Protocol EFSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
5.2 BitAlt Sender Protocol LTS (CADP Produced Graph) . . . . . . . . 195
5.3 CADP Deadlock Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
5.4 CADP Livelock Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198





Systems, especially those that rely on software, have become an essential part
of our world. From an engineering point of view, software systems are ubiquitous.
These systems, where human safety depends upon their correct operation, are con-
sidered safety-critical and are part of our daily life. An obvious example of a safety
critical system is an aircraft fly-by-wire control system. In this system the pilot uses
an interface to input commands to the control computer, and the computer controls
the actual aircraft. The lives of hundreds of passengers depend upon the continued
correct operation of such a system.
Railway signaling systems must enable controllers to direct trains and prevent
trains from colliding. Like an aircraft fly-by-wire, lives depend on the correct oper-
ation of the system. However, all trains can be stopped if the safety of the system
becomes suspect, while stopping an aircraft to fix the fly-by-wire system when flying
is not possible. Software in medical systems may be directly responsible for human
life, such as information which a doctor uses to decide on medication [18].
1
Software may also be involved in providing humans with information, such as
a pacemaker device. Both types of systems can impact the safety of the patient.
A pacemaker device is a safety-critical system, since its failure may cause severe
damage to a human body or even loss of a human life. It is an electronic device
used to treat patients who suffer from slow heartbeats. The purpose of using a
pacemaker is to maintain normal heartbeats so that adequate oxygen and nutrients
can be delivered through the blood to the organs of the human body.
Civil engineers use computer software to design and test structure models. An
error in the software may result in a bridge collapsing. Aircraft, trains, ships and
cars are also designed and modeled using computers. Even something as simple as
traffic lights or a microwave oven can be viewed as safety-critical. An error giving
green lights to both directions at a cross road could result in a car accident, or a
microwave sending out waves while the oven door is open could result in human
injury. In cars, software involved in functions such as engine management, anti-lock
brakes, traction control, and a host of other functions, could potentially fail in a
way that causes a road accident.
With such systems also comes the exposure to risks because some of these sys-
tems may fail or may not work properly resulting in damage, injury, or death.
Potential system failures that result in damage, injury, or death are referred to as a
mishap risk. Therefore, safety must always be considered with respect to all system
components (the software and the computer hardware, other electronic and electri-
cal hardware, mechanical hardware, and operators or users) not just the software
element.
Hazards will always exist, but their risk must be mitigated. Therefore, safety is
a relative term that refers to the level of risk that is acceptable. System safety is
not an absolute quantity, but rather a level of risk that is bound by cost, time, and
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performance. System safety requires the evaluation of risk to determine its level in
order to decide whether to accept or reject it. System safety is achieved through a
sequence of ordered steps applied from the initial system design, through detailed
design and testing, to the end of a system’s lifetime.
1.2 The Cost of Software Safety
The overall cost of software safety is determined by what we are willing to pay.
It includes many factors and components, and depends on whether we want to pay
to prevent the hazards from happening or we want to pay after the occurrence of
hazards. The preventive approach, the cost that we spend to produce safer software
that eliminates software defects in general, is only one proportion of the cost to
develop safety-critical software that can save human lives and properties. The other
one is the cost we pay after the occurrence of an accident or mishap [18]. The
problem is we cannot ever be certain that the system operates safely. On the other
hand, when accidents do occur, the penalties for ignoring software safety can be
very severe. Therefore, a preventive approach for safety during design is more cost-
effective than trying to implement safety into a system after the occurrence of an
accident or mishap since the cost of mishap could be exorbitant [43].
1.3 Safety Analysis
Safety analysis is the examination and evaluation of the system and subsystem
to find and categorize the existing and potential hazards and hazardous conditions
according to their severity and frequency of occurrence and to attain the proper
measures to mitigate them [43]. It increases the probability of finding possible
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faults in safety-critical software. Some safety analysis techniques have been used to
analyze safety in safety-critical software. The outcome of this analysis is considered
when testing safety in the behavioral model.
Besides the techniques used in testing software generally, testing safety-critical
software systems requires analyzing the hazards beforehand by using analysis tech-
niques such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [143], Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA) [123], Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) [83], and Hazard and
Risk Analysis (HRA) [43, 60]. However, there is still a gap between the testing and
analysis activities which negatively impacts the effectiveness of testing. Another
difference is that when testing safety-critical software we are testing the undesired
behaviors which are not described by the system model, while when testing non-
safety critical software we are testing the desired behaviors, i.e. how the system is
supposed to behave.
1.4 Software Testing
Software testing is a very important activity in the software development life
cycle. It is the process of operating the software under a controlled condition to
verify that it behaves as specified, to detect its errors, and to validate that it is what
the customer wants. Validation checks to see if we are building the right system
and Verification checks to see if we are building the system correctly [4]. However,
the purpose of Error Detection is to find out whether things happen when they
should’t or they don’t happen when they should. Both verification and validation
are necessary, but are different components of any testing activity. According to the
ANSI/IEEE1059 standard, testing is defined as the process of analyzing software to
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detect the differences between existing and required conditions and to evaluate the
features of the software item.
The main purpose of testing software is to find errors and problems. The point
of finding these errors and problems is to have them fixed. Testing in itself cannot
ensure the quality of software, all it can do is to give us a certain level of assurance
about the software based on given controlled conditions. In other words, testing
shows us whether the software functions as expected or not under the test cases ex-
ecuted. This level of assurance depends on the testing criteria and strategy applied,
and techniques and tools used. A well-designed test case may reveal previously
undetected software defects [145].
In well-organized projects, the mission of the testing team is not only to perform
testing, but also to help minimize the risk of product failure. Testers in the testing
team do not look only for obvious errors in the product, but also try to find potential
problems and the absence of problems [26]. They examine and report the quality of
the product based on specific criteria, so that a release decision about the software
can be made.
1.5 Testing Problem for Safety-Critical Systems
In safety-critical systems, we are concerned with the desired behavior as much
as the undesired behavior. The undesired behavior may cause injuries or loss of life
to people, or property damage. Therefore, it is essential to lower the probability
of the occurrence of the hazards as well as its severity by implementing mitigation
actions for the system. Thus, we need to:
• generate behavioral test to test the behavior of the system,
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• generate failures at appropriate points ex. by injecting events into the system
model or by manipulating the sensor values, and




Figure 1.1: Overall Approach
From the test process shown in Figure 1.1, we need to know:
• What behavior (b) the model describes,
• with which failures (f ) are we testing, including multiple criteria and priorities,
• at what point (p) in the behavior, and
• with which mitigation model (m).
To overcome the safety-critical system testing problems such as the gap (between
the desired and the undesired behaviors) introduced by the separation of models,
we need to integrate these models such that they can be used for testing as well as
having testing criteria for the this integrated model.
1.6 Model Based Testing (MBT)
Model-based testing (MBT) [31] is common for functional testing. Models pro-
vide a functional view of the system that can be used to produce test cases without
using the actual system implementation details because it is very difficult to cover
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all code structures especially for complex dependable systems [140]. MBT focuses
on testing the functional or the expected behavior (also known as desired behav-
ior). Models commonly used in this context include the Unified Modeling Language
(UML) [125], Finite State Machines (FSM), Extended Finite State Machines (EF-
SMs), and Communicating Extended Finite State Machines (CEFSMs). Each type
of model has its own characteristics that makes it more suitable for one kind of
behavior than for others. For example, CEFSMs are better in modeling commu-
nication between processes than FSMs because CEFSMs have the capabilities to
handle the communication part whereas FSMs do not.
MBT is intended for testing the desired behavior that the model describes. How-
ever, safety is not described by the system models and therefore, it has to be analyzed
separately by one of the safety analysis techniques. The output of this analysis can
then be used for safety testing. To analyze safety, different models, known as fault
models, which describe the undesired behavior, are used. These models are differ-
ent from the models that describe the desired behavior. Although the output of
safety analysis techniques is used for testing, the separation of these models hinders
achieving adequate safety testing since the output of the analysis tells what events
contribute to the occurrence of the hazard but does not tell how and when the haz-
ard would occur during the system execution. That is due to the fact that these
two activities are conducted separately on different models for different goals.
This leads to the idea of model integration. The idea of model integration is to
combine fault models with behavioral models in order to know not only what causes
hazards in the system, but also when and how these hazards occur during system
execution. In this dissertation, we will use CEFSM for model integration due to
its capabilities such as the flatness of the model and the explicit interaction power.
CEFSM has also been extensively used in modeling communicating and embedded
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systems. We propose transformation rules to transform fault trees gate by gate
into their equivalent CEFSMs. Then we integrate the CEFSM form of the fault
tree with behavioral models according to transformation rules. The output of the
integration process is an integrated model. The behavioral model and fault model
can be thought of as communicating processes where the fault process will receive
events from the behavioral process that may contribute directly to a hazard. The
integrated model can be used for safety analysis, safety testing, and testing proper
mitigation. The complexity, scalability, effectiveness, and efficiency of the proposed
approach are investigated.
1.7 Research Questions
• RQ1: Can we combine behavior models with fault models to be used for
testing software safety?
• RQ2: How can we overcome the limitations such as scalability and complexity
that the other approaches introduced?
• RQ3: Can we overcome the limitation of compatibility between the behavior
and fault model and how?
• RQ4: Can we create test cases that target hazards from the integrated model?
• RQ5: Can the integrated model be used for safety analysis as well?
• RQ6: Can we define test criteria that are suitable for the integrated model
and target safety?
• RQ7: Can the approach be used within an end-to-end testing methodology?
• RQ8: Can we generalize the integration approach so that it fits other BM
and FM?
• RQ9: Can we validate the approach?
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• RQ10: Can the approach be applied to all types of safety critical systems?
• RQ11: Can we use this approach with tool support?
The rest of this document is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a back-
ground overview of hazard analysis, hazard testing, Safety-Critical System Lifecycle
(SCSL), MBT, and model integration. Our approach which includes fault model
transformation and integration rules is described in chapter 3. Chapter 4 validates
the approach. It investigates scalability and applicability. It also provides a case
study that shows using the approach as part of an end-to-end testing methodology.
Chapter 5 discusses other uses of the integrated model using CADP. We conclude
in Chapter 6. Finally, chapter 7 explores the future work.
1.8 Contribution to Team Project
This dissertation is a part of a large project to test a proper failure mitigation
and security. This project consists of the following:
• A (Ahmed Gario): This part of the project is this dissertation. It focuses
on generating failures by integrating fault trees and the behavioral model
according to a set of transformation and integration rules.
• B (Salwa Elakeili): This part of the project concentrates on testing the proper
mitigation of safety-critical system.
• C (Seana Hagerman): This part uses the attack tree to test security of the
proper mitigation.
• D (Mahmoud Abdelgawad): This portion emphasizes on testing autonomous
system.
9
• E: This part of the project interested in generating fail-safe tests for Web
application.
Figure 1.2 illustrates how these parts of the overall large project are related, and









   
   
   





































































































































































































































































































































































































































This chapter provides an overview of the Safety-Critical System Lifecycle (SCSL),
hazard analysis techniques, and model based testing. Section 2.1 explains the safety-
critical lifecycle according to [IEC 61508] and explains its phases. The most common
hazard analysis techniques such as FTA, PHA, FMEA, FMECA, HAZOP, ETA,
CED, and FHA are explained in section 2.2. Section 2.3 elucidates model based
testing techniques. The combined fault and behavioral models are discussed and
illustrated with an example in section 2.4. The limitations of these approaches are
explained in section 2.4.1.
2.1 Safety-Critical System Lifecycle (SCSL)
“Safety lifecycle models are considered to form an adequate framework to iden-
tify, allocate, structure, and control safety-related requirements” [IEC 61508]. This
model is standardized in IEC 61508 to cover the complete safety lifecycle. It consists
of sixteen phases as can be seen in Figure 2.1.
1. Concept.
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Overall installation & commissioning 12 
Safety requirements allocation 5 
Overall safety requirements 4 
Hazard and risk analysis 3 



















Overall modification & 
retrofit 
15 
Decommissioning or disposal 16 
Overall operation, maintenance & repair 14 
Overall safety validation 13 
Figure 2.1: Overall Safety Lifecycle[IEC 61508]
3. Hazard and risk analysis.
4. Overall safety requirements.
5. Safety requirements allocation.
6. Overall planning: overall operations and maintenance planning.
7. Overall planning: overall safety validation planning.
8. Overall planning: overall installation and commissioning planning.
9. Safety-related systems (SRSs): Realization of Electrical, Electronic and Pro-
grammable Electronic systems (E/E/PE) SRSs.
10. Safety-related systems (SRSs): Realization of “other technology” SRSs.
11. Safety-related systems (SRSs): Realization of “external risk reduction facili-
ties”.
12. Overall installation and commissioning.
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13. Overall safety validation.
14. Overall operation, maintenance and repair.
15. Overall modification and retrofit.
16. Decommissioning or disposal.
The safety lifecycle model is divided into three parts each of which contain some
phases that address safety related issues. The first state contains the phases from
phase 1 to phase 5, the second part contains the phase from phase 6 to phase 11 and
the last part contains phases from 12 to 16. Every part is concerned with a step in
the development of the safety related system lifecycle.
The first part of the lifecycle, phases 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, concerns the risk analysis
during which the potential hazardous situations are determined, their impact and
consequences are established and the probability of occurrence estimated. Conse-
quently, the need for additional risk reduction measures is determined and the safety
requirements are specified and allocated to safety related systems.
The second part of the lifecycle, phases 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, concern the techni-
cal specification, development and implementation of the safety-related systems. As
can be seen from the overall safety lifecycle model, phases 6, 7 and 8 are concerned
with the overall planning. Their position emphasizes the importance of their overall
status, even though in the standard they are defined as applying only to Electri-
cal/Electronic/Programmable Electronic (E/E/PE) systems. Phases 9, 10 and 11
are concerned with the realization of the SRS, which may take the form of E/E/PE
systems, other technology systems, or external facilities.
The third part, phases 12 to 16 concern the utilization of the SRS. During this
part, requirements are defined concerning commissioning, operation, maintenance,
periodic tests, eventual modifications and decommissioning of the SRS. These phases
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demonstrate that the standard is not restricted to the development of systems,
but that it covers the management of functional safety throughout a system’s life.
Many of the standard’s requirements are indeed technical, but it is effective safety
management rather than merely technical activities which in the long run must be
relied on for the achievement of safe systems. Parts 2 and 3 of the standard address
hardware and software development respectively for E/E/PE systems.
2.2 Hazard Analysis Techniques
The Hazard Analysis falls into the first part of the SCSL lifecycle. This part, at
the early stages of the life-cycle, deals with the analysis of the hazards so that they
can be considered in the coming stages. In this phase, preliminary Hazards and
Operability (HAZOP) analysis [83] is performed along with Layers of Protection
Analysis (LOPA) [130] and Criticality Analysis to know what the kinds of hazards
are, how severe they would be, and how likely they may occur. This analysis allows
for better understanding of the hazards to take the required actions in consideration
in the coming stages of the lifecycle [43]. Table 2.1 contains the most common
hazard analysis techniques, where they can be used in the development life-cycle,
and whether they are quantitative or qualitative techniques. A complete list of these
techniques can be found in [43].
• Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) [143] is a safety analysis technique that is com-
monly used to analyze the safety of systems that are under development or are
existing systems. It was originally designed by Bell Telephone Laboratories in
1962 for the US Air Force as a technique for the safety analysis of electrome-

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































a top-down safety analysis technique in which an undesired state of a system
is analyzed using logical operations to combine a series of lower-level events.
A FT is composed of nodes, edges, and gates. Gates are logical connectors
of events, while nodes represent events, and edges connect nodes to gates.
When FT is used to model faults, every major hazard is represented by a
separate fault tree.
Table 2.2: Fault Tree Gate Types [143, 40]
Symbol Gate Meaning
∧ AND The gate occurs only when all its in-
puts occur.
Z PRIORTY AND The gate occurs only when all its in-
puts occur in a specified order.
∨ OR The gate occurs when at least one of
its inputs occurs.
7 INHIBIT The gate occurs only when the input
occurs and the enabling condition is
true.
⊕ XOR The gate occurs only when the XOR
of the inputs is true.
Single event gate TIMING GATES These gates occur only when an event
occurs and the time-out is triggered.
Table 2.2 lists the gate types we consider here. A fault tree provides qual-
itative and quantitative measures of the likelihood of the occurrence of haz-
ards [143]. Quantitative analysis is done by computing the probability of the
occurrence of the root node from the probabilities of the lower level nodes,
while Qualitative analysis shows the set of events that, if happen together,
contribute to cause the hazard. Qualitative analysis is applicable when inte-
grating faults into the system model because the analysis is performed on the
18
actual occurrence of the set of possible faults rather than on their probability
of occurrence.
Kaiser et al. [77, 75] propose a compositional extension of the FTA tech-
nique. Each technical component in the system is represented by an extended
Fault Tree that has, besides its basic events and gates, input and output ports.
These components can be developed independently and can be integrated into
a higher-level model by connecting these ports. Both qualitative and quanti-
tative analysis can be applied on this FTA.
FTA [143] describes how the combination of behaviors of system compo-
nents result in a hazard or a failure of a system. Although it is one of the
most used techniques, it may not be suitable for software safety analysis be-
cause it is a static model that describes the overall cause of a hazard and
cannot answer the questions why, when, and how the hazard occurs during
the software execution. However, some work has been done to use FTA in
testing safety-critical software. Miguel et al. [32] incorporate safety require-
ments in software architecture based on safety objectives, and evaluate these
software architectures based on safety analysis methods such as FTA. The re-
sults of this incorporation are used to evaluate the architectures and to detect
inconsistencies of software architectures and safety requirements.
Chen et al. [28] used FTA to evaluate the reliability of the railway power
systems and investigates the impact of the maintenance in the reliability. A
binary decision diagram (BDD) algorithm is used to evaluate the FT. Sun
et al. [131] integrated FTA with Architecture Analysis and Design Language
(AADL) to support the consistent reuse of FTA across the systems to re-
duce the effort of maintaining traceability between the safety analysis and the
architectural models. Others such as Tracey et al. [136] integrate safety anal-
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ysis with the automatic test-data generation to be used for software safety
verification.
• Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
It is a comprehensive, structured, and logical technique for identifying
and evaluating risk in complex technological systems that produces detailed
identification and assessment of accident scenarios [58]. PHA is an activity
that takes place while developing the system design to identify software-related
hazards. Therefore, these hazards or its consequences can then be removed
[43].
PHA helps ensure that the system is safe and makes the system modifi-
cations less expensive and easier to implement in the earlier stages of design.
Moreover, it decreases design time by reducing the number of surprises and
unexpected outcomes. On the other hand, in PHA hazards must be foreseen
by the analysts so they can deal with them. However, foreseeing hazards may
not be an easy task since the effects of interactions between hazards are not
easily recognized.
• Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
FMEA is a fault analysis technique that aims to identify hazards in require-
ments that have a potential failure [123, 56]. It is a bottom-up technique that
can be applied during the analysis and design phases. It is used to identify
critical functions based on the applicable specification. The severity and the
likelihood of a mishap will be used to define the criticality level of the function
and thus it will be considered more deeply in a later criticality analysis [114].
Processing FMEA manually can be an error-pron, costly, and hard to repeat
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process. To avoid these drawbacks, Hecht et al. in [66] automate the major
steps in generating a software FMEA.
The FMEA technique has the capability to identify and eliminate potential
failure modes early and thus reduces the cost associated with late changes. It
also reduces the possibility of the occurrence of the same failure in the future.
On the other hand, this technique may only identify major failure modes in a
system and is limited by the analyst’s experience of previous failures.
• Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
FMECA extends FMEA by including a criticality analysis. It charts the
probability of failure modes against the severity of their consequences. The
FMECA process should be initiated as a part of the early design process and
should be updated to reflect design changes as FMECA is a major consider-
ation at Design Review [146]. Due to the nature of the design process, the
FMECA must also be iterative. The purpose of a FMECA is to provide a
systematic, critical examination of potential failure modes and their causes,
assess the safety of systems or components, analyze the effect of each failure
mode, and identify corrective action. It has been used in analyzing safety
in safety-critical systems with software systems in the aerospace [23, 11] and
automobile domains[19].
FMECA is a systematic comprehensive technique that establishes rela-
tionships between failure causes and effects. It has the ability to point out
individual failure modes for corrective action in design. However, due to its
comprehensiveness, a large number of trivial cases will be considered which
requires extensive work. FMECA is unable to deal with multiple-failure sce-
narios or unplanned cross-system effects such as sneak circuits (conditions
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which are present but not always active, and they do not depend on compo-
nent failure [69]).
• HAZard and OPerability (HAZOP)
HAZOP is an analysis technique that assumes the deviations from the
design or operating intentions cause accidents. Therefore, it puts in consid-
eration all possible ways that the hazards or operating problems may arise if
the system is operated under a different mode than the intended operating
conditions. The concept of a HAZOP study first appeared with the aim of
identifying possible hazards present in facilities that manage highly hazardous
materials [83]. The purpose was to eliminate any cause of major accidents,
such as toxic releases, explosions, and fires. Because of its success in iden-
tifying hazards and operational problems, HAZOP’s application extended to
other types of facilities. Therefore, it was adopted for computer-based systems
such as medical diagnostic systems [30, 39] and in railway systems [116, 73].
• Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
ETA is a technique used to explore responses to an initiating event and
enables assessment of the probabilities of outcomes [9]. It is a bottom-up ap-
proach used to define potential accident sequences associated with a particular
event or set of events. It was first applied in risk assessments for the nuclear
industry and then later was adapted by others such as chemical processing,
offshore oil and gas production, transportation, and safety critical software.
The Event-Tree can be used as a quantitative and qualitative analysis tech-
nique. Quantification of the event-tree diagram allows the frequency of each
of the outcomes to be predicted.
22
ETA is structural, rigorous and, a large portion of it can be computer-
ized. It models complex systems relationship in an understandable manner
and can be performed on many levels of design detail. Moreover, it com-
bines hardware, software, environment, and human interaction and it permits
probability assessment. On the other hand, ETA can not distinguish between
partial successes and failures. It also requires an analyst with some training
and practical experience and can only have one initiating event. In addition,
when modeling an event, subtle system dependencies can be overlooked.
• Cause and Effect Diagrams (CED)
CED [81], also known as Ishikawa Analysis, is a quantitative analysis that
graphically represents the relationships between a problem and its possible
causes. The advantage of this analysis technique is that it is very simple,
visual and easy to understand by the analysts. The drawbacks of CEDs are:
(1) there is a lack of distinction between necessary conditions and sufficient
conditions and (2) not all the logical possibilities of the occurrence of the causes
are taken into account [59]. The cause in this analysis technique is broken
down into other causes and these can also be broken down into other causes.
Therefore, it is difficult to understand what the word ’cause’ exactly means.
Does it mean a necessary condition, a sufficient condition, or a necessary and
sufficient condition [42].
• Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA)
FHA is defined as one of the preliminary activities in the safety assessment
process [149]. It is a quantitative analysis technique for identifying all the
hazards that can affect the outcome of the principal functional activities that
need to be carried out to accomplish a given task [149]. The purpose of
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FHA is to identify system hazards by the analysis of functions. Functions
are the means by which a system operates to accomplish its tasks. System
hazards are identified by evaluating the safety effects of a function failing to
operate, operating incorrectly, or operating at the wrong time. They may
consist of a loss of critical function, inadvertent activation of the function,
outside influences on the performance of the function, or some combination of
them. When a failure of a function is determined, the cause factor should be
investigated in more detail.
The advantages of this technique are: (1) this technique works best for
functions that are entirely independent; (2) it helps to better understand the
effect of a failure. The drawbacks of FHA are: (1) It is hard to identify
functions at the right level of abstraction from the available requirements, (2)
determining the effect of function failure of lower level function can be difficult,
and (3) it is hard to apply FHA for dependent functions.
There are many safety analysis techniques that have been in use for many years.
These techniques are used during the development stage of the system lifecycle.
Some of these techniques are used at the system level to analyze the system haz-
ards, while others are used at the subsystem levels to define the hazards related
to components and their interaction. The results of hazard identification help the
designers and the developers eliminate and mitigate these hazards.
2.3 Model Based Testing (MBT)
Model-based Testing uses behavioral models of the software produced from the
functional requirements to carry out the software testing activity. FSM, UML,
EFSM, and CEFSM are common modeling techniques used in modeling software
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systems. They have been used for testing activities such as test case generation as
well. Many coverage criteria such as edge, node, edge-pair, prime path, and W-
method were imposed on one or more of these models and each of these criteria
satisfies one or more test requirements. Table 2.3 shows the models and the types of
systems for which they were used. The rows contain the modeling techniques such
as UML activity diagram, UML statechart diagram, and FSM, while the columns
consist of some types of the systems such as non-embedded, embedded, automotive,
and aerospace.
Table 2.3: Model Based Testing
Model Not embedded Embedded Automotive Aerospace
UML
Activity [27] [94]
Statechart [109, 110, 21] [103, 96,
147]
collaboration [2]
Sequence [25] [128, 92,
104]
class [122]
use case [133, 102]
















2.3.1 Unified Modeling Language (UML)
UML [125] is the de facto standard language for specifying, modeling, analyzing,
and documenting software [117]. It is also used in modeling hardware, in business
contexts as well as in modeling systems. Its graphical notations makes it easier to
express and understand the design of software systems. It has also been used in
testing system implementations against their design artifact [22, 21, 55, 87], or used
to test the design of the system itself [57, 120, 36, 121]. In this section, we will
discuss the work used UML in testing.
The Statechart diagram is one of the UML diagrams that is expressive, repre-
sentative, and easy to use by the modeler. It consists of States which allow for
hierarchy to support the scalability of the representation. Thus states can contain
other states which can be represented as AND, or OR states. This means that a
state can have an orthogonal decomposition, OR decomposition, or have no child
states. In addition to States, a statechart contains Events that represent the oc-
currence of happenings that may trigger a Transition which shows what the next
state will be. Parameters of an event are global variables that can be used to con-
vey quantitative information regarding that occurrence and can be used by Guard
conditions to enable actions or transitions only when they evaluate to true. Figure
2.2 shows a small example of a statechart that contains two states, (Start and Par-
tialDail), an event (digit), a parameter (n), a transition is the arrow between the
states, and a guard ([Number.isValid()]).
UML statechart diagram has been used for testing the system as a whole or as
components or functions for non-embedded as well as embedded software systems.
Offutt et al. in [109] present a technique to generate test cases from UML stat-
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Figure 2.2: Statechart Example
criteria presented in [108]. Offutt et al. in [110] present general criteria for gen-
erating test inputs from the state-based specifications proposed in [109] which are
transition coverage criterion, full predicate coverage criterion, transition-pair cov-
erage criterion and complete sequence criterion. It is possible to apply all these
criteria or to choose any one of them based on a cost/benefit tradeoff.
Many statechart based testing strategies require flattening the statechart to spec-
ify a set of paths to be executed. These techniques can be automated. From the
flattened statechart, we can take each path and produce a test case. Briand et al.
[21] propose a methodology to automate the procedure of generating test case from
a statechart using coverage criteria such as all transitions, all transition pairs, full
predicate, and all round-trip paths. This methodology assumes that a test case to
be in the form of a feasible sequence of transitions. The procedure is to take each
test path separately and derive test data. This requires identifying the system state
involved for each event/transition that is part of the path to be tested and the input
parameter values for all events and actions associated with the transitions. They
introduce a number of algorithms to generate test constraints automatically.
Leftcaru et al. [89] use genetic algorithms (GA) to generate test data for chosen
paths in the state machine, so that the input parameters provided to the methods
trigger the specified transitions. The GA searches for the input parameters which
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satisfy the specified requirements. After this technique obtains some paths according
to some coverage criteria, it then finds, for each path, the input parameter values
that trigger the methods in that path. Murthy et al. [103] introduce Test-Ready
UML statechart models to be used for testing. This model is obtained by annotating
the statechart model with events, guards, conditions, tasks and test statements
along the transitions. They also made the test generation automatic from a UML
statechart by identifying the required annotations for the UML statecharts. The
test path generation algorithm they used is based on depth-first traversal of the
model.
Lochau et al. [96] generate test cases that aim at feature interaction analysis
by using a UML statechart diagram. In order to automatically generate test cases,
they defined the components’ dynamic behavior via UML statecharts, specified the
interactions amongst these components, and annotated the test requirements. Test
cases are then derived from these annotated statecharts. Weibleder et al. [147]
compare several approaches for generating test cases from a UML statechart based
on a set of quality goals or metrics that are used to determine when to stop testing,
instead of testing until the available resources are exhausted.
The Activity diagram is another UML diagram. It describes dynamic aspects of
the system. It is a flow chart that represents the flow from one activity to another.
It consists of four basic elements: (1) rounded rectangles represent Actions that are
part of an activity diagram, (2) a black circle represents the start initial state of the
workflow, (3) diamonds represent decisions, (4) bars represent the start split or end
join of concurrent activities, and an encircled black circle represents the end final
state. Figure 2.3 illustrates a simple example of an activity diagram. The UML
activity diagram has also been used as a testing model. The work of Linzhang et
al. [94] generates test cases directly from a UML activity diagram using a gray-box
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Figure 2.3: Activity Diagram Example
method. A gray-box method is a combination of white-box and Black-box methods.
A Gray-box method generates test cases by parsing the activity diagram to derive
the set of test scenarios that satisfies the path coverage criteria by applying depth
first search on the activity diagram. Input and output parameters are then extracted
from each test scenario. Test cases are then obtained from the input and output
sequences, guards and constrains.
Mingsong et al. [27] also used UML activity diagrams as design specifications
to generate test cases. The approach randomly generates numerous test cases for a
program under test. Then, they execute the program with the generated test cases
to obtain the corresponding outputs. After that, they compare these outputs with
the given activity diagram according to the specific coverage criteria to obtain a
reduced test case set that meets the test adequacy criteria.
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Collaboration diagrams describe a collection of objects that interact to imple-
ment some behavior within the context of the system. They illustrate the rules of the
objects in a system and how they communicate to perform a specific task according
to a use case. The basic elements of collaboration are ClassifierRoles which describe
how objects behave, AssociationRoles that describe how an association will behave
in a particular situation, and Interactions which represent operations/methods that
the receiving object’s class implements. A message defines a particular communica-
tion between instances that is specified in an interaction. Messages in a collaboration
diagram are numbered in the order of the execution.
Collaboration diagrams were used in testing by Abdurazik et al. [2] with test
criteria. Test cases are generated from the collaboration diagrams according to
these criteria. Each collaboration diagram represents a sequence of messages that
corresponds to a use case. These criteria allow formal integration tests to be based
on high level design notations.
Sequence diagrams model the cooperation of objects relying on a time sequence.
They are known as event diagrams, event scenarios, or timing diagrams [1, 46]. They
show how objects interact with one another in a particular scenario of a use case.
Sequence diagrams capture the invocation and the occurrence order of methods
from each object. A sequence diagram consists of: (1) Object which is the a pri-
mary element involved in the diagram and represented by a rectangle, (2) Message
is the interactions between different objects in a sequence diagram and. A message
is denoted by a directed arrow and the notation differs depending on the message
type. A complete arrow is used for check and assignment statements, identifying
the nature of the operation as a comment, while a normal arrow is used instead for
the activation of an operation.
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Cartaxo et al. [25] generate test cases from UML sequence diagrams based on
the derivation of Labeled Transition System (LTS). The LTS [80] provides a global
monolithic description of the set of all possible behaviors of the system. A path on
the LTS can be taken as a test sequence. The Depth First Search technique (DFS) is
used to obtain a path by traversing an LTS starting from the initial state. They use
state and transition coverage criteria to generate test cases. The transformation from
UML sequence diagram to LTS is done by Unified Modeling Language All pUrposes
Transformer (UMLAUT) tool and the test case generation by Test Generation with
Verification technology (TGV) tool. The procedure is targeted to feature testing of
mobile phone applications whose requirements are specified by sequence diagrams,
including loops and alternative flows.
Sarma et al. [128] introduce a method of generating test cases from a UML
sequence diagram by transforming a UML sequence diagram into a graph called
the Sequence Diagram Graph (SDG). Each node in the SDG stores information
necessary for test case generation. This information is collected from the use case
template, class diagrams, and data dictionary represented in the form of object
constrained language (OCL), that ware associated with the use case for which the
sequence diagram is considered. The SDG is traversed and test cases are gener-
ated using all message path sequence coverage criteria. They generate test cases
that satisfy the criteria by first enumerate all possible paths from the initial node
to the final node in the SDG. Each path then would be visited to generate test cases.
Bao-Lin et al. [92] introduce a test cases generation approach which relies on
UML sequence diagrams and Object Constraint Language (OCL). They represent
sequence diagrams as tree by constructing a scenario tree (ST), and obtain the
scenario path from ST. Then, they use the message path coverage and constraint
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attribute coverage to generate test cases. They iteratively select all messages from
SD and use OCL to describe the pre and post conditions.
Nayak et al. [104] introduce an approach of synthesizing test data from the in-
formation embedded in model elements like class diagrams, sequence diagrams and
OCL constraints. They develop a sequence diagram with attribute and constraint
information derived from the class diagram and OCL constraints and map it onto a
Structured Composite Graph (SCG). Test paths are then generated from SCG using
all message criteria. They generate test data for each test path by following a con-
straint solving system. The proposed approach assume that initially all test paths
are feasible unless it cannot be exercised by any set of input data and then the path
becomes infeasible. Many works have used more than one UML diagram for testing
as well. Bertolino et al. in [14] develop a framework for test derivation and execu-
tion in a component-based development environment by integrating some existing
tools and methodologies. The UML components methodology is used to define the
diagrams necessary to apply the Cow Suite tool (Cow Suite is a UML-based test
environment for test-suite planning and derivation). Then the tests are composed
and executed within the Component Deployment Testing CDT framework.
Many UML diagrams such as interaction diagrams, statechart diagrams, and
component diagrams, have been used to characterize the behavior of components in
various aspects, so that they can be used to test component-based systems. Bertolino
et al. [13] combines sequence and state diagrams in order to produce a more infor-
mative testing model. The resulting model is used to identify more accurate test
cases. In case that the sequence model is conformant with the state model, the state
model will be used as a reference model in order to generate further test cases. This
work is meant to improve the work proposed in [14]. Their goal is produce from
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the incomplete diagrams a more complete model to extract test cases from without
requiring extra modeling effort.
Zoughbi et al. [153] propose an UML profile to improve the communication
between safety engineers and software engineers. A UML profile will allow software
engineers to model safety related concepts and properties in UML. Safety-related
concepts are extracted from RTCA DO-178B (the airworthiness standard is the
software standard for commercial and military aerospace programs). Then, the UML
profile is presented to enable modeling these safety-related concepts. Supakkul et
al.[132], Mayer et al. [102], and Donini et al. [37] propose different approaches to
generate test cases from UML sequence and activity diagrams by first transforming
these diagrams into a graph, generating test scenarios from the constructed graph
and then extracting the necessary information for test case generation.
Swain et al. [133] integrate UML sequence and activity diagrams to generate
test cases. This is done by transforming these UML diagrams into a graph. An
algorithm to generate test scenarios from the constructed graph is then applied.
Next, the necessary information for test case generation, such as method-activity
sequence, associated objects, and constraints and conditions are extracted from the
test scenario. This approach is meant to reduce the number of test cases while
achieving adequate test coverage. Wu et al. in [150] defines some UML-based test
adequacy criteria that can be used to test component based software.
Hartmann et al. in [64] models components with their interactions and derived
test cases are from these component models and then execute them to verify their
conformant behavior. Prasanna et al. in [122] derive test cases by analyzing the
dynamic behavior of the object diagrams (a detailed state of the system at a point
of time) taken from the UML model of the system. This diagram is mapped to a
tree. Genetic algorithm’s crossover technique is then applied to this tree to generate
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a new generation of trees. Each tree is then converted into a binary tree and a depth
first search technique is applied on these binary trees to produce test cases.
UML techniques have also been used in testing automotive and aerospace sys-
tems. Flamini et al. in [45] present a methodology to automatically perform an
’abstract testing’ of a large control systems. The abstract testing can be defined
as a configuration-independent and auto-instantiating approach for large computer-
based control systems. It is specified from system functional requirements and covers
many system configurations. It can be instantiated to cover any number of control
entities (sensors, actuators and logic processes). The configuration of the system is
used as an input to the transformation algorithm from abstract to specific tests that
are suitable for this configuration. The algorithm executes the test cases one by until
a failure is found or the test suite is set is empty. This approach saves a considerable
time effort required for this process when it is performed by hand. In the same field
Nicola et al. in [106] describe the Ansaldo Segnalamento Ferroviario (ASF) func-
tional testing methodology, based on a grey-box approach to generate and reduce
an extensive set of influence variables and test-cases. An influence variables is a
variable that effects the behavior of the system under test.
2.3.2 Finite State Machine (FSM)
FSM has a long and rich history as a modeling and testing language [4]. It
has been used for testing activities such as test case generation [4]. Many coverage
criteria such as edge, node, edge-pair, prime path, and W-method were imposed on
the FSM model and each of these criteria satisfies one or more test requirements. A
FSM is defined as: [88]
M is a quintuple M =(I, O, S, σ, λ) where
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• I is a finite and nonempty set of input symbols,
• O is a finite and nonempty set of output symbols,
• S is a set of states,
• δ: S× I → S is the state transition function, and
• λ: S× I → O is the output function.
When the machine is in a current state s ∈ S and receives an input i ∈ I it
moves to next state specified by δ(s, i) and produces an output given by λ(s, o
where o ∈ O.
Chow [29] proposed a testing strategy known as “automata theory” or “W-
method”. It verifies the correctness of control structures that can be modeled by
FSM. This strategy showed that it can find transition errors, state errors, and op-
eration errors. Therefore, it can be applied to software testing and the test results
derived from the design are evaluated against the specification. Fujiwara et al. [48]
presented a new method called partial W-method (Wp). This method is a variation
of that proposed in [29] that provides shorter test sequences than the W-method.
Luo et al. [98] studied the issue of test selection for open distributed processing
with several distributed interfaces that was modeled in FSM. They also developed
a test generation method to generate test sequences based on the idea of synchro-
nizable test sequences. Tsai et al. [138] presented an approach to automatically
generate test cases for an object oriented class. These test cases are generated
based on the test case tree which is built based on an implementation state machine
which in turn is built up from the design state machine and the implemented class.
Friedman et al. [47] generate tests based on FSM models of a specification.
They describe a set of coverage criteria and testing constraints that compromise
between state and transition coverage criteria, and input domain coverage criteria.
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The transition and state coverage often lead to large suite of test cases while the
input domain requires big engineering efforts.
2.3.3 Extended Finite State Machine (EFSM)
EFSM is an extension of the original FSM. The expressiveness power of EFSM
makes it capable of modeling system specification that include variables and oper-
ations based on variable values. In an FSM, the transition is associated with a set
of inputs and a set of output functions, whereas in an EFSM model, the transition
will be fired if the predicate conditions are all satisfied, moving the machine from
the current state to the next state and performing the specified data operations.
An EFSM is 5-tuple = (S, I, O, T, V), such that:
• S is a finite set of states,
• I is a set of inputs symbols,
• O is a set of output symbols,
• T is a set of transitions,
• V is a set of variables, and
State changes: The transition t in the set T is a 6-tuple:
t = T(st, śt, it, ot, Pt, At) where,
• st is the current state,
• śt is the next state,
• it is the input,
• ot is the output,
• Pt(~v) is predicates on the current variable values, and
• At(~v) is the action on variable values.
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EFSM has also been used for software testing. Tahat et al. in [134] automatically
generates a system model from the requirement information. This model is then
used to automatically generate test cases related to individual requirements. This
approach is extended to generate regression tests that are related to the requirement
changes. Derderian et al. in [34] use a genetic algorithm to create an input sequence
that triggers a given path within an EFSM. Fantinato et al. in [44] extend the FSMs
to provide data flow modeling mechanisms to be used as a basis to define a set of
functional testing criteria.
Kalaji et al. [78] developed an approach to optimize the testing from EFSM.
The aim of this approach is to overcome the path feasibility and path test data
generation problems. A path is said to be infeasible if there is no input data that
can trigger such path. This is due to the fact that the transition in a EFSM model
includes predicates and operations that there does not exist data can trigger such
path. However, finding such a set of input data for the feasible path is difficult task
since the input domain is usually large and the required values is a small subset of
this domain. A fitness metric is used to estimate the likelihood of the feasibility
of a given path. EFSM transitions and their input parameters can be considered
as functions and their input parameters. The fitness function is used to guide the
search for a suitable set of inputs.
Guglielmo et al. in [61] use the extended finite state machine (EFSM) model
to generate test sequences. The same author et al. in [62] propose a functional
deterministic automatic test pattern generation (ATPG) approach that uses EFSMs
for functional verification.
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2.3.4 Communicating Extended Finite State Machine
(CEFSM)
CEFSM is an extended type of the traditional EFSM that provides data flow
modeling and communications channels. CEFSM F is a tuple 〈EF ,CF 〉, where EF
is an EFSM and CF is a set of input/output communication channels used in this
CEFSM. CEFSM has been used in modeling and testing distributed systems and
network protocols. The strength of CEFSM is that it can model orthogonal states
of a system in a flat manner and does not need to compose the whole system in
one state as in statecharts. which would makes them more complicated and harder
to analyze and/or test. Communicating EFSMs can be defined as a finite set of
consistent and completely specified EFSMs along with two disjoint sets of input and
output messages[88]:
CEFSM = (S, s0, E, P, T, M, V, A, C), such that:
• S is a finite set of states,
• s0 is the initial state,
• E is a set of events,
• P is a set of boolean predicates,
• T is a set of transition functions such that T: S×P×E→S× A×M,
• M is a set of communicating messages,
• V is a set of variables,
• A is the set of actions, and
• C is the set of input/output communication channels used in this CEFSM.
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State changes (action language): The function T returns a next state, a set of
output signals, and action list for each combination of a current state, an input
signal, and a predicate. It is defined as:
T(si, pi, get(mi))/(sj, A, send(mj1,..., mjk)) where,
• si is the current state,
• sj is the next state,
• pi is the predicate that must be true in order to execute the transition,
• ei is the event that when combined with a predicate trigger the transition
function,
• mi1,..., mik are the messages, and
The communicating message mi is defined as:
(mId, ej, mDestination) where,
• mId is the message identifier, and
• mDestination is the CEFSM the message is sent to.
An event ei is defined as: (eId, eOccurrence, eStatus) where,
• eId is the event identifier that uniquely identifies it, and
• eOccurrence is set to false as long as the event has not occurred for the first
time and to true otherwise, and
• eStatus is set to true when the event occurs and to false when it no longer
applies. Note that eStatus allows reoccurring events to happen multiple times
(loops in the model).
CEFSMs communicate by exchanging messages through communication chan-
nels C that connect the outputs of one CEFSM to the input to other CEFSMs. Let
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C denote the set {〈name, SYNC|ASYNC〉| for all the channels in the system} where
name is the name of the communication channel and SYNC and ASYNC indicate
that the channel is synchronous or asynchronous. A same communication channel
can be used differently according to different transitions. A channel c ∈ C can be
represented as 〈name, t, get()/send()〉 where,
• name is the name of the channel,
• t ∈ T refers to the transition linked to this use of the channel, and
• get()/send() indicates whether this channel is an input or an output channel.
The action ai may include an assignment and mathematical operations on the
variables. The predicate is a condition that must be met prior to the execution
of the function. For example, T(S0, e0, total = 4)/(S1, {m0, m1}, (total = 0;
increment(i))) describes that if a CEFSM is in a state S0 receives an event e0 and
the value of variable total, which is the predicate, is four at that time, it will move
to the next state S1 and outputs m0 and m1 after setting the total to zero and
performing increment(i). For full formal semantics see [20].
2.3.4.1 Test Case Generation from CEFSM model
CEFSM-based test generation methodology proposed by Li et al. in [93] uses
FSMs to model behavior and events. The extension of events with variables is used
to model data while the events’ interaction channels are used to model commu-
nication. The tests are generated based on a combination of behavior, data, and
communication specifications. This method addresses branching coverage for data-
related decision coverage and behavioral transition coverage. It applies priority and
dominator analysis to generate efficient test cases to increase the branching cover-
age as much as possible with as few tests as possible. During the generation of test
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cases, the priority of each branch is calculated by sorting them in decreasing order
of additional branching coverage, while a dominator means that a node A is said to
be a dominator of a node B if covering of B implies the covering of A. A branch can
be a data-related decision or an event alternative, i.e., each branch is defined as a
unique transition from a state to another state.
Hessel et al. [68] present an algorithm for generating test suites that cover all
feasible coverage criteria. The algorithm is inspired by reachability analysis. The
algorithm, at any given point, uses the information about the total coverage of
the currently generated state space to avoid unnecessary state space exploration
and to improve the performance of the algorithm. Derderian et al. [33] outlined
the problem of observing local transitions of individual CEFSMs within a global
transition (the interconnected transitions within the set of CEFSMs) using genetic
algorithms without the use of a product machine. A product machine is a FSM that
results from converting a set of CEFSMs.
The easiest approach to testing CEFSMs is to compose them as one machine
at once, using reachability analysis, and then generate test cases for the product
machine. However, this approach is impractical due to the state explosion prob-
lem and the presence of variables and conditional statements. Bourhfir et al. [16]
propose generating test cases for systems modeled by CEFSM. Test cases can be
generated for the global system by performing a complete reachability analysis, i.e.,
taking all transitions of all CEFSMs into consideration to generate test cases for
the whole produced graph. CEFTG can also be used to generate test cases for each
CEFSM individually. The algorithm terminates when the coverage achieved by the
generated test cases is satisfactory or after the generation of the test cases for the
partial products of all CEFSMs.
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Kovács et al. in [86] methods and mutation operators are designed to enable the
automation of test selection in a CEFSM model. These mutation operators do not
simulate the typical errors of the specification or the implementation, rather they
create erroneous specifications that provide the basis for test case selection.
2.4 Combined Behavioral and Fault Models
Testing safety-critical software differs from testing non-safety-critical software in
many ways. Before testing safety-critical software systems, we need to conduct a
safety analysis for the system to find possible safety breaches and what may cause
them. The result of such an analysis is then used during testing. Another difference
is that in safety-critical software we are testing for safety breaches, which is undesired
behavior, in addition to the desired behavior. However, recent model-based testing
techniques do not adequately consider the information derived from the safety anal-
ysis like Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
[85]. Hence, people realized that there is a considerable gap between the safety
analysis models and the behavioral models that needed to be bridged. Therefore,
different approaches to integrate the fault analysis and system models were proposed
and used in safety analysis and testing.
Al-Ariss et al. in [41, 40] integrate fault-tree-based safety analysis into a func-
tional model. They use systematic transformation steps from Fault Tree to a stat-
echart model. The integration results in an integrated functional and safety spec-
ification (IFSS) model that preserves the semantics of both the fault tree and the
statechart. It also shows how the system behaves when a failure condition occurs.
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Thus, it is used as a model that ensures safety through requirement validation. Ex-
ample 2.4.1 illustrates a model of a microwave oven which will be applied for the
next integration techniques.
Example 2.4.1. Microwave System: Figure 2.4 shows the behavioral model of
the microwave system. The statechart model consists of the Timer, the Door, the
Switch, and the Control as orthogonal regions. The door can be in one of the states
open, opening, closing, or closed. The Switch is either switched on or off and the


































Figure 2.4: Statechart for Microwave System
Figure 2.5 illustrates the fault model for the exposure of microwave. This FTA
shows the events that contribute in the top event exposure of microwave. For sim-
plicity, we assume that the microwave oven is already switched on and the Control
region is in the idle state. We used this small FTA that contains only three primary
events which are Timing, Door sensor failure, and Door open. All these events are
connected with the logical AND gate, which means all these events must occur in
order for the top event to occur.
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Figure 2.5: FTA for Microwave Exposure
The top event of the FTA is the event exposure of microwaving. This event
is considered a mishap and composed of a combination of events. It occurs when
the microwave oven door is open and the microwave is operational. This will ex-
pose the user to microwaves. The microwave is not supposed to operate when the
door is open, however, this may happen if the door sensor gives a wrong signal or
information to the controller.
We apply this technique [40] on Example 2.4.1. The transformation starts with
deducing the safety requirements from the FTA and that will give the following
formula:
Exposure of microwave = (∧, (∧, (Timing,Door Sensor Failure),DoorOpen))
First, we need to check whether the leaf nodes are simple or composed. In this
example, all the leaf nodes are simple, therefore, the formula will not change. The
next step is to deduce the library of semantics from 2.5 and 2.4, which is shown in
table 2.4
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After the semantic table is constructed, the transformation of FTA gates, gate
by gate, starts from the top event to the leaves. At the beginning, we have two
inputs from the top AND gate and they are A1 and A2 as shown in figure 2.6.
The formula for A1 and A2 is
Exposure of microwave = (∧, ( microwaving, Door Open).
Exposure of microwave = (∧, (A1, A2).
The equivalent statechart is shown in figure 2.7.
The formula is Microwaving = (∧, (Switched on, Door sensor failure)) which is
the same as Microwaving = (∧, (A1.1, A1.2)). See figure 2.8.
After the transformation of all the FTA gates, these gates will be integrated into
the statechart of the behavioral model. The control region will be modified so that
it includes the top event of the FTA. The IFSS model is shown in Figure 2.9. This
model integrating approach has integrated a statechart and a fault tree according to
some transformation and integration steps. The IFSS model can be used for safety
analysis only. Our goal in this dissertation is to integrated behavioral model with
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Figure 2.6: Applying Transformation Rules on Exposure of Microwave
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Figure 2.8: Statechart Gate for Microwaving Event
failure models to be used for safety testing. Kim et al. in [82] develop an algorithm
to transform hazards of a Fault Tree (FT) into a UML statechart diagram in order
to perform safety analysis. In this approach, the authors assume that the behavior
of the system is modeled in a state machine notation. Therefore, the hazards have
to be transformed to a statechart diagram. Their transformation of hazards is done
according to the following steps:
• Identifying the types of primary events in the fault tree related to the behav-
ioral model of the system. These types are categorized into four groups: (1)
state and entry and doActivity of a state, (2) exit of state, (3) transitions,
events, guard conditions and actions, and (4) data comparatives. Elements in
the same category have the same transformation rules.
• developing the rules to represent the primary events and gates in a UML
statechart notation, and
• extracting the information that deals with the hierarchy and the orthogonality
from the original behavioral model. The output of these steps is also a state



























































Figure 2.9: Modified Statechart for the Microwave Oven
We will use Example 2.4.1 to illustrate this technique. The first step is to identify
the types of primary events in fault tree and to match them to one of doactivity in
the state machine. Figure 2.10 illustrates the FTA for the microwave. This FTA is
then transformed to a statechart according to the transformation rules. The AND
gate in a FTA is represented as an orthogonal region in the statechart. That means
both events have to happen in order for the gate to occur. Figure 2.11 shows the
statechart equivalent of Figure 2.10.
After the transformation of the FTA is completed, the transition information
is retrieved. Figure 2.12 shows the transformed statechart with information. This
approach integrates a fault tree into a statechart model according to a set of trans-
formation and integration rules. However, the integrated model can be used for
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Figure 2.12: Transformed Statechart Diagram with Information
Because, usually, the system specification does not thoroughly describe the un-
desired behavior, Sánchez et al. in [127, 126] propose generating test cases based
on a fault-based approach. This approach is meant to overcome the limitations of
specification-based approaches that derive from the incompleteness of the specifica-
tion with respect to undesirable behavior, and from the focus of specifications on
the desired behavior, rather than potential faults. FTA is used to determine how
undesirable states can occur in a system. The results of the analysis expressed in
terms of Duration Calculus are integrated with statechart based specifications. The
statechart diagram is then transformed to Extended Finite State Machines (EF-
SMs) to flatten the hierarchical and concurrent structure of states and to eliminate
broadcast communication. Control flow is then identified in terms of the paths in
the EFSMs.
Again, Example 2.4.1 will be used to illustrate this technique. The step is to
find the set of basic events that can contribute to a failure. From the given FTA,
the cut set for the event “Exposure of microwave” is
c = dtiming ∧Door sensor failure ∧Door opene
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The FTA node “Exposure of microwave” refers to the statechart component
“control” and the sub-tree rooted “Door open” refers to the Door component, “tim-
ing” refers to the “Timer” component, and “Door sensor failure” refers to hardware
component sensor. The formula denotes that the microwave is switched on, and
microwave oven door is open, and the door sensors failed to operate properly. Ac-
cording to the transformation rules, the formula will be as follows:
c = dtiminge ∧ dDoor sensor failuree ∧ dDoor opene
According to rule I2 c i in [127] that says if the failure event or state is already
represented in the behavioral model, do nothing. Hence, the state “Switched on”,
the event “Door sensor failure” and the “Door open” state already exist in the
behavioral model, there is nothing to be done.
All the aforementioned integrating techniques integrate Fault Trees with Stat-
echarts. However, these approaches used different integration rules. We compare
these techniques based on the models integrated, the use for the integrated model,
and the number of states and transition in the resulting model as seen in Table
2.5. The use of these approaches is mainly safety analysis, however, the approach in
Sánchez et al. [127] is used for safety testing after translating the integrated model,
which is a statechart, into an EFSM.
Ortmeier et al. [112] present a systematic approach to formally model failure
modes. The approach is combined with most formal safety analysis. They provide
construction rules that ensure preserving that the initial functional behavior. They
apply their method to a radio-based railroad crossing modeled using statechart.
After they construct the model of the intended behavior of the system, they extend
it to capture failure modes. During the extension, they split the failures into models
of occurrence patterns and of direct effects modes. This allows to uniformly model
a large class of occurrence patterns of failure modes (like transient, persistent etc).
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The occurrence pattern of a failure mode describes under what situations a failure
mode occurs. Two common patterns are transient which can appear and disappears
and persistent patterns failure which when it occurs it stays forever. Deductive
cause-consequence analysis (DCCA) is integrated into the presented failure model
to find the minimal critical sets if failure modes.
Kaiser et al. [76] proposed a combination of fault trees with an explicit State/Event
semantics, using a graphical notation called State/Event Fault Trees (SEFTs). This
model uses the fault tree to represent the faults which are connected to the state or
event in the state/event model that describes the system behavior. However, this
model is used for safety analysis. Furthermore, identifying the events for an FT
and connecting them to state or event is done manually which makes the process
of constructing SEFT very difficult, time consuming, and error-prone especially for
large and complicated systems.
Similarly, Nazier et al.[105] transform fault tree events into elements of a stat-
echart behavior model. The resulting risk-based test model is used for automated
test case generation by building Timed Computation Tree Logic (TCTL) queries to
verify the system correctness and criticality using model checker. However, it is not
clear how any coverage criteria can be imposed for interactions between orthogonal
regions of the cut sets.
Table 2.5: Comparison of the Integration Techniques
Technique FM BM Use
Example 2.4.1 Microwave System
States Transitions
[41, 40] FT Statechart Analysis 19 25
[82] FT Statechart Analysis 22 28
[127] FT Statechart Testing 11 16
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2.4.1 Limitations
• The limitation introduced by the gap between the models: Combining
a behavioral model and a safety model is doable in case both models are
compatible. By compatible we mean that both models are described at the
same level of detail, the same events in both models have the same names
and attributes, and both models are dynamic. To describe the same level
of detail, both models have to be at the same level of abstraction. Figure
2.13 shows where the behavioral models and fault models are used in the v-
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Figure 2.13: Fault and Behavioral Models at the V-model
they can be at different levels of these phases and describe different levels of
abstractions, so that they cannot be compatible. Therefore, the output of
the safety analysis techniques at one level will not be useful for testing at a
different level. Besides that, these models can be integrated together to be
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used for testing. For example, an FTA at the Architecture design level cannot
be combined with a statechart at the detailed design level.
In other cases where the behavioral model describes the same level of detail
as the fault model, both models have to describe the same function, compo-
nent, or system (from a desired and undesired behaviors view) and both models
have to have the same event names and attributes. However, in case they do
not, we need to transform one model to a form that is compatible with the
other. In other words, we may model safety using a modeling language that
is used for modeling behavior. Doing so, we can easily integrate them in one
model that considers safety aspects of the system besides the behavioral ones.
• Scalability: Some of the proposed model integration approaches have scal-
ability and complexity limitations. Using a UML statechart to model fault
tree gates may not be suitable because of the state explosion problem. FTA
may contain hundreds of gates which means there will be hundreds of orthog-
onal regions since each gate is represented as an independent region inside the
statechart that represents the system under test.
• Complexity: The transformed fault tree falls into the lowest level of the
composed statechart that makes it difficult to manually or formally analyze
the diagram for safety because of the indirect paths to causes of hazards [82].
These indirect paths make it difficult to generate test paths from the statechart
model and make it impossible to inject faults into the system, i.e. to simulate
the environment, during requirement validation.
• No explicit mitigation models: All hazard mitigations are implicit within
the behavioral models of safety-critical systems. There are no explicit miti-
gation models in the form of exception handling patterns, such as emergency
54
stop, return to a safe state, insert an additional behavior, or try an alternative
behavior.
In our approach, we will overcome these limitation by using CEFSM to model
both behavioral and failure processes and how they interact. CEFSM is scalable
since we can use it to model bigger systems. As for the complexity, the system
modeled with a statechart may be composed of many levels of hierarchy. The
hierarchical diagram can have indirect paths to causes of the hazards due to its
depth (i.e., a composite state can own its sub-states) and orthogonality (i.e., regions
in a state are independent of each other). Therefore, we chose to use CEFSM as
a modeling language because we can keep the model flat to get rid of the system




In this approach, we propose an integration of the behavioral model with a fault
model to take advantage of the two in the analysis and testing activities. From the
testing point of view we need to:
• generate behavioral tests to test the system behavior,
• generate failures at appropriate points e.g. by injecting events into the test
model [144], and
• test proper mitigation.





Figure 3.1: Safety-Critical System Behavior
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3.1 Test Generation Process
The test generation process shown in Figure 3.2 uses the behavioral model and
a FT to generate test cases. It starts with the compatibility transformation step.
The FT́ produced from this step is transformed to gate CEFSMs (GCEFSMs) ac-
cording to the transformation rules. Then, the model integration step integrates the
GCEFSM with the behavioral model (BM) according to the integration rules. The
resultant model is the Integrated Communicating Extended Finite State Machine
























Figure 3.2: Test Process
based on test criteria (IC). Because we consider both behavior and failure occurrence
to be parallel, communicating processes (cf.Figure 3.1), we use a communicating ex-
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tended finite state machine to model their interaction. The following subsections
explain each step in more detail.
At the analysis stage of the system, safety analysts will have a list of every
possible failure and its ID. This list will be filled into the Failure Types Table shown
in Table 3.1 at the analysis stage. This table will be used to connect phase1 (our
approach) to phase2 (Generate Safety Mitigation Tests approach) of the end-to-end
testing methodology. At the beginning of phase1, the first two columns contain
Failure ID and Failure Type for every possible failure in the system. The following
columns, Node in FT́, Event ID, Gate ID, and Message ID will be filled in during
the various steps of phase1. That is, Node in the FT́ column is filled in during
the compatibility transformation step (section 3.1.3), Event IDs and Gate IDs are
filled in during the transformation procedure (section 3.1.6), Message IDs are filled
in during the integration procedure (section 3.1.7), and Path IDs is filled in during
test generation step (section 3.1.10).
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3.1.1 Behavioral Model: Communicating Extended Finite
State Machine (CEFSM)
In principle, finite state machines can appropriately model control portions of
communicating components of a system. However, practically, the usual specifi-
cations of these components include operations based on variable values; ordinary
FSMs do not have the capabilities to model such systems in a concise way [88]. They
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cannot model the manipulation of variables conveniently or model the exchange of
arbitrary values between components.
To solve the variable manipulation problem, FSMs were extended by adding
other elements used for data flow representation such as predicates, variables, and
instructions, to a more advanced model called an Extended Finite State Machine
(EFSM). The transfer of values between components is handled by adding commu-
nication capabilities to the EFSMs. CEFSM has been used in modeling and testing
distributed systems and network protocols [15]. The strength of CEFSM is that
it can model orthogonal states of a system in a flat manner and does not need to
compose the whole system in one state as in statecharts which would make it more
complicated and harder to analyze and/or test. The communication capabilities of
the CEFSM make it suitable for modeling communicating processes.
3.1.2 Fault model: Fault Tree (FT)
Many safety analysis technique has been used to analyze. These techniques aid
in the detection of the safety flaws and the design error. From these techniques, we
select the fault tree to be used as our fault model to be integrated in the behavioral
model in order to be used for safety testing. Fault tree is an analysis model that
describes how events and failures contribute in a hazard. This is very important for
our integrating approach because we need to know when and how that events and
failures of the system combine to cause a hazard at the system execution.
3.1.3 Compatibility Transformation
The basic events in fault trees (leaf nodes) depend on the scope, resolution and
the ground rules [143]. The scope of the FT indicates which failure will be included
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and which will not, the resolution is the level of detail at which these basic events
will be developed, and the ground rules include the procedure and terminology used
to name these events. Often, the basic events in fault trees are informally described,
i.e. in a natural language. If the resolution or the event naming does not match
that of the behavioral model, which is often the case, we say these models are not
compatible. Therefore, we need to make these models compatible in order to be
able to integrate them. Behavioral and Fault models are said to be compatible if
they describe the same level of abstraction and the same events in both models have
the same meaning.
The compatibility transformation procedure takes the BM and the FT as inputs
and produces a FT́ that is compatible with the BM. The attributes of entities in
FT (each leaf) and behavioral model are formalized by creating a class diagram.
1. Identify entities that have capability of failure or contributing to a failure (leaf
nodes). An entity could be a state or an event.
2. For each such entity, create a Bclass with behavioral attributes and Fclass
with attributes related to failure and failure condition.
3. Express entity.failure condition in terms of attributes of Fclass.
4. Combine both Bclass and Fclass by identifying attributes common to both
diagrams such that, if values in Fclass and Bclass are the same, we combine
the attributes, otherwise we create Battribute and Fattribute.
Figure 3.3 shows a BClass, a FClass, and a BFClass. The BClass contains
either a state BS (a state at the behavioral model) or an event BE (an event at
the behavioral model) from the behavioral model that contributes to a failure at
the fault model. These events are carried in the communicating messages from
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-BAttr: BS | BE 
-FAttr: FS | FE  
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           Fcondition 
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-condition: FC 
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Figure 3.3: Behavioral and Fault Classes Combination
contains a state FS (a state at the failure model) or an event FE (an event at the
failure model) as described in a leaf node of a FT along with their conditions FC (if
any). The BFClass contains either a combination of BClass and FClass attributes
if these attributes are the same as shown in Figure 3.3 (c) or separate Battributes
and Fattributes are created as shown in Figure 3.3 (d). At this step, the column
Node in FT́ in the Failure Type Table is filled in with the related leaf node from the
FT́ for every Failure ID.
For example, the fault tree (∧,Air Present, Gas leaks > 4 sec) depicted in Figure
3.4 contains two events that contribute to an unsafe environment. These events need
to be made compatible with the events that have the same meaning in the behavioral
model. Let us assume that the entities that have capability of failure or contributing
to a failure in the behavioral model are “Air Valve” and “Gas Valve”. Therefore,
BClass, BAirValve, will be created for the entity “Air Valve”. The attribute of
this class is of type BS and its values are “Open” or “Closed”. The FClass, FAir-
Valve, will be created for the leaf node “Air present”. The name of the attribute
is “AirPresent”, its type is FS, its values are “yes” or “no”, and the condition of
this attribute AirPresent = yes. Since the names of these entities are not the same
although they have the same meaning, we create a BFAirValve class that contains
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separate attributes of both BAirV alve and FAirV alve as described in Figure 3.3
(d). The BFAirValve attributes are BState:Open, Closed, FState:Airpresent:yes, no
and BFEventCondition:AirPresent= yes (Figure. 3.5). Also, the Bclass, BGas-
Valve, will be created for the entity “Gas Valve”. The attribute of this class is
of type BS and its values are “Open” or “Closed”. The FClass, FGasValve, will
also be created for the leaf node “Gas leaks > 4 sec”. The name of the attribute
is “Leaks”, its type is FS, its values are “yes” or “no”, and the condition of this
attribute Leaks & TimeInState > 4 sec. We create a BFGasValve class that con-
tains separate attributes of both BGasV alve and FGasV alve. The BFGasValve
attributes are BState:Open, Closed, FState:Leaks:yes, no, FTimeInState:4 sec, and
BFEventCondition:Leaks & FTimeInState > 4 sec (cf. Figure 3.6).
 Unsafe Environment 
Air Present Gas leaks > 4 sec 
Figure 3.4: Fault Tree Example
   
 
  
-State: AirPresent: yes,no 
-EventCond: AirPresent  




-BState: Open, Closed 
-FState: AirPresent: yes, no 
-BFEventCond:FState=   
                         AirPresent  
BFAirValve 
 
Figure 3.5: Air Valve Class
At this point, the conditions are aggregated from the leaves of the FT to the
root. The compatibility transformation is an essential step to solve the ambiguity
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State:Open,Closed 
BGasValve 
 -State: Leaks:yes, no  
-TimeInState: 4s 
-EventCond: State= Leaks 
           & TimeInState >4s 
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 -BState: Open, Closed  
-FState: Leaks:yes, no  
-FTimeInState: 4s 
-BFEventCond:FState=  
  Leaks &FTimeInState>4s 
BFGasValve 
 
Figure 3.6: Gas Valve Class
between the events in the behavioral model and fault model. The output of this
step is a FT́ which is described in terms of BFClass.BFEventCondition combined
with logical operators. The compatible fault tree for this example will be: FT́ =
(∧,BFAirValve.BFEventCond, BFGasValve.BFEventCond)
3.1.4 FT́ model Transformation
Events can be classified as either “transient” or “persistent” [111]. A transient
event is an event that is reversible i.e. it can appear and disappear completely,
while the persistent event once it occurs, stays. An ordinary fault tree, which
statically describes hazard, does not consider this distinction between events because
this distinction would not make a difference for a static model. However, it is
essential to consider the event type attribute when making a fault tree dynamic.
The event type determines if the status of the event can be “not-occurred” after
it had already “occurred”. The change of the event status makes the integrated
fault tree react according to the status of the event in the behavioral model. Note
that our transformation rules allow for modeling transient events unlike the classical
fault trees where all the events are persistent.
However, the FT́ is a static model that describes the hazard as a specific com-
bination of events. In order for the FT́ to be integrated into a behavioral model it
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has to be dynamic and understands the behavioral model’s events. To accomplish
that, we have to transform the FT́ to a CEFSM format. Every gate in the FT́
is represented as a GCEFSM. The whole model forms a tree-like structure. The
ICEFSM consists of a collection of CEFSMs that represent the behavioral model
and GCEFSMs (the transformed FT) model.
The communication between the behavioral model and FT́ model is achieved by
sending and receiving messages between the models. The behavioral model sends
messages to the Fault related GCEFSMs, but they do not send any message back
to the behavioral model. Upon receiving those messages, the GCEFSMs at the
lower level of the tree sends messages that carry “the event occurred” or “has not
occurred” to the upper level GCEFSMs and so on. The output message from one
GCEFSM is taken as a parameter to a generic event in the receiving GCEFSM, e.g.
event(param) = get(mi).
To make the FT́ to GCEFSM transformation automatic, the representation of
the FT events and gates in GCEFSM is standardized. Each gate must be given an
identifier that uniquely identifies it. The output of the gate, which is an input to
another gate, should carry the same identification number as the gate that outputs it.
If the gate event has occurred, a message mi is sent to the receiving gate indicating
that the event has occurred. The output of each gate is an input to another gate.
The GCEFSM may be in one of three conditions; it has not received any input
messages so far, it received a message that says the gate event has occurred, or
received a message that says the gate event has not occurred.
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3.1.5 Transformation Rules
The transformation rules use the notation for e,m introduced for CEFSM in
section 3.1.1. Every gate in the FT́ is converted to an equivalent representation in
CEFSM i.e. Gate CEFSM (GCEFSM). Every GCEFSM is identified by a unique
identifier Gi that uniquely identifies the gate. The set of variables V are:
• TotalNoOfEvents is the total number of input events to the gate.
• NoOfOccurredEvents is the number of occurred events that the gate received
so far.
• NoOfPositiveEvents is the number of occurred events whose eStatus is true.
Each GCEFSM consists of states and transitions that perform the same boolean
function as the gates in an FT. The difference is that in the original FT, a gate
produces a single output when all the input events satisfy the gate conditions. Oth-
erwise, no output would be produced. However, in the transformed FT, a gate has
two kinds of outputs. One output is defined as the “Gate occurred” and the other
is defined as “Gate not occurred” such that:
mi =

Gate Occurred if Gi(e1, e2, ...ek) = true,
Gate not Occurred if Gi(e1, e2, ...ek) = false
and eOccurrence = true
∀ei, i = 1 to k
For example, an AND gate = true if GAND(e1 ∩ e2... ∩ ek) = true. Each structure
and behavior of each GCEFSM is predefined and for this matter we will present
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Figure 3.7: AND Gate Representation in FT and GCEFSM
3.1.5.1 AND Gate
When combining some events with an AND gate, the output occurs when all
the events occur. Otherwise, no output would occur. An AND gate is represented
as shown in Figure 3.7. It consists of two states and four transitions. State S0 is
the initial state and S1 is the “gate occurred” state. The transition T2 will never be
taken unless its predicate NoOfOccurredEvents=TotalNoOfEvents & ei.eOccurrence
=true & ei.eStatus = true is true which means all the inputs are received and their
status is true. When T2 is taken the message “gate occurred” is sent to a GCEFSM
that is supposed to receive it. The transition T0 is as follows:
T0:(S0, [ej.eOccurrence = true & ej.eStatus = true & NoOfOccurredEvents < To-
talNoOfEvents], get(mj))/ (S0, update(events),-) Where,
1. The event get(mj) obtains input messages from the environment or from an-
other CEFSM. mi contains an event that could be ”gate occurred” or ”gate
not occurred”.
2. update(events) is an action performed upon the executing of this transition.
It updates the number of occurred events and their status based on the last
input message received.
3. The predicate “[ej.eOccurrence = true & ej.eStatus = true & NoOfOccurre-
dEvents < TotalNoOfEvents]” ensures that the event has occurred and the
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number of inputs received so far is less than the total number of inputs
and the input status is true. Note that “gate not occurred” implies that
eOccurrence=true&eStatus=false, while “gate occurred” implies that eOccur-
rence=true&eStatus=true.
If all the messages to this GCEFSM are received and all the events have occurred,
the transition T2 will be taken.
T2:(S0,[NoOfPositiveEvents=TotalNoOfEvents & ej.eOccurrence=true &
ej.eStatus = true], get(mj))/(S1, update(events), Send(Gate Occurred))
When this transition is taken based on the input and the predicate, it moves to
state S1, increments the number of inputs, and send an output message saying that
the gate has occurred.
T1: (S0,[ej.eOccurrence = true & ej.eStatus = false], get(mj))/(S0, update
(events),-), where “-” means no output produced.
When on state S0 and the input message implies that the event has changed its
status, the transition T1 is taken. T1 decrements the number of inputs, and updates
the status of the event from occurred to not occurred.
T3:(S1, [ej.eStatus = false],get(mj))/(S0, update(events), Send(Gate not Occurred))
At the state S1, Transition T3 is taken when the coming input status is false. When
this transition is taken it decrements NoOfOccurredEvents and NoOfPositiveEvents,
updates the status of the input from occurred to not occurred and sends “gate not
occurred” message to the receiving gate.
3.1.5.2 INHIBIT Gate
INHIBIT is similar to the AND gate. They have the same states and transitions.
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Figure 3.8: XOR Gate Representation in FT and GCEFSM
the enabling condition. We do not need to have a separate gate representation for
NOT gate since we can express it in any predicate. If we want to negate any event
we can use the NOT logical operator inside the gate that the negated event is one
of its inputs.
3.1.5.3 XOR Gate
This gate is slightly different from the AND gate although it has the same struc-
ture and same number of transitions and states. At this gate, it is necessary to
distinguish between the event that has not occurred in the first place and the one
whose status is false. The representation of GCEFSM XOR gate is shown in Figure








T3:(S1,[inputStatusChanged(ej)=true],get(mj))/(S0, update(events),Send(gate not oc-
curred))
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3.1.5.4 Priority AND Gate
As seen in Figure 3.9, the priority AND gate is very similar to the AND gate
in the overall structure and transitions. It differs from the AND gate in that the
events have to happen in predetermined order. This difference is taken care of by
manipulating the predicate condition in such a way that it considers the order of
occurrence of the events. For example, if the events are ordered E0 then E1, they
have to happen in this order so that the gate can occur. Otherwise the gate will not
occur. T0 to T3 are the transitions that control the priority AND gate.
T0:(S0,[NoOfPositiveEvents<TotalNoOfEvents & ei.eStatus= true],get(mi))
/(S0,update(events),-)
T1:(S0,[ej.eStatus = false & ej.eOccurrence = true], get(mj ))/( S0,
update(events),-)
T2:(S0,[NoOfPositiveEvents = TotalNoOfEvents & ordered(ej) = true &
ej.eStatus = true],get(mj))/(S1,update(events), Send(Gate Occurred))
The predicate ordered() returns true of the input event in the message mi is received
in its predefined order and returns false otherwise.
T3:(S1, [ei.eStatus = false], get(mi))/(S0,update(events), Send(Gate Not Occurred))
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Figure 3.9: Priority And Gate Representation in FT and GCEFSM
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3.1.5.5 OR Gate
The OR gate occurs if at least one event occurs. This gate, as seen in Figure 3.10,
consists of two states and four transitions. When in S0 and the input message carries
an event whose eOccurrence and eStatus are true (i.e. the event has occurred), T0
is taken and the OR gate occurs. In state S1 and if the events in the input messages
have not occurred (i.e. their eStatus is false) and there was only one input so far,
which means this input has changed its status, then a “Gate not occurred” message
is sent. Otherwise, no message is sent out of this gate and only update(events)
actions take place.
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Figure 3.10: OR Gate Representation in FT and GCEFSM
T0:(S0,[ej.eStatus=true],get(mj))/(S1,update(inputs), Send( Gate Occurred))
T1:(S1,[ej.eStatus = false & NoOfPositiveEvents = 0], get(mj))/(S1, update
(inputs), Send(Gate not Occurred))
T2:(S1,[ej.eStatus= true],get(mj))/(S1,update(events),-)
T3:(S1,[ej.eStatus= false],get(mj))/(S1,update(events),-)
3.1.5.6 Timing an Event Gate
FT gates such as AND, OR, INHIBIT, etc. are well defined and can be syntacti-
cally represented. Events in FT can be simple or composed. A composed event can
be decomposed further to simple events or a timed simple event. A timed simple
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Figure 3.11: Event Timer GCEFSM
event is the simple event that should occur for a specific period of time to con-
tribute to a hazard. However, FT has no timing gates. Therefore, we need to have
a representation that can handle the timing issue (either a minimum or maximum
timing).
Thus, we introduce this gate that can time an event and the gate in the subsec-
tion 3.1.5 that deals with the timing intervals. This gate works as follows. Upon
receiving a message that indicates the occurrence of the event, the transition T0
takes place which starts the timer. When the time expires and no further “gate not
occurred” message was received that indicates that the event is no longer happening,
the transition T 2 is taken and sends a “gate occurred” message. Otherwise the gate







3.1.5.7 Timing an Event for Continuous Intervals Gate
Some event may need to be timed for continuous intervals. For example, we
may need to observe an occurrence of an event every consecutive 5 sec as long as
the system is operational. Figure 3.12 shows that as long as the transition T0 is
fired and T2 was not, the event will be timed for fixed consecutive amount of time
and it keeps timing until the status of the event ei.eStatus changes to false. Upon
receiving this event change, the transition T3 to the state S1 is fired sending out a
“gate not occurred” message.
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Figure 3.12: Timing Continuous Intervals GCEFSM
T0:(S0,[ej.eStatus = true], get(mj))/(S1, setTimer(v, Timeri), Send(Gate Occurred))
T1:(S1,timeout)/(S2,-, Send(Gate not Occurred))
T2:(S1,[ej.eStatus = false],get(mj))/(S0,reset(Timeri), Send(Gate not Occurred))
T3:(S2,setTimer(v,Timeri))/(S1,-,Send(Gate Occurred))
3.1.6 Transformation Procedure
As mentioned above, the transformed GCEFSMs form a tree-like structure and
each GCEFSM gate is denoted by a unique identifier Gi that uniquely identifies the
gate. The transformation procedure shown in Figure 3.13 takes an FT as an input
and produces GCEFSMs according to a postorder tree traversal. Event-gate table is
used for the integration of GCEFSMs model with the behavioral model. It contains
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Procedure FT_TO_GCEFSM (T : Tree) 
{ 
   if  (T is null)    then return; 
   for each child C of T from left to right do 
       FT_TO_GCEFSM(C); 
       Construct GCEFSM gate;                     // Create a gate with its variables,     
                                                                     //  output messages, and its ID. 
    if  (leaf node) 
     then     insert event name, event ID & Gate ID into Event-Gate  table. 
} 
Figure 3.13: Transformation Procedure
the entries for all leaf nodes of the FT and is defined as shown in Table 3.2. This
table is constructed during the transformation of FT to GCEFSM. The leaf node
event name and identifier are inserted into the table entry along with the identifier
of the gate that receives this event. At this step, the columns Event ID and Gate
ID in the Failure Type Table are also filled in with the event id and the gate id for
every Failure ID.
Table 3.2: Event-Gate Table for Leaf Nodes
Event name & at-
tribute
Event ID Gate ID
event name as indi-
cated in the FT́
ei, where (i = 1, ..., n) and ei is
leaf connected to Gj
Gj
Ex. temp > 10 ◦C e1 G1
3.1.7 Integration Procedure
Before integrating the models, all the messages from the behavioral model to the
fault model have the form of equation (3.1.1). At that time the event id contains
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the events name and attribute and the receiving gate id of that event is not known
yet. During the integration of both models, the event name in each message in
the behavioral model is looked up in the event-gate table. If the event name and
attribute in the behavioral model match those in the event-gate table, the message
is modified such that it contains the event id ei and gate id Gj as stated in equation
(3.1.2) according to the procedure in Figure 3.14.
Procedure ModelsIntegration(BM,Event-Gate Table){ 
  For every mBk Do 
    For every Event-Gate entries Do  
      If(mBk. EventNameAndAttribute  ==  Event-Gate.EventNameAndAttribute) then 
                     mBk.EventID         =   Event-Gate.ei 
                     mBk.mDestination = Event-Gate.Gi 
} 
Figure 3.14: Integration Procedure
Let mBk = (mId,EventNameAndAttribute, )
be a message from the BM (3.1.1)
mBk will be modified to (mId, ej, Gi) (3.1.2)
The column message ID in the Failure Type Table is filled in with the message
id that carries the event id for every Failure ID.
3.1.8 Concurrent Processes
Our integrated model consists of communicating behavioral and failure processes.
These processes have their internal paths that exhibit the execution of task paths
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for each individual CEFSMi and the communicating messages that show the global
paths that represent the communications between the CEFSMs during their execu-
tions. The behavior varies according to the change of the synchronized condition
among the concurrent processes. Therefore, we need to consider the concurrent
paths of the model. The concurrent path is generated by the Cartesian product
of CEFSMs paths. Each produced concurrent path is an arbitrary combination of
CEFSMs paths and not always a real concurrent path. Thus, a huge number of paths
is produced and therefore, different concurrent path representation approaches were
introduced. Weiss [148] serializes the concurrent program as a set of sequential pro-
grams to produce test paths. However, this approach was criticized by Yang et al.
in [151] as generating serialization for a concurrent programs is difficult and tedious
task especially for a large number of lengthy processes. Another approach proposed
by Liu et al. [95] uses reachability analysis to identify the concurrent paths from the
whole production of the candidate concurrent test paths. However, their approach
requires a large memory space and a long verification time for the concurrent paths.
Therefore, for our model, it is more suitable to use the concurrent path representa-
tion used in [71, 151]. They represent the concurrent paths as ordered paths of the
processes involved in the execution of a specific task and they defined the concurrent
paths as follows:
Let P be a set of concurrent CEFSMs that consists of CEFSM1, CEFSM2,
. . . ,CEFSMn where n is the number of the processes in P.
A test path is a sequence of nodes, n0n1n2...nm, where n0 is the starting node,
nm is the ending node and for each 0 ≤ j < m, (nj, nj+i) ∈ Ei, Ei is the set if edges
in CEFSMi. A path represents one possible execution sequence of a CEFSMi.
In the execution of P, each test case will traverse a path through one or more
CEFSMs. Therefore, the execution can be seen as involving a set of paths of con-
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current processes. A concurrent path is an n-tuple (P1, P2, ..., Pn) where, for each i,
Pi is a test path.
A feasible concurrent path is a path (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) where at least one input x
causes Pi to be traversed during the execution of the system with x. The concurrent
path may be infeasible due to data or communication (rendezvous) dependencies,
or could be a result of the arbitrary production of paths, that is, paths that are not
related.
Let pi be the number of paths of CEFSMi. Then the possible number of con-
current paths |CP | of the system P is
n∏
i=1
(pi + 1)− 1 [151].
Let P be a concurrent system, LG=(LG1, LG2, . . . , LGn) the local view or the
internal graph of the system and GG=(GG1, GG2, . . . , GGn) the global view or the
rendezvous graph of P.
The length of the test suite for the whole integrated ICEFSM model is len(CP)
states.
Let L be the set of paths of LG, and L0 ⊂ L be a subset of LG. Let G be the
set of paths of GG, and G0 ⊂ G be a subset of GG.
3.1.8.1 Rendezvous Graph
To define a concurrent coverage criteria, we need to define the rendezvous graph.
According to Yang et al. in [151], A rendezvous graph for a task Ti, RGi = (REi,
RNi) is obtained from the task graph of Task Ti according to the following rules:
1. Delete all nodes that do not send or receive messages except the start and the
end node. An edge between ni and nj exists if there is a path from ni to nj
where there is no rendezvous node between ni and nj.
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2. If a node na which is involved in the communication sends or receives mes-
sages k tasks, the node is replaced by nodes (ns,n1,n2,..,nk) such that each
node sends or receives one communication message and communicate with
one other task from other task graph. That is, each node represents that Ti
rendezvous with one of the k tasks. The edge (ns, nj) ∈ RNi for each 1 ≤
j≤k, For each edge (nx, na) ∈ Ei, there is an edges (nx, ns) ∈ RNi and for
each edge (na,ny) ∈ Ei, there is k edge (nj,nj) ∈ RNi, 1 ≤ j≤k.
3.1.9 ICEFSM Coverage Criteria
Exhaustive testing of all possible behaviors of a system is costly and may not be
feasible. Therefore, an adequate subset of the complete testing behavior has to be
selected and used in the testing process. This subset is produced according to some
coverage criteria and often used to control the test generation process or to measure
the quality of the test suite. A coverage criterion is usually defined regardless of any
specific test model. Defining coverage criteria for the CEFSM model should consider
the local view which deals with the internal states and transitions of every individual
CEFSMi, and the global view which considers the behavior of the whole system.
Every individual CEFSM’s behavior is, in fact, sequential, and therefore, coverage
criteria defined for sequential programs, such as node and edge coverage can be used.
The Integrated CEFSM (ICEFSM) model is a collection of concurrent processes.
Each process is modeled as a CEFSMi that can be represented as a directed graph
Gi = (Ni, Ei) where Ni is a set of nodes and Ei is a set of edges and is considered
as a conventional graph where it is treated sequentially [151]. These CEFSMs com-
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municate via the exchange of messages. It is clear that we have two different kinds
of paths that represent the execution behavior of the concurrent systems.
3.1.9.1 Internal Coverage Criteria
The internal paths that describe the internal execution of the process that can be
characterized by the input and the sequence of the states involved in the execution.
This can be described as a static structure. The static structure, however, is not
really applicable for modeling concurrent programs because the behavior of the
concurrent system can not be determined by an input and a sequence of states of
each individual process involved in the execution [135].
The first class of coverage criteria is the same as the graph coverage criteria de-
fined in [4]. These coverage criteria are suitable for the internal structure of CEFSM
since each CEFSM is described as a directed graph that behaves sequentially. Cri-
teria such as Structural Coverage (Node Coverage, Edge Coverage, Edge-Pair Cov-
erage, Prime Path Coverage, . . . ) or Data Flow (All-Defs Coverage, All-Uses Cov-
erage, All-du-Paths Coverage, . . . ) can be used.
3.1.9.2 Concurrent Coverage Criteria
The second class of coverage criteria is defined on the global view (rendezvous)
graph GG in which we consider every CEFSMi as one node without getting into
the internal details. These criteria work for the global view of the integrated model,
especially for the GCEFSM part, where the GCEFSM accepts more than one input
to produce output. The internal details is already covered by the first criteria.
Another criteria is defined for the global view of the integrated model. This crite-
ria is defined for the test coverage of whole ICEFSM’s execution behavior, especially
for the fault tree (GCEFSMs) where we already know their internal behavior and
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since we are concerned with whether the events meet at a GCEFSM and whether
an output from that GCEFSM is produced. Therefore, we consider each CEFSMi
as a rendezvous state without going into its internal details. Based on our inte-
grated model, we define the following two classes of coverage criteria for concurrent
processes testing.
1. CEFSM coverage (CC) - Each CEFSM in the rendezvous graph is visited at
least once. G0 satisfies CC iff for each CEFSM c0 ∈ GG there exists a path
G ∈ G0 visits that c0. The rendezvous node at the fault tree part of the model
mean a GCEFSM.
2. Message edge coverage (EC) - Each message edge should be tested at least
once. L0 satisfies EC iff for each edge(c1, c2) ∈ GG there exists a path G ∈ G0
such that (c1, c2) is passed by a path along G. The message edge means every
message comes in or out of a CEFSMi.
3. Message path coverage (PC) - All paths of each individual test path should
be visited at least once. G0 satisfies PC iff for each syntactic path SP ∈ GG
there exists a semantic path G ∈ G0 such that SP is passed by G.
4. Concurrent path coverage (CP) - Each concurrent path of rendezvous graph
should be visited at least once. G0 satisfies CP iff for each syntactic concurrent
path P ∈ GG there exists a semantic path G ∈ G0 such that SP is passed by G.
This criterion is meant to cover the fault tree FT part of the model’s minimum
cut sets.
5. GCEFSM leaves coverage (GL) - Each leaf GCEFSM at the fault model part
in the rendezvous graph is visited at least once. G0 satisfies GL iff for each
GCEFSM c0 ∈ GG there exists a path G ∈ G0 visits that c0. The rendezvous
node at the fault tree part of the model mean a GCEFSM.
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3.1.10 Test Case Generation
A number of existing test generation methods for CEFSMs can be used. One
approach to testing CEFSMs is to compose them all into one machine at once, using
reachability analysis to generate test cases. However, this approach is impractical
due to the state explosion problem and the presence of variables and conditional
statements. Some work has been done in testing the behavior of concurrent sys-
tems and network protocols that were modeled using CEFSM. Hessel et al. [68] and
Bourhfir et al. [17, 16]. They use reachability analysis to generate test cases from
systems modeled in CEFSMs, while Kovas et al. [86] design methods and mutation
operators to enable the automation of test selection in a CEFSM model. Henniger
et al. [67] generate test purpose description of the behavior of a system of asyn-
chronously CEFSMs. [86] use mutation to enable the automation of test selection
in a CEFSM model. [15] combines specification and fault coverages to generate test
cases in CEFSM models. Li et al. [93] proposes a methodology to generate test cases
from CEFSM-based models. At this step, the column Path ID in the Failure Type





In this chapter, we validate our approach by investigating scalability in section
section 4.1 and applicability in section 4.2. To investigate scalability, we built a sim-
ulator that calculates the size of the integrated models (number of states and tran-
sitions) of our approach and estimates the sizes of the integrated models of Sánchez
et al.’s [127]. We compared the result of the two approaches because Sánchez et
al.’s approach [127] is the only approach that models integration for the purpose of
test case generation and found that our approach scales better than Sánchez et al.’s.
We varied the behavioral model and the fault model sizes to show how scalable our
approach is.
To show applicability, we applied our approach on case studies from different
application domains (cf sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and 4.4) hence our approach is not
domain specific. Generally, we expect that it can be used for systems modeled using
CEFSMs. We also used case studies that reflect different model sizes and integrated
multiple fault trees to show that this approach can be used as described in chapter
3.
Applicability also means that our approach fits into an end-to-end testing method-
ology. Section 4.3 describes how our approach fits in an end-to-end testing method-
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ology. We apply it to a case study. This work was done jointly with Salwa Elakeili.
Validating the effectiveness is limited by the existing test generation techniques such
as [68, 16, 86] that are being used for test generation with CEFSMs.
4.1 Scalability and Comparison to Sánchez et. al.’s
[127]
4.1.1 Simulator Experiment Design
The simulator is intended to calculate the number of states and the transitions
of the integrated behavioral and fault models according to our approach’s trans-
formation rules (CEFSMs with FTs) and Sánchez et al.’s approach (EFSM from
statecharts and FTs) [127]. We fed the simulator with input date of different ranges
of BM and FM. The behavioral models vary from 13 states and 15 transitions to 50
states and 60 transitions while the fault trees that vary from 5 leaves to 19 leaves as
shown in Table 4.2. We assume that every behavioral model is integrated with every
fault model. Therefore, The simulator calculates the size (states and transitions) of
the integrated model of every behavioral model with every fault model as inputs.
4.1.2 Comparison of the Number of Nodes and Transitions
We developed a tool to calculate the number of states and transitions of the
integrated behavioral and fault models according to the approach’s transformation
rules (CEFSMs with FTs) and to estimate the number of nodes and transitions
according to Sánchez et al.’s approach (EFSM from statecharts and FTs) [127].
82
4.1.2.1 In CEFSM
The tool calculates the number of nodes and transition of the integrated model
by adding the number of the nodes and transitions of the behavioral model to the
number of the states and transitions of the GCEFSM part of the model. As we have
seen in section 3 the FT gates are transformed into a collection of GCEFSMs. Every
GCEFSM has a specific number of nodes and transitions. Thus, the tool calculates
the number of nodes and transitions of the ICEFSM based on the number and type
of gates.
4.1.2.2 For EFSM in [127]
The tool estimates the number of nodes and transitions of the integrated model
according to the approach’s transformation rules. The integration rules of the the
approach by Sánchez et al. [127] use the minimum cut set of the leaf node events.
For every member of the cut set they create an independent region, add a state to
the behavioral model, or do nothing. This depends on whether the event already
existed in the behavioral model, or may need human intervention to decide whether
to model the cut as an independent region or to add it to the behavioral model as a
single state and transition. Therefore, we calculated the size of the integrated model
based on these options repeatedly and computed an average. Each time we change
the percentage of creating an independent region. We run the tool 10 times for
each input data varying the probability of creating an independent region between
50% and 60%. Then we calculated the confidence interval with a confidence level of
95%, alpha = 0.05%, for each run to show that we have taken into account the non-
determinism of the estimation of the number of the states and transitions introduced
83
by the EFSM approach of Sánchez et al. [127]. Therefore, we can say that there is
a 95% chance that this confidence interval contains the true population mean.
4.1.2.3 Comparison of Case Studies
We compare the number of nodes and transitions between the model integration
approach presented here and Sánchez et al.’s approach (EFSM from statecharts and
FTs) [127]. First, we compare the number of nodes of three case studies:
1. The railroad crossing control system presented here (RRCCS) in [6],
2. The gas burner example (GB) of [52], and
3. The launch vehicle (LV) in [54].
Table 4.1 shows this comparison. The left column identifies the case study. The
column labeled BM reports the number of states (S) and transitions (T) in the
behavioral model, respectively. The column labeled FM reports the number of
leaves in the fault tree, and how many gates of various types are in the FT. The
columns marked CEFSMs and EFSMs report the number of states and transitions
in our approach vs. Sánchez et al.’s approach [127]. Note that our approach roughly
increases states and transitions as a proportion of the number of leaves in the Fault
Tree, while Sánchez et al.’s shows an exponential increase. Clearly, our approach
looks more scalable. To investigate this further, we used our tool as a simulator
with a range of model and fault tree sizes.
4.1.2.4 Simulation With Increasing Size
We fed the tool with input data of different size ranges of BM and FM. The
behavioral models vary from 13 states and 15 transitions to 50 states and 60 tran-




BM FM CEFSMs EFSMs
S T leaves AND OR XOR Timing S T Avg(S) Avg(T)
GB 13 15 5 3 1 0 2 27 55 79 162
RRC 14 19 8 2 5 0 0 28 70 303 514
LV 21 39 14 0 10 0 0 41 117 4316 8335
S= State, T=Transition, Timing= Timing gates, Avg(S) = The average of the number
of states and Avg(T) = The average of the number of transitions of 10 runs.
The fault tree is constructed of leaves which denote the number of input events to
the fault tree and different types and numbers of gates, AND (0-6) gates, OR (1-10)
gates, XOR (0-6) gates, and Timing gates (0-4) gates. The AND gate includes AND
gate, Priority AND gate, and Inhibit gate.
We assume that the behavioral model is connected and no part of is isolated,
therefore, the number of transitions must not be less than the number of states minus
1. We also assumed that the fault tree is a binary tree where the number of gates
equals the number of leaf nodes minus 1. The timing gates, however, are excluded
from this calculation because they take only one event and they appear only at the
leaf nodes. However, we need to consider them to calculate the number of states and
transitions of our integrated model, the ICEFSM. We assume that every behavioral
model is integrated with every fault model. Therefore, the simulator calculates the
size (states and transitions) of the integrated model of every behavioral model with
every fault model as inputs.
We started with the relatively small behavioral model (GB) with 13 states and
15 transitions. This model is integrated with different fault trees as shown in Table
4.2. We can see that the number of states and transitions of the integrated model
of the EFSM approach grows exponentially. The number of the states produced by
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our integration approach grows from 21 to 59 and the number of transitions grows
from 41 to 137, whereas the number of states produced by the EFSM integration
approach grows on average from 79 to 70245 and transitions from 162 to 85330. It
is very clear that the numbers of the states and transitions of both approaches are
quite different.
Table 4.2: Simulation Data and Results
BM FM CEFSMs EFSMs
S T Leaves AND OR XOR Timing S T Avg(S) Avg(T)
13 15 5 3 1 0 2 27 55 79 162
13 15 7 3 2 1 1 28 64 178 304
13 15 8 2 5 0 0 27 66 263 416
13 15 14 0 10 0 0 33 93 2672 3280
13 15 19 6 5 6 4 59 158 18264 21342
13 17 5 3 1 0 2 27 57 79 174
13 17 7 3 2 1 1 28 66 178 332
13 17 8 2 5 0 0 27 68 263 456
13 17 14 0 10 0 0 33 95 2672 3691
Continued on next page
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BM FM CEFSMs EFSMs
S T Leaves AND OR XOR Timing S T Avg(S) Avg(T)
13 17 19 6 5 6 4 59 160 18264 24152
15 19 5 3 1 0 2 29 59 92 197
15 19 7 3 2 1 1 30 68 206 374
15 19 8 2 5 0 0 29 70 303 514
15 19 14 0 10 0 0 35 97 3083 41335
15 19 19 6 5 6 4 61 162 21074 27003
17 18 5 3 1 0 2 31 58 104 202
17 18 7 3 2 1 1 32 67 233 376
17 18 8 2 5 0 0 31 69 343 5115
17 18 14 0 10 0 0 37 96 3494 3958
17 18 19 6 5 6 4 63 161 23883 25640
19 19 5 3 1 0 2 33 59 116 219
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous page
BM FM CEFSMs EFSMs
S T Leaves AND OR XOR Timing S T Avg(S) Avg(T)
19 19 7 3 2 1 1 34 68 260 405
19 19 8 2 5 0 0 33 70 384 549
19 19 14 0 10 0 0 39 97 3905 4194
19 19 19 6 5 6 4 65 162 26693 27086
21 39 5 3 1 0 2 35 79 128 352
21 39 7 3 2 1 1 36 88 288 694
21 39 8 2 5 0 0 35 90 424 971
21 39 14 0 10 0 0 41 117 4316 8335
21 39 19 6 5 6 4 67 182 29503 55225
30 40 5 3 1 0 2 44 80 183 408
30 40 7 3 2 1 1 45 89 411 777
30 40 8 2 5 0 0 44 91 606 1069
Continued on next page
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BM FM CEFSMs EFSMs
S T Leaves AND OR XOR Timing S T Avg(S) Avg(T)
30 40 14 0 10 0 0 50 118 6165 8677
30 40 19 6 5 6 4 76 183 42147 56817
40 45 5 3 1 0 2 54 85 244 493
40 45 7 3 2 1 1 55 94 548 921
40 45 8 2 5 0 0 54 96 808 1257
40 45 14 0 10 0 0 60 123 8220 9858
40 45 19 6 5 6 4 86 188 56196 64049
50 60 5 3 1 0 2 64 100 305 639
50 60 7 3 2 1 1 65 109 685 1204
50 60 8 2 5 0 0 64 111 1010 1648
50 60 14 0 10 0 0 70 138 10275 13093
50 60 19 6 5 6 4 96 203 70245 85330
S= State, T=Transition, Timing= Timing gates, Avg(S) = The average of the number
of states and Avg(T) = The average of the number of transitions of 10 runs.
Table 4.2 shows that even for the larger BMs and larger Fault Trees with more
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leaves, our approach produces integrated models of efficient sizes while the approach
by Sánchez et al. very quickly reaches scalability limits. Figures 4.1-4.8 show the
growth of the integrated models as a function of the number of leaves in the Fault
Tree. While Sánchez et al.’s approach is highly affected by the number of leaves in
the Fault Tree, our approach is not. As Figure 4.1, Figure 4.3, Figure 4.5, and 4.7
illustrate, CEFSM states and CEFSM transitions curves are invisible when we used
the full simulation data because the numbers are so much smaller. Therefore, we
represent these figures in Figure 4.2, Figure 4.4, Figure 4.6, and Figure 4.8 using
only a part of the simulation data (no more than 8 leaf nodes for the failure model for
every integrated model) in order to show the CEFSM states and CEFSM transitions
for every simulation result.
Figure 4.8 represents the (50 state 60 transition) model. We can clearly notice
that the trend of the curves in Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.8 are the same. The only
difference is the number of states and transitions which depends on the size of the
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Figure 4.2: EFSM and CEFSM Approaches Model Growth for 13 S and 15 T Behavioral

















Model growth for 15 states and 19 transitions BM
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Model growth for 15 states and 19 transitions BM
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Figure 4.4: EFSM and CEFSM Approaches Model Growth for 15 S and 19 T Behavioral
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Model growth for 21 states and 39 transitions BM
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Figure 4.6: EFSM and CEFSM Approaches Model Growth for 21 S and 39 T Behavioral
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Figure 4.8: EFSM and CEFSM Approaches Model Growth for 50 S and 60 T Behavioral
Model (up to 8 leaves)
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4.2 Applicability: Case Studies
In this section, we apply our approach to three case studies of different sizes: a
Gas Burner system [52], a Railroad Crossing Control System (RCCS) [53], and an
Aerospace Launch System [54]. Seana Hagerman provided the functional description
of the Launch system, the types of failures, and required mitigation. The variation
of sizes, fault trees and mitigation requirements as well as using varying domains
show the applicability of our approach. The Gas Burner System [52] is relatively a
small system. It consists of five CEFSMs with a total of 13 states, 15 transitions,
and 4 CEFSM communication channels. This behavioral model is integrated with
a 4-gate-5-leaf fire occurrence fault tree. The RCCS [53] is another model from
different application domain. It consists of four CEFSMs with a total of 14 states,
18 transitions, and 3 CEFSM communicating messages. This model is integrated
with a 7-gate-8-leaf accident occurrence fault tree. The third model is the launch
system. This system contains 5 CEFSMs with a total of 21 states, 34 transitions,
and 5 CEFSM communication channels. This model is integrated with 4 fault trees
altogether. These fault trees contain a total of 6 gates and 14 leaf nodes.
4.2.1 Gas Burner System
4.2.1.1 Description of Gas Burner System
We adapted the gas burner model of the example from [40] to explain how the
transformed model will look like in CEFSM. Figure 4.9 shows the model of the gas
burner system and Figure 4.10 shows the FT for the fire occurrence. The purpose
of a gas burner is to produce heat by consuming gas. The model of the system
consists of a controller component that controls the heat process and monitors a
95
gas valve (responsible for gas supply), an air valve (responsible for air supply), an



































Figure 4.9: Gas Burner Model
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4.2.1.2 Gas Burner Failure
The fault model shown in Figure 4.10 describes fire occurrence and the events
that contribute to fire occurrence when they occur. If the gas leaks for more than
4 seconds during an interval window of less than 30 seconds, it means that there
is an excess of gas which, if combined with the presence of gas, causes an unsafe
environment. If an ignition is attempted when there is an unsafe environment, a
fire will occur.
4.2.1.3 Compatibility Transformation Step
The first step is the compatibility transformation. At this step we create Bclass
and Fclass for the failure related entities GasValve, AirValve, and Igniter and com-
bine the related classes according to the compatibility transformation procedure
3.1.3. These classes are shown in Figure 4.11, Figure 4.12, and Figure 4.13. Table
4.4 shows the composition of the FT́ from these classes at each gate. The events in
the FT are substituted with the combined attributes from the BF classes that are
97
 Fire 










Excess of gas 
 
Gas leaks > 4 sec 
 
Observation Interval <30 Sec 
 
Figure 4.10: FT for a Fire Occurrence in a Gas Burner [40]
equivalent to these events. For example, the event Air present in the FT is equiva-
lent to BFAirValve.FeventCond in FT́. The attributes of BAirValve and FAirValve
are combined in BFAirValve. As we can see in Fig 4.11, the attribute BState be-
longs to the class BAirValve at the behavioral model and FState belongs to the
FAirValve at the fault model. For example, the event Gas leaks > 4 sec in the FT
is equivalent to BFGasValve.FeventCond and the event Observation Interval < 30
sec is equivalent to BFObservation.FEventCond.
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-State: AirPresent: yes,no 
-EventCond: AirPresent  




-BState: Open, Closed 
-FState: AirPresent: yes, no 
-BFEventCond:FState=   
                         AirPresent  
BFAirValve 
 
Figure 4.11: Bclass, Fclass, and BFclass for AirValve Entity
   
State:Open,Closed 
BGasValve 
 -State: Leaks:yes, no  
-TimeInState: 4s 
-EventCond: State= Leaks 
           & TimeInState >4s 
FGasValve 
 -BState: Open, Closed  
-FState: Leaks:yes, no  
-FTimeInState: 4s 
-BFEventCond:FState=  
  Leaks &FTimeInState>4s 
BFGasValve 
 
Figure 4.12: Bclass, Fclass, and BFclass for GasValve Entity
   
  -State: On 
BFIgniter 




-BState: Open, Closed 
-FTimeInState: 30 sec 
-BFEventCond: BState= Open  
             & TimeInState<30sec 
BFObservation 
Figure 4.13: Igniter and Observation Classes
After the compatibility transformation procedure is finished, the complete FT́
will be: (∨,(Z,(∧,BFAirValve.FEventCond, (∧,BFGasValve.FeventCond, BFObser-
vation.FeventCond)),BFIgniter.State),ElectricalShortInCable).
4.2.1.4 Fault Tree Transformation
The fault CEFSM is constructed according to a tree postorder traversal. The









=BFAirValve.FEventCond ∧ Excess of
gas
Figure 4.17
Gas Explodes =Unsafe Environment Z BFIg-
niter.State
Figure 4.18
Fire =Gas Explodes ∨ Electrical short in ca-
ble
Figure 4.19
node. The transformation starts with the leftmost leaf of the FT which is in this
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S0 S1 S2 
Interval <30 s 
Figure 4.15: GCEFSM for Gas Observation Interval < 30s
Next we look for the right sibling of this gate which turns to be an AND gate
between two events. The left child of this node is an event but it is not simple. It
is composed of a timed event. In this case we need to use the “event timer” gate
we presented in the transformation rules after configuring the value of the timer
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and the outgoing message number. The message id should carry the same number
as the gate. In this case the gate is given number one since it is the first gate to
transform. The numbering of the internal transition is not important since each gate
is an independent entity and no confusion will occur. The gate is shown in Figure
4.14. The right child also is a composed event. It is an event timed for continuous
time intervals, in which we use the timing continuous interval gate, give it a number
(number 2 since it is the second gate transformed), and create the input and output
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Figure 4.16: GCEFSMs for Excess Of Gas
Table 4.5: Event-Gate Table
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Gas leaks >4s 
T0 
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Figure 4.18: GCEFSMs for Gas Explodes
At this point the Event-Gate table contains the entries of the leaf nodes that
were found so far as shown in Table 4.5. Since there are no other children for this
AND gate, we transform the gate itself. We use the predefined representation for
AND gate from the transformation rules. Figure 4.16 shows the part of the fault
tree that has been transformed, the AND gate and its inputs and output. The trans-
formed AND gate is a right child of another AND gate, that is the gate between
“Air present” and “Excess of gas” events. “Air present” is a simple event from the
behavioral model while the “Excess of gas” event, which is represented as “m3”, is
the output message of this AND gate. The next step is to transform the AND gate
that combines “Air present AND Excess of gas”. The same transformation steps
are followed and this gate is given number 4. The inputs of this gate are mB3 and
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m3 messages which are equivalent to “Air present” and “Excess of gas” respectively.
Figure 4.17 shows the transformed gates. The next gate to be transformed is the
Priority AND gate which combines the “Unsafe Environment” and “Ignition At-
tempted” events. For this gate the order in which these events occur is important
and defined as left to right order.
In this FT example, The left event, “Unsafe Environment”, should occur be-
fore the event “Ignition Attempted”. Therefore, this order is considered in the
GCEFSM PAND gate. Figure 4.18 illustrates the GCEFSM after the PAND gate
is transformed. The event mB4 represents the event “Ignition Attempted” in the
FT, which is a message received directly from the behavioral model by this gate
indicating that the igniter is on or off. This algorithm continues until the whole FT
is transformed.
4.2.1.5 Model Integration
After the fault tree is transformed to GCEFSMs, we start integrating it into the
behavioral model. At this point, every message in the BM contains an event name
that is related to an event in one of the leaf nods of the fault tree. We check the class
diagram and the Event-Gate table to find the event ID and the gate ID for the event.
These event ID and gate ID are inserted into the message at the BM. The event
Gas leak > 4 sec is represented in the class diagram as BFGasValve.FeventCond.
This event is looked up inside the the event-gate table to get its event ID (eB1) and
the gate ID (G1) the message is sent to. The message in the BM is modified as
(mB1, eB1, G1). Then, the event Observation Interval < 30 Sec which is represented
in the class diagram as BFObservation.BFEventCond is looked up inside the the
event-gate table to get its event ID (eB2) and the gate ID (G2) the message is sent
to. The message in the BM is modified as (mB2, eB2, G2). Next, the event Air
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Present which is represented in the class diagram as BFAirValve.FEventCond is
looked up to get its event ID (eB3) and the gate ID (G4) the message is sent to.
The message in the BM is modified as (mB3, eB3, G4). Finally, the event Ignition
Attempted which is represented in the class diagram as BFIgniter.State is looked up
to get its event ID (eB4) and the gate ID (G5) the message is sent to. The message
in the BM is modified as (mB4, eB4, G5).
Figure 4.19 illustrates the gas burner system transformed to an CEFSM model
integrated with a transformed FT (GCEFSMs). There are two connected models,
the behavioral model and the FT model. The red arrows represent the communicat-
ing messages between the CEFSMs. The transformed system shown in Figure 4.19
forms a graph to which suitable coverage criteria can be applied. The FT gates that
are directly connected to the behavioral model receive messages from the behavioral
model and acts accordingly. The messages m1 to m5 represent the global transitions
between the GCEFSMs for the FT part, while mI1 to mI4 represent the messages
between the components of the behavioral model and mB1 to mB5 represent the
communicating messages between the BM and FT. If we apply the algorithm in [68]
on the graph in Figure 4.19 by imposing the edge coverage criteria on the global

































































































































































































































































































































•T5:(Burning,[HeatReg =true&FlameOn = true])/(Burning, -, -)
•T6:(Burning,[NoHeatReq =true|NoFlame = true],SetTimer(t,1))/
(NotBurning,-,-)
•T7:(NotBurning, TimeOut)/(Idle, -, Send(GasOff))
•T8:(Absent, FlameOn)/(Present, -, Send(FlameOn))
•T9:(Present, FlameOff)/(Absent, -, Send(FlameOff))
•T10:(Closed, AirOn)/(Open, -, Send(mB3))
•T11:(Open, AirOff)/(Closed, -, Send(mB3))
•T12:(Closed, GasOn)/(Open, -, Send(mB1,mB2))
•T13:(Open, GasOff)/(Closed, -, Send(mB1,mB2))
•T14:(Off, IgniteOn)/(On, -, Send(mB4))
Continued on next page
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•T15:(On, IgniteOff)/(Off, -, Send(mB4))
•T16:(S0,setTimer(v,4s))/(S1, -, -)
•T17:(S1,timeout)/(S2, -, Send(GasleakingMSG))
•T18:(S1, [ei.eId = “GasNotLeaking”], get(mB1))/ (S0, reset(Timer),
Send(GateNotOccured))
•T19:(S2, ei.eStatus = false], get(mB1))/ (S0, reset(Timer);
update(events),Send(GateNotOccurred))
•T20:(S0, get(mB2)/(S1, setTimer(v,30), Send(GateOccurred))
•T21:(S1, timeout)/(S2, -, Send(GateNotOccurred))
•T22:(S1,[ei.eId = “GasOff”], get(mB2))/(S0, reset(v,30s),
Send(GateNotOccurred))
•T23:(S2, setTimer(v,30s))/(S1, -, Send(GateOccurred))
•T24:(S0,[NoOfPositiveEvents < 2 & ei.eStatus = true], get(mi))/(S0,
update(events),-)
•T25:(S0,[NoOfPositiveEvents > 0 & ei.eStatus = false], get(mi))/(S0,
update(events),-)
•T26:(S0,[NoOfPositiveEvents = 2 & ei.eStatus = true],get(mi))/(S1,
update(events),Send(GateOccurred))
Continued on next page
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•T27:(S1,[ei.eStatus = t ], get(mi))/(S0,update(events),Send(Gate
NotOccurred))
•T28:(S0,[NoOfPositiveEvents < 2 & ei.eStatus = true],get(mi))/(S0,
update(events),-)
•T29:(S0,[NoOf PositiveEvents > 0 & ei.eStatus = false], get(mi))/(S0,
update(events),-)
•T30:(S0,[NoOfPositiveEvents = 2 & ei.eStatus = true],get(mi))/(S1,
update(events),Send(GateOccurred))
•T31:(S1,[ei.eStatus = false], get(mi))/(S0,update(events),Send(GateNot
Occurred))
•T32:(S0,[ordered(input);notLast(input)], get(mi))/(S0,update(event),-)
•T33:(S0, [ei.eId = “GateNotOccurred”|ei.eId = “igniteOff”],get(mi))/
(S0,update(event),-)





•T37:(S1,[ei.eStatus = false & NoOfPositiveEvents = 0],get(mi))/(S1,-,
Send(GateNot Occurred))
Continued on next page
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•T38:(S1, [NoOfPositiveEvents = 2 & ei.eStatus = true],get(mi))/(S1,
update(events),-)
•T39:(S1, [ei.eStatus = false], get(mi))/(S1,update(events),-)
• mB1:(mB1,e1, G1) • mB2:(mB2,e2, G2)
• mB3:(mB3,eB3, G4) • mB4:(mB4,eB4, G5)
Table 4.7: Gas Burner System Test Paths
• Idle T 1−→Idle
• Idle T 2−→Igniting T 3−→Ignited T 4−→Burning T 5−→Burning T 6−→NotBurning T 7−→Idle
• Idle mI3−−→Igniter[Off T 14−−→On] mB4−−→5 m5−→6
• Idle T 2−→Igniting T 3−→Ignited mI3−−→Igniter[On T 15−−→Off] mB4−−→5 m5−→6
• Idle mI1−−→AirValve[Closed T 10−−→Open] mB3−−→4 m4−→5 m5−→6
• Idle mI2−−→GasValve[Closed T 12−−→Open] mB2−−→2 m2−→3 m3−→4 m4−→5 m5−→6
• Idle mI2−−→GasValve[closed T 12−−→Open] mB1−−→1 m1−→3 m3−→4 m4−→5 m5−→6
• Idle T 2−→Igniting T 3−→Ignited T 4−→Burning T 5−→Burning T 6−→NotBurning
mI2−−→GasValve[Open T 13−−→Closed] mB1−−→1 m1−→3 m3−→4 m4−→5 m5−→6
• Idle T 2−→Igniting T 3−→Ignited T 4−→Burning T 5−→Burning T 6−→NotBurning mI2−−→
GasValve[Open
T 13−−→Closed] mB2−−→2 m2−→3 m3−→4 m4−→5 m5−→6
The difference between our approach and those that use statecharts such as [127,
40, 82] is that our approach is used to explicitly model systems (with communication
edges) where the behavior process and the failure process intersect. Therefore,
paths can be produced. It is also possible to manipulate sensor values and create
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events during system testing. This model can also be used as a simulation test
bed. Moreover, in our approach, different levels of details can be used for different
testing purposes. For example, if we want to test the system, we can look at every
GCEFSM as a whole and we do not have to worry about the GCEFSMs’ internal
details (transitions and states) since we know how they behave. When we compared
the number of states and transitions produced by our integration approach with
those of [127] on this Gas burner example, we found that the ICEFSM contains 27
states and 41 transitions whereas the EFSM model of [127] will contain at least 84
states and 168 transitions. The slicing algorithm used in [127] will not be useful in
partitioning the model here because the FT has two minimum cuts one of which
contains all the leaf nodes except for the external event “Electrical short in cables”.
4.2.2 Application: Aerospace Launch System
4.2.2.1 Description of Launch System
In this section we demonstrate our approach with a launch system example to
show the integration of multiple fault trees 1 into CEFSMs. A launch system consists
of a launch conductor, ground system, launch pad, mobile launch platform and a
launch vehicle which is comprised of a booster, upper stage and a payload. The
booster and upper stage are fueled by cryogenic fuels which can only be liquefied
at extremely low temperatures. Cryogenic fuels are chosen because they generate
a high specific impulse, which defines their efficiency of fuel relative to the amount
consumed. A medium lift vehicle is capable of lofting a payload weighing between
4000 and 40,000 lbs. into low earth orbit. The launch controller is responsible for
initiating the launch sequence and verifying the safety and security of the launch
1Seana Hagerman contributed to this case study
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control system throughout the launch. The launch conductor communicates to the
vehicle through the ground system. The ground system is physically connected to
the launch vehicle via Ethernet cables, serial cables, 1553 data cables and fuel lines.
The sequence begins about 24 hours before a launch when the launch conductor
initiates the countdown clock. The launch conductor then clears the area of non-
essential personnel using a public announcement system. The mobile launch pad
is prepared for jacking. The launch conductor initiates environmental control sys-
tem (ECS) on the launch pad, solicits a weather briefing, and turns on both search
lights and amber warning lights. The MLP and vehicle are moved to the launch
pad. Cryogenic tanking begins on the launch vehicle and an instrumentation check
is performed. A test to detect hazard gas is performed. The launch vehicle’s Liquid
Oxygen LO2 is verified as well as the upper stage’s Liquid Hydrogen LH2. The
launch conductor periodically conducts polls of the stakeholders to obtain concur-
rence to continue the sequence. When concurrence is received, the launch conductor
initiates the chill down procedures and flight pressures. The safe arm device (SAD)
is initiated. The SAD is used to terminate the flight, should there be a problem after
launch. The launch conductor commands the launch vehicle to switch to internal
power and the vehicle lifts off the launch pad. Figure 4.20 shows the CEFSM model
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Figure 4.20: CEFSM Model for a Launch System
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• T11:(NitrogenPurge, [ECSError = false])/(NitrogenPurge,-,send(mf11
”fuelcheckFail”))
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• T27:(BatteryChk,[BatteryPresent = false|PowerLevelOK = false |
BatteryLifeOK = false])/(BatteryChk,-,send(mf27”Batteryfail”))













4.2.2.2 Launch System Failure
The Aerospace launch system fault trees include initialization, fire, preflight,
and launch fail. Initialization fail is the first fault that can occur in the system,
these faults are less extreme. The initialization sequence includes connection fail,
countdown clock fail and hazard lights fail. Any of these can be mitigated with a
retry before an abort command is issued. The fire fault tree sequence contains the
most critical failures that could result in explosion of the system. These failures are
LO2, helium and LH2 fail. Preflight fail are the faults that can occur before a launch
command is issued. Preflight fail includes battery check, initialize fuel and battery
switch fail. Launch is the final set of faults that can occur after the launch command
has been issued. It includes environmental control system ECS and preflight fail.
ECS includes the air conditioning failures and Nitro Purge failures. Preflight fail
includes the Instrument, cryotesting and chill down failures. The fire, prelaunch
and launch faults must be mitigated with an abort to protect the payload.
Four launch failure occurrences are described as four FTs, one FT for each fail-
ure. The FT in Figure 4.21 shows what causes the initialization failure of the launch
vehicle, the FT in Figure 4.22 shows what can cause a fire and possible explosion.
The pre-flight failure is illustrated by the FT in the Figure 4.23, and the launch fail-
ure is shown in Figure 4.24. These FTs will be integrated in the behavioral model
shown in Figure 4.20. The mitigation actions for this system is to abort. Therefore,
mitigations are not applicable.
Initialization fail FT and the event description are as follows:
• Connection fail: The first step in the launch sequence requires that a connec-
tion is made between the launch vehicle, upper stage, launch platform and
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ground system. This connection consists of Ethernet cable to establish the
ground network and 1553 cables for commanding and getting status from the
launch vehicle. Failure for one of the networks to communicate would result
in the launch being canceled or delayed. A retry action could be taken to
attempt to establish the connection.
• CountDownClk fail:The launch vehicle and the ground system heavily rely on
the countdown clock to synchronize time between them. If the countdown
clock fails to start, pause or stop the result could fail to synchronize and cause
a tank to be over/under filled and an explosion. If the fault were caught early
on, the ground operator could retry to sync them or abort the launch.
• HazardLight fail: Hazard Lights are used for safety around a launch vehicle.
They consist of flashing or strobe lights to warn people in the area to keep
away. The launch should not be conducted with a failure in the safety light
mechanism.
 Initialization fail 
Connection fail CountDownCLK fail HazardLights fail 
Figure 4.21: Initialization Fail FT
Fire fail FT and the event description are as follows:
• LO2 fail: Liquid oxygen is cryogenic liquid oxidizer propellant for a launch
vehicle. It creates a high specific impulse. The launch vehicle tank is made





LO2 fail Helium fail LH2 fail 
Figure 4.22: Fire Occurrence FT
boil off and must be replenished before launch. Liquid Oxygen is fed into the
engine using valves. Faults associated with LO2 include: failure to pressurize,
failure to top off tank, stuck valve, or defective structural integrity of the tank.
The faults if not mitigated in time would result in a fire or explosion.
• Helium fail: Helium is used by the upper stage to purge fuel and pre-cool liquid
hydrogen. A failure from helium would result in liquid oxygen overheating and
an explosion of the system.
• LH2 fail: Liquid Hydrogen is the upper stage cryogenic rocket propellant. It
has the lowest molecular weight of any substance and burns with extreme
intensity. Liquid hydrogen creates the highest specific impulse. The faults
associated with Liquid Hydrogen include, exposure to heat and leaking out of
tank weld seams which would cause an explosion.
Pre-flight fail FT and the event description are as follows:
• BAChk fail: Battery checks are performed on the launch vehicle by the ground
system. Batteries are tested for condition, state of charge is measured in volts,
cell resistance is measured ohms, and a percent of life expectancy is evaluated.






BAChk fail InitFuel fail BASwitch fail 
Figure 4.23: Preflight Fail FT
• InitFuel fail: Fuel Initialization is the process of preparing the booster LO2
system and the upper stage LH2 system. The fuel systems are prepared by
locking the valves and measuring gas pressure. Faults include low fuel pres-
sures or bad valves.
• BASwitch fail: Prior to launching, the ground system must switch the launch
vehicle from external power to internal power. This is accomplished by switch-
ing the power to the internal batteries. Internal battery failures include failure
to switch, bad battery condition, low voltage, low cell resistance and low life
expectancy.
Launch fail FT and the event description are as follows:
• ACInit fail: Launch pad environmental control system air conditioning is ini-
tialized. The system fails when the air conditioning unit fails to power, or
temperature is not within an acceptable range.
• NitroPurge fail: Launch pad environmental control system performs a nitrogen
purge of the tanks prior to launch. Nitrogen is used to clean the tanks of
impurities. It will also displace oxygen and reduce the risk of fire or oxidation.
Faults that could occur are low nitrogen pressure or stuck valve.
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 Launch fail 
ECSInit Internal fail 
ACInit fail NetroPurge fail Instrument fail ChillDown fail 
CryoTesting fail 
Figure 4.24: Launch Fail FT
• Instrument fail: Prior to launch, the vehicle’s instrumentation is verified by
running a self or BIT (built in test) Test, the self-test verifies the instrumenta-
tion is running properly and performs a check sum to ensure that the proper
version of software is loaded. Instrumentation faults include self-test failure,
checksum error or telemetry data error.
• ChillDown fail: The chilldown procedure is used to condition fuel lines to
handle the extreme cold temperatures of the cryogenic fuel. Small amounts
of fuel are released from the storage tanks into the lines the feed the vehicle.
Failures include: low chilldown pressure or ruptured fuel line.
• CryoTesting fail: Cryotesting is used to determine if the vehicle will operate
under extreme temperatures. This demonstration fills and drains the tanks
several times. Failures include: failure to pressurize tanks and valve failure.
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4.2.2.3 Compatibility Transformation Step
At this step we create Bclass and Fclass for failure related entities and combine
the related classes according to the compatibility transformation procedure. At this
step we create Bclass and Fclass. In this example, four FTs will be integrated to
the behavioral model. We start with the left most leaf node of the FT in Figure
4.21. The leaf node Connection fail of the fault tree in Figure 4.21 is related to
the entity Network Connection. Therefore, according to the compatibility transfor-
mation rules, since the attribute of the Bclass BNetworkConnection and the Fclass
FConnection are the same, they are combined in the BFclass BFConnection.
Next, we take its sibling, the CountDownCLK fail which is represented as
FCountDownCLK class. This Fclass is related to the entity Countdown Clock at
the behavioral model which is represented as BCountDownClock. Therefore, they
are combined into BFCountDownCLK class. The third leaf node in this FT is the
HazardLights fail. This leaf node event is related to the HazardLights On. Therefore,
we combine their related Bclass and Fclass into BFHazardLights. Notice that, here
the values of the attributes are different, therefore, we need to include a BAttribute
(Bstate) from the BhazardLights and FAttribute from the FHazardLights into the
BFHazardLights.
Next, we do the compatibility transformation for the second FT Figure 4.22. We
start with the left most leaf node which is the event LO2 fail that is represented
as FLO2Chk. This event is related to the entity LO2Chk which is represented as
BLO2Chk. Since the attributes of these classes are the same, we combine them into
BFLO2 as shown in Figure 4.28. The next event to transform is the Helium fail. It
is related to the HeliumChk entity and both have the same attributes. Therefore,
they are combined into BFHelium (Figure 4.29.) The next event in this FT is the
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leaf node LH2 fail. It is related to the LH2Chk entity at the behavioral model. The
LH2Chk and LH2 fail are represented as BLH2Chk and FLH2 respectively. Since
these events have the same attributes, they are combined in BFLH2.
Having finished all leaf node events in the FT in Figure 4.22, we start with the
left most leaf node event of the PreFlight fail FT (Figure 4.23), which is BAChk
fail that is represented as FBAChk. It is related to the entity BatteryChk which
is represented as BBatteryChk class. These classes are combined in BFBatteryChk
class (cf Figure 4.31.) InitiFuel fail, represented as FInitFuel, is related to Initiate-
Fueling entity which is represented as BInitiateFueling. As shown in Figure 4.32,
these two classes are combined in BFInitFuel. Figure 4.33 shows the combination
of the event BASwitch fail and IntBattery. These two events are represented in
BInternalBattery and FBSwitch classes respectively.
Next we analyze the fault tree for launch fail (Figure 4.24) starts with the left
most leaf node event which is ACInit fail. This event is represented as FACIni-
tion class and is related to the entity Air Conditioning which is also represented as
BAirCondition. The attributes of these classes are the same so they are combined
in BFACInitiation class as shown in Figure 4.34. The next leaf node event is Ni-
troPurge fail which is related to the entity NitrogenPurge at the behavioral model.
The NetroPurge fail is represented as FNitrogenPurge class and the BNitrogenPurge
is represented as NitrogenPurge class. These two classes are combined in BFNitro-
genPurge as shown in Figure 4.35. Next, we take the event Instrument fail. This
event is related to the INSTChk entity. They are represented as FInstrument and
BINSTChk respectively and combined into BFInstrument as illustrated in Figure
4.36.
The event CryoTesting fail is transformed next. This event is represented in
FCryoTesting and is related to the CryoTesting entity which is also represented as
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BCryoTesting class. The combination of these two classes is the BFCryoTesting
class can be seen in Figure 4.37. Finally, we transform the event ChillDown fail to
be compatible with the entity ChillDown. They are represented as FChilldown class
and BChilldown class and are combined in BFChilldown class as Figure 4.38 shows.
   
 
  
-FState: connected,  fail 
-FCond: Fstate= fail 
FConnection 
-Bstate:connected,  fail 
BNetworkConnection 
-BFState:connected,  fail 
-BFCond:FState =fail  
BFConnection 
 
Figure 4.25: Network Connection Class
   
 
  
-FState: reset, fail 
-FCond:FState =fail 
FCountDownCLK 




            not reset 
BCountDownClock 
Figure 4.26: Countdown Clock Class
   
 
  
-BState: On, Off 
-FState: On, fail 
-BFCond:FState=fail  
BFHazardLights 
-Bstate: On, Off 
BHazardLights 
-FState: On, fail 
-FCond: FState=fail 
FHazardLights 
Figure 4.27: Hazard Lights Class
   
 
  
-BFState: Pass, fail 
-BFCond:FState=fail  
BFLO2 
 -Bstate: Pass, 
             fail 
BLO2Chk 
-FState: Pass, fail 
-FCond: FState=fail 
FLO2 
Figure 4.28: LO2 Class
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-BFState: Pass, fail 
-BFCond:FState=fail  
BFHelium 




             fail 
BHeliumChk 
Figure 4.29: Helium Class
   
 
  
-BFState: Pass, fail 
-BFCond:FState=fail  
BFLH2 
-FState: Pass, fail 
-FCond: FState = fail 
FLH2 
-Bstate: Pass, 
             fail 
BLH2Chk 
Figure 4.30: LH2 Class
   
 
  
-BFState: Pass, fail 
-BFCond:FState=fail  
BFBatteryChk 
 -FState: Pass, fail 
-FCond: FState = fail 
FBAChk 
-Bstate: Pass, 
            fail 
BBatteryChk 
Figure 4.31: Battery Class








-FState: Pass, fail 
-FCond:FState=fail 
FInitFuel 
Figure 4.32: Initiating Fueling Class
   
 
  
-BFState: Pass, fail 
-BFCond:FState=fail 
BFIntBatSwitch 
 -FState: Pass, fail 
-FCond:FState=fail 
FBASwitch 
-Bstate: Pass, fail 
BInternalBattery 
Figure 4.33: Battery Switching Class
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-BFState: Pass, fail 
-BFCond:FState=fail  
BFACInitiation 
-Bstate: Pass,  
             fail 
BAirCondition 
-FState: Pass, fail 
-FCond:FState=fail 
FACInition 
Figure 4.34: Air Conditioning Initiation Class
   
 
  




             fail 
BNitrogenPurge 
-FState: Pass, fail 
-FCond:FState=fail 
FNitrogenPurge 
Figure 4.35: Nitrogen Class
   
 
  
-BFState: Pass, fail 
-BFCond:FState=fail  
BFInstrument 




             fail 
BINSTChk 
 
Figure 4.36: Instruments Class
   
 
  
-BFState: Pass, fail 
-BFCond:FState=fail  
BFCryoTesting 




             fail 
BCryoTesting 
Figure 4.37: Cryo Class
   
 
  
-BFState: Pass, fail 
-BFCond:FState=fail  
BFChilldown 




             fail 
BChilldown 
 
Figure 4.38: Chill Down Class
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After the compatibility transformation procedure is finished, the fault tree of the
initialization failure Figure (4.21) is represented as: FT́ =
(∨,(BFConnection.BFCond,BFCountDownCLK.BFCond,BFHazardLight. BFCond)).
The FT in Figure 4.22 is presented as: FT́ =
(∨,(BFLO2.BFCond,BFHeluim.BFCond,LH2.BFCond))
The FT in Figure 4.23 is presented as: FT́ =
(∨,(BFBatteryChk.BFCond,BFInitFuel.BFCond,BFIntBatSwitch.BFCond))
The FT in Figure 4.24 is presented as: FT́ =
(∨,(∨,BFACInitiation.BFCond,BFNitrogenPurge.BFCond),(∨,(BFInstrument
.BFCond,BFCryoTesting.BFCond,BFChilldown.BFCond)))
4.2.2.4 Fault Tree Transformation
The fault CEFSM is constructed according to a tree postorder traversal. Each
FT is read gate by gate starting from the root node until we reach the leftmost leaf
node. The transformation starts with the leftmost leaf of the FT. The events are
described in terms of class diagram states and events as shown in the compatibility
transformation step. We start with the Initialization fail FT of Figure 4.21. We
traverse this FT from the root to the left most leaf node, the connection fail. Since
this is a leaf node, we give it an Event ID and the Gate ID, and insert it in the
Event-Gate table. Each event and the Gate ID are assigned a unique sequential ID
according to their appearance in the table. The next event is the CountDownCLK
fail as expressed in the condition determined by the compatibility step and the third
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is HazardLights fail. These events are shown in Table 4.9. This FT contains only
one gate and its GCEFSM can be seen in Figure 4.39.
Table 4.9: Event-Gate Table after Transforming FT in Figure 4.21






  BFConnection.BFCond 
mB1 
       BFHazardLight.BFCond 
    mB3 
1 
BFCountDownCLK.BFCond 






Figure 4.39: GCEFSM for the FT in Figure 4.21
The next FT to transform into GCEFSM is the fire occurrence FT, Figure 4.22.
We start with the left most leaf node which is LO2 fail. Since it is a leaf node, we
give it an Event ID and the Gate ID, and insert it in the Event-Gate table. Then
we take its siblings from left to right. The next sibling is the Helium fail event, give
it and event ID and insert it in the Event-Gate table and then take the last sibling
and do the same thing. At this point, all the leaf nodes of the this FT are processed,
we create the gate and give it a gate ID. Figure 4.40 shows the GCEFSM for this
FT and Table 4.10 shows the Event-Gate table after the transformation of this FT.
The pre-flight fail FT in Figure 4.23 is then transformed following the same
procedure. The first leaf node is BAChk fail. We give this event an event ID and
















Figure 4.40: GCEFSM for Fire Occurrence FT in Figure 4.22
Table 4.10: Event-Gate Table after Transforming FT in Figure 4.22







take its sibling, InitFuel fail and we give it an event ID and inset it into the Event-
Gate table. We do the same thing with the last event in this FT is the BASwitch
fail and then we create the gate. The GCEFSM of this FT is shown in Figure 4.41
and the Event-Gate table is shown in Table 4.11.
The Launch fail FT is then transformed to an equivalent GCEFSM. The leaf
node ACInit fail is read first, given an event ID and inserted into the table. Second,
the event NitroPurge fail is read and given an Event ID and inserted into the Event-
Gate table. Then the GCEFSM OR gate is created. This step is shown in Figure
4.42.
Next, we take the leaf node Instrument fail, CryoTesting fail, and ChillDown
fail one after another and we take the same action for each one. At this point, all
127
Table 4.11: Event-Gate Table after Transforming FT in Figure 4.23
























Figure 4.41: GCEFSM for the Preflight Failure FT in Figure 4.23
the leaf nodes of this FT are read and all the related gates are transformed into
GCEFSMs. Figure 4.43 shows the GCEFSM for this gate and Table 4.12 shows the





























Figure 4.43: GCEFSM for the Second OR Gate in Figure 4.24
Then we take the gate at the upper level of this FT. This gate is an OR gate.
We transform it and assign the events from the lower level gates. Figure 4.44 shows































Figure 4.44: GCEFSM for Flight Fail FT in Figure 4.24
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Table 4.12: Event-Gate Table after Transforming FT in Figure 4.24
















After all fault trees are transformed to GCEFSMs, we start integrating them
into the behavioral model. At this point, every message in the BM contains an
event name that is related to an event in one of the fault trees. We check the class
diagram and the Event-Gate table to find the event ID and the gate ID for the event.
These event ID and gate ID are inserted into the message at the BM. The event
“NetworkConnection fail” in the message mf 2 is represented in the class diagram as
BFConnection.BFCond. This event is looked up inside the the event-gate table to
obtain its event ID (eB1) and the gate ID (G1) the message is sent to. The message
is modified as (mB1, eB1, G1).
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The event HazardLights fail in the message next message mf 2 is represented as
BFCountDownCLK.BFCond in the class diagram. This event is looked up in the
event-gate table to obtain its event ID and the gate ID for the gate that receives
this event. They are eB2 and G1 respectively. The message is modified as (mB2,
eB2, G1). The next message to be modified is the message that carries the event
“CountDownCLK fail”. This event is represented as BFCountDownCLK.BFCond.
The event ID and the gate ID for this event are eB3 and G1 respectively. The
modified message will look like (mB3, eB3, G1). These events happen to be for the
same FT and this FT has only these three events as leaf nodes which means that
the first FT is integrated.
The next event to check is ”ACError” in the message mf 9. This event is repre-
sented in the class diagram as BFACInitiation.BFCond. This event is looked up in
the event-gate table to obtain its event ID and the gate ID this event is an input
to which are eB10 and G4. The message will be (mB10, eB10, G4). The next event
from the BM is ”fuelcheck Fail” in the message mf 12. This event is represented as
BFNitrogenPurge.BFCond. Its event ID and gate ID are looked up in the event-gate
table. This message will be modified as (mB11, eB11, G4).
The event ”LO2 fail” in the message mf14 which is represented as BFLO2.
BFCond is looked up in the event-gate table for the event ID and the gate ID. the
message will be modified to be (mB4, eB4,G2). The ”Helium fail” in the message
mf16 is looked up in the event-gate table to obtain its ID and the gate ID for the
gate this event is an input to. This event is represented as BFHelium.BFCond. The
message is modified to be (mB5,eB5,G2). The event ”LH2fail” in the message mf18 at
the behavioral model is taken next. According to the compatibility transformation,
this event is represented as LH2.BFCond and from the event-gate table its ID is eB6
and the gate ID this event is sent to is G2. Therefore, the message is modified as
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(mB6, eB6, G2). The next event from the begavioral model to check is “Instrufail” in
the message mf21. This event is represented as BFInstrument.BFCond. Its event ID
and gate ID are looked up in the event-gate table and they are eB12, G5. Therefore
the message is modified as (mB12, eB12, G5).
The integration procedure continues for all remaining messages from the behav-
ioral model. These messages are: the message mf23 carrying the event “cryoTesting-
fail” becomes (mB13, eB13, G5), the message mf25 carrying the event “ChillDownfail”
becomes (mB14, eB14, G5), the message mf27 carrying the event “Batteryfail” be-
comes (mB7, eB7, G3), the message mf29 carrying the event “initiateFueling fail”
becomes (mB8, eB8, G3), and the message mf32 carrying the event InternalBattery-
fail becomes (mB9, eB9, G3). Ones all the messages are assigned to their GCEFSMs
destinations, The behavioral model and the fault trees are integrated. Figure 4.45











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































•T4:(HazardsightsOn, [AllHazardLighsOn = false],)/(HazardLightsOn,-,
send(mB2))
•T5:(nazardLightsOn, [AllHazardLighsOn = true], ResetClock)/(Count
DownClockReset ,-,-)
•T6:(CountDoenclockRwset, [ClkError = true],)/(CountDownclock
Reset,-,send(mI1))











•T15:(LO2Chk, [LO2leak = false & LO2PressureOK = true])/
Continued on next page
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(HeliumChk,-,-)
•T16:(HeliumChk,[Helkimleak = true|HeliumPressureOK = false])/
(HeliumChk, -, send(mB5))
•T17:(HeliumChk,[Heliumleak = false&HeliumPressureOK = true])/
(LH2Chk,-,-)
•T18:(LH2Chk,[LH2leak = true|LH2PressureOk != false])/(LH2Chk,
send(mB6))
•T19:(LH2Chk,[LH2leak = false & LH2PressureOK = true])/(LH2Chk
,-,send(mI3))
•T20:(Idle,,get(m3”PreFlight”)/(INSTChk,-,-)
•T21:(INSTChk,[ChkcksumOK = false | LaunchConductCommOk =
false])/(INSTChk,send(mB12))
•T22:(INSTChk,[ChecksumOk = true & LaunchConductCommOk =
true])/(CryoTesting, -,-)
•T23:(CryoTesting, [IntTempOK = false | IntPressureOk = false]) /
(CryoTesting, send(mB13))
•T24:(CryoTesting, [IntTempOK = true & IntPressureOk = true])/
(ChillDown,-,-)
•T25:(ChillDown,[IntTempOK = false | InterPssurOK = false])/
(ChillDown,-, send(mB14)
•T26:(ChillDown,[IntTemIOK = true & IntPressurOK = true])/
(BatteryChk,-,-)
•T27:(BatteryChk,[BatBeryPresent = false | PowerLevelOK = false |
BatteryLifeOK = false])/(BatteryChk,-,send(mB7))
•T28:(BatteryChk, [BatteryPresent = true & PowerLevelOK = true &
Continued on next page
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ButteryLifeOK = true])/(InitiateFueling,-,-)
•T29:(InitiateFueling, [TankPressureOK = false | FuelLevelOK = false |
TankTempOK = false])/(InitiateFueling,send(mB8))
•T30:(InitiateFueling, [TankPressureOK = true & FuelLevelOK = true








•mB1:(mB1, eB1, G1) •mB2:(mB2, eB2, G1) •mB3:(mB3, eB3, G1)
•mB4:(mB4, eB4, G2) •mB5:(mB5, eB5, G2) •mB6:(mB6, eB6, G2)
•mB7:(mB7, eB7, G3) •mB8:(mB8, eB8, G3) •mB9:(mB9, eB9, G3)
•mB10:(mB10, eB10, G4) •mB11:(mB11, eB11, G4)
•mB12:(mB12, eB12, G5) •mB13:(mB13, eB13, G5)
•mB14:(mB14, eB14, G5)
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Table 4.14: Aerospace Launch System Test Paths
• Initialization[Idle T 1−→NetworkConnection T 3−→HazardLightsOn T 5−→Count
DownClockReset]
• ECSInitialization[idle T 8−→AirConditioning T 10−−→NitrogenPurge T 11−−→Nitrogen
Purge]
• FuelCheck[Idle T 13−−→LO2Chk T 15−−→HeliumChk T 17−−→LH2Chk T 18−−→LH2Chk]
• PreFlight[Idle m20−−→InstrumentChk] mb12−−→ S9
m5−→ S11
T 51−−→ S12
• PreFlight[Idle m20−−→InstrumentChk T 22−−→CryoTesting T 24−−→ChillDown T 26−−→
BatteryChk
T 28−−→InitiaFueling T 29−−→InitiateFueling]




• Initialization[Idle T 1−→NetworkConnection T 2−→NetworkConnection] mB1−−→
S0
T 31−−→ S1
• Initialization[Idle T 1−→NetworkConnection T 3−→HazardLightsOn] mB2−−→
S0
T 31−−→ S1




• Initialization[Idle T 1−→NetworkConnection T 3−→HazardLightsOn T 4−→Hazard
LightsOn
T 5−→CountDown Clock Reset]
• Initialization[Idle T 1−→NetworkConnection T 3−→HazardLightsOn T 5−→Count
Continued on next page
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DownClockReset]
m1−→ECSInitialization[Idle T 8−→ AirConditioning T 10−−→
NitrogenPurge]
• ECSInitialization[Idle T 8−→AirConditioning T 9−→Air conditioning T 10−−→
NitrogenPurge]
• ECSInitialization[Idle T 8−→AirConditioning T 10−−→NitrogenPurge] mB11−−−→ S7
m4−→ S11
T 51−−→ S12
• ECSInitialization[Idle T 8−→AirConditioning T 10−−→NitrogenPurge] m2−→
FuelChk[idle
T 13−−→LO2Chk m15−−→HeliumChk] mB5−−→ S3
• FuelChk[Idle T 13−−→LO2Chk T 14−−→LO2Chk T 15−−→HeliumChk] mB5−−→ S4
• FuelChk[Idle T 13−−→LO2Chk T 15−−→HeliumChk T 16−−→HeliumChk] mB5−−→ S4
• FuelChk[Idle m13−−→LO2Chk T 15−−→HeliumChk T 17−−→LH2Chk] mI3−−→PreFlight[Idle
T 20−−→InstrumentChk] mB12−−−→ S9
m5−→ S11
T 51−−→ S12
• PreFlight[Idle T 20−−→InstrumentChk T 22−−→CryoTesting] mB13−−−→S9
m5−→S11
T 51−−→S12




• PreFlight[Idle m20−−→InstrumentChk T 22−−→CryoTesting T 23−−→CryoTesting T 24−−→
ChillDown
T 26−−→BatteryChk T 28−−→InitiaFueling]
• PreFlight[Idle m20−−→InstrumentChk T 22−−→CryoTesting T 24−−→ChillDown T 25−−→
ChillDown
T 26−−→BatteryChk T 28−−→InitiaFueling]
Continued on next page
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• PreFlight[Idle m20−−→InstrumentChk T 22−−→CryoTesting T 24−−→ChillDown T 26−−→
BatteryChk
T 27−−→BatteryChk T 28−−→InitiaFueling]
• PreFlight[Idle m20−−→InstrumentChk T 22−−→CryoTesting T 24−−→ChillDown T 26−−→
BatteryChk
T 28−−→InitiaFueling] mB8−−→ S5
T 39−−→ S6
• PreFlight[Idle m20−−→InstrumentChk T 22−−→CryoTesting T 24−−→ChillDown T 26−−→
BatteryChk
T 28−−→InitiaFueling] m4−→Flight[idle T 31−−→IntBattery T 33−−→
FlightCommand
T 34−−→Success]
•Flight[Idle T 31−−→IntBattery T 32−−→IntBattery T 33−−→FlightCommand T 34−−→Success]
The transformed system shown in Figure 4.45 forms a graph to which suitable
coverage criteria can be applied. The FT gates that are directly connected to the
behavioral model receive messages from the behavioral model and act accordingly.
The messages m1 to m5 represent the global transitions between the GCEFSMs for
the FTs, while mI1 to mI5 represent the messages between the components of the
behavioral model and mB1 to mB14 represent the communicating messages between
the behavioral and fault models. If we apply the algorithm in [68] to the graph in
Figure 4.45 by imposing the edge coverage criteria, we obtain the test paths shown
in Table 4.14. Note that this approach forces a proper prioritization if the tests are
executed in order, i.e. there is no need for extra test prioritization rules.
The difference between our approach and those that use statecharts such as [127,
40, 82] is that our approach is used to explicitly model systems (with communication
edges) where the behavior process and the failure process intersect. Therefore, paths
can be produced. These paths can be used for feasibility testing and planning for
mitigation actions, and mitigation testing. It is also possible to manipulate sensor
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values and create failure events during system testing. Moreover, in our approach,
different levels of details can be used for different testing purposes. For example, if
we want to test the system, we can look at every GCEFSM as a unit and not worry
about the GCEFSMs’ internal details (transitions and states) since we know how
they behave.
When we compared the number of states and transitions produced by our inte-
grated approach with those of [127] on this aerospace launch system example, we
found that our ICEFSM contains 41 states and 117 transitions whereas the EFSM
model of [127] will contain at least 4316 states and 8335 transitions.
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4.3 ICEFSM as Part of an End-to-End testing
Methodology
The End-to-End testing2 [6] methodology shown in Figure 4.46 consists of two
phases. The first phase integrates the behavioral and fault model to produce test
cases. The second phase construct the safety mitigation tests based on the weaving
rules and some coverage criteria.
4.3.1 Test Generation Process
The test generation process is shown in Figure 4.46. It uses the behavioral
model (BM) and a FT to generate test cases. The approach consists of two phases.
The first phase generates failures and determines in which behavioral states spe-
cific failures may occur (failure applicability). Phase 1 starts with a compatibility
transformation step for the Fault Tree wrt the behavioral model. The FT produced
from this step is transformed into gate CEFSMs (GCEFSMs) according to transfor-
mation rules. Then, the model integration step integrates the GCEFSM with the
behavioral model (BM) according to the integration rules. The resultant model is
the integrated communicating extended finite state machine (ICEFSM). Any of a
number of existing test case generation methods can use this model to generate test
cases based on test criteria (IC). This is the approach described in Section 3 of this
dissertation.
The second phase generates safety mitigation tests. We construct the behavioral
test suite (BT) from the behavioral model (BM) using behavioral test criteria (BC).
From the test paths generated from the integrated model ICEFSM, we construct
2This portion of the work is done jointly with Mrs. Salwa Elakeili.
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the applicability matrix. Then, we apply test coverage criteria (the paper suggests
C1-C4) to the behavioral test suite and failure types. Based on the applicability
of failures in specific behavioral states, we select states in existing test paths repre-
senting behavioral tests (positions in a test path) and combine them with applicable
failures(e) to systematically create failure situations for which we test proper miti-
gation. The mitigation tests are generated from the mitigation model (MM) based
on mitigation coverage criteria (MC). After that, we construct the safety mitigation
tests (SMTs) by combining the mitigation tests (MTs) with the behavioral tests at
the failure position (p) according to weaving rules (WRs). We describe each phase
in more detail in the following subsections.
4.3.2 Phase1: Generate Failures and Failure Applicability
In this phase, we propose an integration of the behavioral model with a fault
model to take advantage of the two for testing. The test generation process in Figure
4.46 uses the behavioral model and a FT to generate test cases. It starts with the
compatibility transformation step. The FT́ produced from this step is transformed
into gate CEFSMs (GCEFSMs) according to the transformation rules. Then, the
model integration step integrates the GCEFSM with the behavioral model (BM)
according to the integration rules. The resultant model is the Integrated Communi-
cating Extended Finite State Machine ICEFSM. Test case generation methods can
use this model to generate test cases based on test criteria (IC) that lead to failure.
A shorter version of the technique described here was originally developed in [52].
In [52, 54, 53] it was applied to multiple fault trees related to an aerospace launch
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Figure 4.46: End-To-End Test Generation Process
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4.3.3 Construction of the Applicability Matrix
The applicability matrix is a two dimensional array. Each column represents a




1 if failure type j can occur in state si,
0 if otherwise
Phase 1 determines whether a failure of type j can occur in state si or not. The
applicability matrix is then constructed from the test paths obtained from phase 1




- Set of test paths (R )  from ICEFSM. 
- Failure types table (Q). 
Output: 
- Applicability Matrix AM(i,j). 
Begin 
   For all the paths r i in R take r i one-by-one { 
    If (path r i   R contribute to failure)  
       Then { 
       Obtain failure name (Wi) from Q 
       Check Wi  in Q  
       If (found)     //it mean that it is a failure not an event 
       then{ 
           For every behavior state si   r i 
                 Assign “1” to AM (fj , si)  
           Check the reminder test paths r’j  R that don’t  
           contribute to failure 
           If (s0   r i == s’0   r’j) 
             then 
                For all s’i   r’i  
                     Assign “1” to AM (f j, s’I )   
           } 
          else 
                  // this is a normal event 
    }  
       } 
   And assign “0” to the reminder of AM  
End 
Figure 4.47: Applicability Matrix Construction Procedure
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4.3.4 Phase2: Generate Safety Mitigation Tests
Our goal in this phase is to provide an MBT approach to test proper mitigation
of safety failures in SCSs. Andrews et al. [8] describe this approach for generating
a safety mitigation test suite. However, they use an EFSM instead of a CEFSM
and these are not able to model the interaction of the failure process and the be-
havioral process and merely assume that a particular failure can be generated when
the system is in a given behavioral state. However the process described below
is substantially Mrs. Elakeili’s work and described here to demonstrate how the
end-to-end process works.
Mitigation models describe mitigation patterns associated with a fault. Mitiga-
tion test criteria describe required coverage. Mitigation test paths are then gener-
ated and woven into the behavioral test similar to aspect oriented modeling [129].
Weaving rules describe how a mitigation test path is woven into the original behav-
ioral test. Phase 2 in figure 4.46 summaries how to construct safety mitigation tests
(SMTs). The safety critical testing process has the following steps:
• Construct a behavioral test suite BT from the behavior model BM, using
behavior test criteria BC.
• Construct mitigation test suites MT from mitigation models MM, using miti-
gation coverage criteria MC.
• Select positions of failure (p) in a test suite (BT), and type of failure (e)
(failure scenarios). Select (p,e) using failure coverage criteria FC.
• Construct a safety mitigation test suite SMT using the behavioral test suite
(BT), point of failure (p), type of failure (e) and mitigation test suite (MT)
according to weaving rules (WR).
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Next we need failure coverage criteria for failure scenarios. These are based on
where in our behavioral test suites failure can occur and need to be tested. In other
words, which positions p in the test suite need to be tested with which failure e?
The test criteria specify coverage rules for selecting such (p,e) pairs.
Criteria 1: All combinations, i.e. all positions p, all applicable failure types e
(test everything). This is clearly infeasible for all but the smallest models. It would
require |I| × |F | pairs if A contains all ”1”s.





(A(i,j)=1) combinations i.e. the number of one entries in the applicability matrix.
When some nodes occur many times in a test suite only one needs to be selected by
some scheme. This could lead to not testing failure recovery in all tests. A stronger
test criterion is to require covering each test as well.
Criteria 3: All tests, all unique nodes, all applicable failures. Here we simply
require that when unique nodes need to be covered they are selected from tests that
have not been covered.
A weaker criterion is not to require covering all applicable failures for each selected
position.
Criteria 4: All tests, all unique nodes, some failures (only one failure per position,
but covering all failures). Some failure means that collectively all failures must be
paired with a position at least once, but not with each selected position as in Criteria
3.
Example: This example shows the differences between the four types of coverage
criteria for all combinations (p, e). Suppose we have a test suite that has three test
paths T= {t1,t2,t3} where each test path contains a path.
t1 = {s1, s2, s3, s4}, t2 = {s1, s2, s1, s3, s1, s4}, t3 = {s2, s4, s3, s2, s3, s4}.
CT= t1 ◦ t2 . . . tl = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s1, s2, s1, s3, s1, s4, s2, s4, s3, s2, s3, s4}. I= [1,16].
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Assume we have four failures F= {f1, f2, f3, f4}. |F | =4 failures and we have four
failure types E=[1,4]. The applicability matrix is shown in Table 4.15. Tables 4.16-
4.19 show (p, e) pairs marked with ”1” that, if selected, would collectively meet test
criteria C1-C4 respectively.
Table 4.15: Applicability Matrix
F/S s1 s2 s3 s4
f1 1 1 1 1
f2 1 0 0 1
f3 1 1 1 0
f4 1 1 1 1
Table 4.16: All Position, All Applicable Failures
F/CT s1 s2 s3 s4 s1 s2 s1 s3 s1 s4 s2 s4 s3 s2 s3 s4
f1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
f2 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
f3 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
f4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 4.16 shows required combinations for criteria 1. This would need |I| ×
|F | minus the zeros entries (not applicable) in Table 4.16 ( 16 × 4 - 12 =64-12=52
pairs). For a tiny model with only 4 nodes and 4 failure types this is clearly too
much.
For Criteria 2 consider Table 4.17. The options selected (marked 1) provide
the desired coverage, but only test t1 is used to fulfill this coverage. A total of 13
pairs is needed. According to Table 4.17 the following position-failure pairs (p,e) are
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selected:{(1,1),(1,2),(1,3),(1,4),(2,1),(2,3),(2,4),(3,1),(3,3),(3,4),(4,1),(4,2),(4,4)}. A
large portion of the test suite is unused. Random selection of nodes in I can improve
this somewhat.
Criteria 3 requires using all tests. Table 4.18 shows an example of a set of position-
Table 4.17: All Unique Nodes, All Applicable Failures
F/CT s1 s2 s3 s4 s1 s2 s1 s3 s1 s4 s2 s4 s3 s2 s3 s4
f1 1 1 1 1
f2 1 0 0 1
f3 1 1 1 0
f4 1 1 1 1
failure pairs (p, e) that fulfills this criterion {(1,1),(1,2),(1,3),(1,4),(6,1),(6,3),(6,4),
(10,1),(10,2),(10,4),(13,1),(13,3),(13,4)}. As before, 13 pairs are needed, but the
selection of unique nodes is spread over all three tests. Criteria 4 does not require
Table 4.18: All Tests, All Unique Nodes, All Applicable Failures
F/CT t1 t2 t3
s1 s2 s3 s4 s1 s2 s1 s3 s1 s4 s2 s4 s3 s2 s3 s4
f1 1 1 1 1
f2 1 1
f3 1 1 1
f4 1 1 1 1
that all failures be applied at every selected position although each failure must
be selected at least once. Table 4.19 shows an example of selecting position-failure
pairs (p, e). This is the weakest criterion, since it only requires selecting each failure
at least once and each unique node at least once. The four position-failure pairs in
Table 4.19 that fulfill this criterion are {(1,1),(6,3),(10,2),(13,4)}.
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Table 4.19: All Tests, All Unique Nodes, Some Failures
F/CT t1 t2 t3





4.3.4.1 Generate Mitigation Test (MT)
Safety critical systems (SCSs) require mitigation of failures to prevent adverse
effects. This can take a variety of actions. Mitigation patterns have been defined in
[10][90] as follows:
1. Rollback brings the system back to a previous state before the failure oc-
curred. A mitigation action may occur and the system may stop or proceed
to re-execute the remainder of the test.
2. Rollforward mitigates the failure, fixes and proceeds.
3. Try other alternatives deals with decisions about which of several alterna-
tives to pursue.
4. Immediate(partial) fixing when a failure is noted, an action is taken to
deal with the problem that caused this failure prior to continuing with the
remainder of the test.
5. Deferred (partial) fixing when a failure is noted, an action must be per-
formed to record the situation and deal with the failure either partially or
temporarily because handling the failure completely is not possible.
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6. Retry when a failure is detected immediately after the execution of the activ-
ity causing the problem, an action is performed to solve the failure and then
the activity that caused the problem is tried again.
7. Compensate means the system contains enough redundancy to allow a failure
to be masked.
8. Go to fail-safe state a system is transferred into a mitigation state to avoid
dangerous effects and stops.
These mitigation patterns can be expressed in the form of mitigation models. For
example, try other alternatives is shown in Figure 4.48. Each failure fi is associated
Figure 4.48: Try Other Alternatives: Mitigation Model
with a corresponding mitigation model MMi where i = 1, . . . , k. We assume that
the models are of the same type as the behavioral model BM (e.g. an EFSM).
Graph-based [5], mitigation criteria MCi can be used to generate mitigation test
paths MTi = {mti1 , . . . , mtiki} for failure fi. Figure 4.48 shows an example of a
mitigation model of type ”Try alternatives”. Assuming MC as ”edge coverage”, the
following three mitigation test paths fulfill MC: MT={mt1,mt2,mt3} where
mt1 ={n1, n2, n5}, mt2 ={n1, n3, n5}, mt3 ={n1, n4, n5}
Mitigation models can be very small for some failures and the mitigation can be an
”empty action”. For example, if there is a rollback to state sb with immediate stop,
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the mitigation action only consists of adding a transition from sb to sf , the final
state. Hence, mt={sb, sf}. The weaving rule would specify what node to rollback
to, in this case sb. On the other hand, some mitigation models may consists of a full
set of alternative behaviors that completely replace the remainder of the original
test. We will illustrate this in the next section.
4.3.4.2 Generate Safety Mitigation Tests using Weaving Rules
Assume we have t ∈ BT , p ∈ I, e ∈ E and mt ∈ MTe. We now build a safety
mitigation test smt ∈ SMT using this information and the weaving rules wre ∈ WR
as follows:
• keep path represented by t until failure position p.
• apply failure of type e (fe) in p.
• select appropriate mt ∈MTe.
• apply weaving rule wre to construct smt.
We now explain weaving rules more formally for each type of mitigation. Let t=
{s1 . . . sb . . . node(p). . . sf . . . sk}
1. Fix
(a) Compensate ((Partial) Fix and proceed ) mitigates a failure and
continues with the remainder of the behavioral test. So,
smt=s1 . . .node(p)mtnode(p). . . sk.
mt may be zero, if mitigation does not require user involvement (inputs).
See rule 4.
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(b) Go to fail-safe state (Fix and stop) mitigates a failure and ignores
the remainder of t: smt=s1 . . .node(p)mt.
2. Rollforward
(a) Rollforward mitigates the failure, and proceeds.
smt =s1 . . .node(p)mtsf . . . sk where sf is the node in t to which we
rollforward. If only rollforward and no other actions are required mt is
empty and smt=s1 . . .node(p)sf . . . sk.
(b) Deferred fixing.
If the failure can only be fixed after reaching the rollforward node sf then
smt becomes:
smt = s1 . . .node(p)sfmtsf+1 . . . sk.
Note that further variants of this weaving rule can exist, like a state sdf
between sf and sk at which the failure mitigation mt is inserted.
t = s1 . . . sb . . .node(p). . . sf . . . sdf . . . sk.
smt= s1 . . .node(p)sf . . . sdfmt. . . sk.
3. Rollbackward
(a) Rollbackward.
Apply mitigation path mt from point of failure and rollback to node
before the failure occurred and continue with remainder of behavioral
test.
smt=s1 . . .node(p)mtsb . . . sk where sb is a node before node (p).
(b) Rollbackward and stop.
smt=s1 . . .node(p)mtsb.
4. Internal compensate (no user action required). Test immediate system
fix. For example, this can happen if a system switches to backup/redundant
153
sensors. To test this merely requires applying the failure and continuing to
execute the original test t. In this case, we do not have to modify the original
test at all (note that the assumption is that the system deals with the failure
internally without any change in black-box behavior).
While weaving rules in this section are representative, they are not meant to be
comprehensive. We expect that, over time, we may find some more or find that some
are more common than others. The result of this step is the full safety mitigation
test suite SMT.
4.4 End-To-End Case Study: Railroad Crossing
Control System (RCCS)
In this section, we use the Railroad Crossing Control System (RCCS) to illustrate
the whole End-to-End testing methodology.
4.4.1 Phase1: Generate Failures and Failure Applicability
4.4.1.1 Description of Railroad System
RCCS encompasses the following main components: train, railway track, sen-
sors, gates, controller, and signal lights as shown in Figure 4.49. A depiction of each
element is given below [101].
Train: A train is powered by a power supply. When the power is switched on, the
train starts moving along the track when the metallic wheels of the train receive
power. The train comes to a stop at the position where the power to the tracks is
switched off.
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Controller: The software that controls the general operation of the RCCS is stored
in the memory of the controller. The controller continuously monitors the sensors
and controls the gate actuators, track change lever, and the signal lights.
Sensors: Are used to detect the location of the train on the tracks. Two pairs of
sensors detect the train position before and after the gates.
Gate: RCCS has two sets of gates on either side of the track layout. The gate
receives signals from the controller. When it receives the command to lower the
gate, the gate moves down and closes. When it receives the command to raise the
gate, it moves up allowing the traffic to pass through.
Signal Lights: RCCS contains a warning light at the crossing area to indicate that
the train is approaching when the light is on and there is no train otherwise.
A railroad crossing is an intersection where a railroad crosses a road or a path
at the same level. Because of the safety concerns at the intersection, this system
is intended to prevent normal traffic and people from using the intersection when a
train approaches and crosses. Figure 4.49 depicts the behavioral model of a Rail-
road Crossing Control System (RCCS) as a Communicating Extended Finite State
Machine (CEFSM) with one train and one track. The model specifies that gates
are to be closed and warning lights are to be turned on when a train approaches,
that they are to stay that way until the train is leaving. When the train is leaving,
the gates are opened and the lights switched off. Gates stay open and lights are off
while no train is approaching. The structure of the messages (Msg) in CEFSM is
shown as in Table 4.20 (Msgid, Event, CEFSM(MsgDestination))
155
Table 4.20: Structure of Messages
Msgid Event CEFSM
Msg1 Approaching=True Controller ” activated”
Msg2 Crossing=True Controller ”monitor”
Msg3 Leaving=False Controller ” deactivated”’
Msg4 Activate=True Gate ”lower gate”
Msg5 Monitor=False Gate ”raise gate”
Msg6 Activate=True Light ”on”





T13= ([lower gate = true])/() 




T14= ([gate down =true])/() 





T17= ([light on = true]) /() 
T18= ([light on = false]) /() 
Off(S13) 
T5= ([crossing =false]) / 
 
Train 
T6= ([leaving =true)/ () 
T0=([approaching=false]]/() T2=([approaching=true])/() 












 T8=([activate =true])/ 
  








Figure 4.49: Railroad Crossing System Model
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4.4.1.2 Railroad Crossing System Failure
Basic events description:
• Raise Gate is an action from the controller component to the gate component
to open.
• Gate Opening means that the gate is in the opening state.
• Gate Open means that the gate is in the open state.
• Controller Fail means the controller has not received any message from the
train (means sensor failed to detect the train) component and therefore it has
not sent any message to the light to switch on or the gate to close.
• Controller Deactivated means that the controller has stopped monitoring the
system as it received a message saying that a train has left the crossing area.
• Train Approaching indicates that a train is approaching when it hits a sensor.
• Train Crossing indicates that a train is in the crossing area when it hits a
sensor.
This railroad crossing system example has one fault tree that describes a possible
accident. This fault tree shows how some events or faults can cause an accident when
they happen as the fault tree describes. For example, if the event Train Approaching
is true and the event Controller Fail is true, the top event accident will be true,
which means the hazard occurs. The fault tree shown in Figure 4.50 is described by
Accident = (∧,(∨,(∨,(∨, Raise Gate, Gate Opening),∧,(Gate Open, Warning
Light Off )),∨,(Controller Fail, Controller Deactivate)), (∨,(Train Approaching, Train
Crossing)))
Some events such as the Train Crossing and Train Approaching of the leaf nodes





















Figure 4.50: Fault Tree for Accident
other faults occur. For example, if the gate is open when the train is approaching,
an accident may occur. At this point, the Failure Types Table shown in figure 4.21
contains only the Failure IDs and Failure Types.
Table 4.21: Failure Types Table
Failure
ID











f2 Warning Light Fail
f3 Gate Stuck Open
f4 Controller deactivated
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4.4.1.3 Compatibility Transformation Step
The first step is the compatibility transformation. At this step we create Bclass
and Fclass for the failure related entities BTrain, BController,BGate and BWarn-
ingLight and combine the related classes according to the compatibility transforma-
tion procedure 3.1.3. These classes are shown in Figure 4.51, Figure 4.52, Figure
4.53,and Figure 4.54. The events in the FT are substituted with the combined at-
tributes from the BF classes that are equivalent to these events. For example, the
event Raise Gate in the FT is equivalent to BFRaiseGate.BFEventCond in FT́. The
attributes of BGate and FRaisGate are combined in BFRaisGate. As we can see in
Fig 4.53, the attribute BState belongs to the class BGate at the behavioral model
and FState belongs to the BFRaisGate at the fault model.
   
State: Idle, Approaching,  
          Crossing, Leaving 
BTrain 
-State: Crossing: True, False 
-EventCond: Crossing= True 
FTrainCrossing 
-State: Approaching: 
           True,False 
-EventCond: Approaching  
                     =True 
FTrainApproaching 
-BState: Idle,Approaching,  




 -BState: Idle, Approaching,  
              Crossing,Leaving 




Figure 4.51: Train Approaching and Crossing Class
After the compatibility transformation procedure is finished, the complete fault
tree Accident is represented as:
FT́= (∧, (∨, (∨, (∨, BFRaiseGate.BFEventCond, BFGateOpening.BF EventCond)
,∧,(BFGateOpen.BFEventCond, BFWarning.BFEventCond)), ∨, (BFControllerFail.
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-State: Deactivate:Yes, No 
-EventCond:Deactivate=Yes 
FControllerDeactivate 
State: Idle, Monitor,  
         Activate, deactivate 
BController 




-BState: Idle, Monitor,   
             Activate, Deactivate 
-State: Deactivate:Yes, No 
-BFEventCond:FState=  Yes 
BFControllerDeactivate 
-BState: Idle, Monitor,  
             Activate, Deactivate 
-FState: Idle:Yes, No 
-BFEventCond:FState=  Idle 
BFControllerIFail 
Figure 4.52: Train Controller Class Diagram
   
State: Open, Closed,  
        Opening,Closing 
BGate 
-State:Opening: yes, no  
-EventCond: Opening:yes 
FGateOpening 
-State:Open:yes, no  
-EventCond:Open:yes 
FGateOpen 
-State:Rais:yes, no  
-EventCond:Raise=yes 
FRaisGate 
-BState: Open, Closed,  
              Opening, Closing  
-FState: Opening: yes, no  
-BFEventCond: FState=Opening  
                            
BFGateOpening 
-BState: Opening, Closing,  
              Open, Closed  
-FState: Raising:yes, no  
-BFEventCond:FState= Raise 
BFRaisGate 
-BState: Open, Closed,  
             Opening, Closing 
-FState: Open: yes, no 
-BFEventCond: FState=  Open 
BFGateOpen 
Figure 4.53: Gate Events Class Diagram
   
-State:On, Off 
-EventCond: State= Off 
FWarningLight 
 State: On, Off 
BWarningLight 





Figure 4.54: Warining Light Class Diagram
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BFEventCond, BFControllerDeactivate.BFEventCond)), (∨, BFTrainApproaching.
BFEventCond, BFTrainCrossing.BFEventCond))
At this step, the third column of the Failure Types Table is updated with the
nodes in FT́ for every failure type. This is shown in Table 4.22.
4.4.1.4 Fault Tree Transformation
The fault CEFSM is constructed according to a tree postorder traversal. The
FT is read gate by gate starting from the root node until we reach the leftmost leaf
node. The transformation starts with the leftmost leaf of the FT which is in this
example Raise Gate. The event is described in terms of class diagram as shown
in Figure 4.53. The sibling of this event is Gate Opening which is also an event
from the BM. The gate is constructed and given a number one because it is the
first gate to construct in this FT. The message id should carry the same number
as the gate. In this case the gate is given number one since it is the first gate to
transform. The numbering of the internal transition is not important since each
gate is an independent entity and no confusion will occur.
Next, we look for the right sibling of this gate which turns out to be an AND
gate between two events. Gate Open and Warning Light Off The gate is shown in
Figure 4.56. This gate is given number 2 since it is the second gate transformed.
The next step it to transform the gate that combines these two gates and we give
it number 3. The inputs to this gate are the output messages m1 from gate 1 and
message m2 from gate 2. This gate is shown in Figure 4.57.
The next step is to transform gate number 4 and then gate number 5 which is
the root for this subtree as shown in Figure 4.58. The next gate to transform is
the sibling of gate number 5 which is given number 6 and then the root of these to













































































































































































































1 OR gate 
S0 S1 







2 AND gate 
S15 S16 














3 OR gate 
S0 S1 
mB2 mB1 mB3 mB4 
m2 m1 
m3 



























mB1 mB2 mB3 mB4 
mB5 mB6 








































7 AND gate 
S15 S16 
Figure 4.59: GCEFSMs for the Whole FT’
The event-gate table after the whole FT is transformed is shown in Figure 4.23. At
this step, the forth and fifth columns of the Failure Types Table are updated with
the Event ID and Gate ID for every failure type. This is shown in Table 4.24.
4.4.1.5 Model Integration
After the fault tree is transformed into GCEFSMs, we start integrating them
into the behavioral model. At this point, every message in the BM contains an
event name that is related to an event in one of the leaf nodes of the fault tree.
We check the class diagram and the Event-Gate table to find the event ID and
the gate ID for the event. These event IDs and gate IDs are inserted into the
message at the BM. The event Raise Gate is represented in the class diagram as
BFRaiseGate.BFEventCond. This event is looked up in the event-gate table to
obtain its event ID (eB1) and the gate ID (G1) the message is sent to. The message in
165
Table 4.23: Event-Gate Table









the BM is modified as (mB1, eB1, G1). This procedure continues till all the messages
in the BM are linked to the FM. At this step, the sixth column of the Failure Types
Table is updated with the Message ID that carries the failure to the fault part of
the model. This is shown in Table 4.25.
Figure 4.60 illustrates the RCCS transformed into an ICEFSM model. There
are two connected models, the behavioral model and the FT model. The arrows
between the CEFSMs represent the communicating messages between them. The
transformed system shown in Figure 4.60 forms a graph to which suitable coverage
criteria can be applied. The FT gates that are directly connected to the behav-
ioral model receive messages from the behavioral model and act accordingly. The
messages m1 to m7 represent the global transitions between the GCEFSMs for the
FT part, while mI1 to mI3 represent the messages between the components of the
behavioral model and mB1 to mB8 represent the communicating messages between


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.4.1.6 Test Case Generation from CEFSM Model
If we apply the algorithm in [68] to the graph in Figure 4.60 by imposing edge
coverage criteria on the global transitions of the ICEFSM, we will obtain the test
paths shown in Table 4.26. By using reachability analysis, we find that these paths
are feasible since there are no conflicts between predicates in transitions. Note that
we do not need to go into the details of the GCEFSMs and there for we represent
each of them as one node. e.x. the GCEFSM 1 that represents the first AND gate
is represented as “[1]” and the test path that reaches the root node of the FT,
GCEFSM 7, end with a message not a node to indicate that a hazard has occurred.
At this step, the last column of the Failure Types Table is updated with the Test
Path that covers the failure. This is shown in Table 4.27.
4.4.2 Construction of the Applicability Matrix
In addition to test paths r1-r14 in Table 4.26, phase1 produces Table 4.27 that
contains failure ID, Failure Type, Failure name in FT́, Event ID that carries the
failure, Gate ID that takes the failure as an input, and the Message ID of the message
that carries the failure. This information is used to map between the failures in the
test paths produced in phase1 and the failures that need to be mitigated in phase2.
The applicability matrix is build based on the information in this table.
From Table 4.26, we take the test paths through the ICEFSM one by one. We
start with r1. From Table 4.27, we find that r1 reaches the fault model via MB5.
From Table 4.27, we know that MB5 is in path r1 and it carries e5 which has
the failure ID f1. In the applicability matrix, we assign 1 to the positions indexed
(f1, s1),(f1, s2),(f1, s6),(f1, s7), and (f1, s8). These positions are taken from test path































































































































































































































Table 4.28: Applicability Matrix
F/S s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 s14
f1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
f2 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
f3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
f4 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
paths that don’t contribute to the failure, r5, r8, r10, r12, and r14. We assign 1 to the
position indexed (f1, s5), (f1, s6), (f1, s7), (f1, s14), (f1, s13),(f1, s3), (f1, s9), (f1, s10),
(f1, s11), (f1, s12), and (f1, s4) in the applicability matrix shown in table 4.28.
We apply the same steps to the remainder of test paths that contribute to a failure,
r6, r9, and r2 that are present in the Failure Types table 4.27.
4.4.3 Phase2: Generate Safety Mitigation Tests
4.4.3.1 Behavioral Model (BM), Test Criteria (BC), and Test Suite
(BT)
Figure 4.49 depicts the behavioral model of a Railroad Crossing Control System
(RCCS) in Communicating Extended Finite State Machine (CEFSM) format with
one train and one track. The model contains 14 states, = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, s8, s9,
s10, s11, s12, s13, s14} where the initial states are s1,s5,s9,s13 and the final states are
s1,s5,s9,s13. There are 19 transitions T={T0, T1, T2, T3, T4, T5, T6, T7, T8, T9, T10, T11,
T12, T13, T14, T15, T16, T17, T18}. Assuming edge coverage is required, the test paths
in Table 4.29 fulfill this requirement.
Let r1-r14 be the test paths through ICEFSM in Figure 4.60 obtained from exe-
cuting phase 1. Let t1-t11 be the paths through the CEFSM shown in Table 4.29.
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4.4.3.2 Failure Coverage Criteria (FC)
There are
∑|CT |
i=1 len(t) positions p to select for failure. Concatenating the tests
results in CT = CT= t1 ◦ t2 . . . ◦t11 = {s1, s1, s2, s2, s3, s3, s4, s4, s1, s5, s6, s7, s7, s8,
s5, s9, s10, s11, s12, s9, s13, s14, s13, s1, s2, s5, s1, s2, s3, s4, s7, s8, s5, s1, s2, s3, s7, s8, s5,
s5, s6, s9, s5, s6, s14, s13, s5, s6, s7, s8, s11, s12, s9, s5, s6, s7, s8, s13}. There are 58 posi-
tions.
We now apply coverage criteria for positions of failure (1 ≤ p ≤ 58 ) and type
of failure (1 ≤ e ≤ 4).
Coverage Criteria 1: all positions, all applicable failures. The required (p,e)
combinations are shown in Table 4.30 as ”1” entries. 138 tests are required. This is















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































f 3 f 4
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Coverage Criteria 2: all unique nodes, all applicable failures. The required
position-failure pairs (p,e) are shown in Table 4.31 as ”1” entries. This required
34 tests. Note that behavioral test paths t5 − t11 are not used. This criterion leads
to not testing failure recovery in all tests. A stronger test criterion is to require
covering each test as well. The (p,e) pairs are also stated in the second column in
Table 4.35.
Coverage Criteria 3: all test, all unique nodes, all applicable failures. Here
we simply require that when unique nodes need to be covered they are selected from
tests that have not been covered. Table 4.32 shows the set of position-failure pairs
(p, e) that fulfills this criteria. As with criteria 2, this required 34 pairs. The (p, e)
pairs are stated in the second column in Table 4.36.
Coverage Criteria 4: all tests, all unique nodes, some failures. The required (p,e)
pairs are shown in Table 4.33 as ”1” entries. This requires 14 tests. The (p,e) pairs
are also stated in the second column in Table 4.37 to indicate the associated safety
mitigation tests.
4.4.3.3 Mitigation Requirements, Mitigation Models, and Safety Miti-
gation Tests
The mitigation requirements are summarized in Table 4.34. Table 4.34 specifies
the corresponding mitigation models and associated weaving rules. Figures 4.61-
4.63 show the mitigation models for failures f2 − f4. Note that f1 does not need a
model, since it is an implicit fix that does not use additional test inputs (category 4
under weaving rules). Again, assuming edge coverage, the mitigation tests listed in
figures 4.61- 4.63 fulfill this coverage. Note also, that only failure f4 has more than
one mitigation test path.
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MM1 compensate; switch to backup





MM2 fix and stop; close gate; send
alarm; stop
cf. Figure 4.61 1b in 4.3.4.2
MM3 fix and proceed; turn warning
light on; send alarm
cf. Figure 4.62 1a in 4.3.4.2
MM4 Try other alternatives: compen-
sate; switch to back up and close
gates or turn warning light on;
send maintenance request






mt21 ={n21, n22, n23, n24}
n21 n22 n23 n24





mt31 ={n31, n32, n33}
n31 n32 n33


















mt41= { n41, n42, n44 }
mt42= { n41, n43, n44}
Figure 4.63: Compensate: Mitigation Model MM4
Construct Safety Mitigation Tests: Due to the large number of tests for
C1, we will only show tests for criteria C2-C4. Table 4.35 indicates tests for the
44 position-failure pairs that fulfill coverage criteria 2. Note that because f4 has
two mitigation paths required, these are two test paths for each position failure pair
(i, 4) (i ∈ 10− 12, 14, 16− 19, 21− 22).
Table 4.35: Safety Mitigation Tests for Criteria 2
SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt1 (1,1) t1 (no MT added to it) t1
smt2 (3,1) t1 (no MT added to it) t1
smt3 (5,1) t1 (no MT added to it) t1
smt4 (7,1) t1 (no MT added to it) t1
Continued on next page
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SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt5 (10,1) t2 (no MT added to it) t2
smt6 (11,1) t2 (no MT added to it) t2
smt7 (12,1) t2 (no MT added to it) t2
smt8 (14,1) t2 (no MT added to it) t2
smt9 (16,1) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt10 (17,1) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt11 (18,1) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt12 (19,1) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt13 (21,1) t4 (no MT added to it) t4
smt14 (22,1) t4 (no MT added to it) t4
smt15 (10,2) s5, n21, n22, n23, n24 t2
smt16 (11,2) s5, s6, n21, n22, n23, n24 t2
smt17 (12,2) s5, s6, s7, n21, n22, n23, n24 t2
Continued on next page
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SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt18 (14,2) s5, s6, s7, s7, s8, n21, n22, n23, n24 t2
smt19 (21,2) s13, n21, n22, n23, n24 t4
smt20 (22,2) s13, s14, n21, n22, n23, n24 t4
smt21 (16,3) s9, n31, n32, n33, s9, s10, s11, s12, s9 t3
smt22 (17,3) s9, s10, n31, n32, n33, s10, s11, s12, s9 t3
smt23 (18,3) s9, s10, s11, n31, n32, n33, s11, s12, s9 t3
smt24 (19,3) s9, s10, s11, s12, n31, n32, n33, s12, s9 t3
smt25 (10,4) s5, n41, n42, n44, s5, s6, s7, s7, s8, s5 t2
smt26 (10,4) s5, n41, n43, n44, s5, s6, s7, s7, s8, s5 t2
smt27 (11,4) s5, s6, n41, n42, n44, s6, s7, s7, s8, s5 t2
smt28 (11,4) s5, s6, n41, n43, n44, s6, s7, s7, s8, s5 t2
smt29 (12,4) s5, s6, s7, n41, n42, n44, s7, s7, s8, s5 t2
smt30 (12,4) s5, s6, s7, n41, n43, n44, s7, s7, s8, s5 t2
Continued on next page
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SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt31 (14,4) s5, s6, s7, s7, s8, n41, n42, n44, s8, s5 t2
smt32 (14,4) s5, s6, s7, s7, s8, n41, n43, n44, s8, s5 t2
smt33 (16,4) s9, n41, n42, n44, s9, s10, s11, s12, s9 t3
smt34 (16,4) s9, n41, n43, n44, s9, s10, s11, s12, s9 t3
smt35 (17,4) s9, s10, n41, n42, n44, s10, s11, s12, s9 t3
smt36 (17,4) s9, s10, n41, n43, n44, s10, s11, s12, s9 t3
smt37 (18,4) s9, s10s11, n41, n42, n44, s11, s12, s9 t3
smt38 (18,4) s9, s10, s11, n41, n43, n44, s11, s12, s9 t3
smt39 (19,4) s9, s10, s11, s12, n41, n42, n44, s12, s9 t3
smt40 (19,4) s9, s10, s11, s12, n41, n43, n44, s12, s9 t3
smt41 (21,4) s13, n41, n42, n44, s13, s14, s13 t4
smt42 (21,4) s13, n41, n43, n44, s13, s14, s13 t4
smt43 (22,4) s13, s14, n41, n42, n44, s14, s13 t4
Continued on next page
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SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt44 (22,4) s13, s14, n41, n43, n44, s14, s13 t4
Table 4.36 lists safety mitigation tests for the 44 position-failure pairs that fulfill
coverage criteria 3.
Table 4.36: Safety Mitigation Tests for Criteria 3
SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt1 (1,1) t1 (no MT added to it) t1
smt2 (7,1) t1 (no MT added to it) t1
smt3 (10,1) t2 (no MT added to it) t2
smt4 (17,1) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt5 (19,1) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt6 (20,1) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt7 (22,1) t4 (no MT added to it) t4
smt8 (25,1) t5 (no MT added to it) t5
Continued on next page
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SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt9 (29,1) t6 (no MT added to it) t6
smt10 (37,1) t7 (no MT added to it) t7
smt11 (41,1) t8 (no MT added to it) t8
smt12 (46,1) t9 (no MT added to it) t9
smt13 (51,1) t10 (no MT added to it) t10
smt14 (57,1) t11 (no MT added to it) t11
smt15 (10,2) s5, n21, n22, n23, n24 t2
smt16 (22,2) s13, s14, n21, n22, n23, n24 t4
smt17 (37,2) s1, s2, s3, s7, n21, n22, n23, n24 t7
smt18 (41,2) s5, s6, n21, n22, n23, n24 t8
smt19 (46,2) s5, s6, s14, s13, n21, n22, n23, n24 t9
smt20 (57,2) s5, s6, s7, s8, n21, n22, n23, n24 t11
smt21 (17,3) s9, s10, n31, n32, n33, s10, s11, s12, s9 t3
Continued on next page
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SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt22 (19,3) s9, s10, s11, s12, n31, n32, n33, s12, s9 t3
smt23 (20,3) s9, s10, s11, s12, s9, n31, n32, n33, s9 t3
smt24 (51,3) s5, s6, s7, s8, s11, n31, n32, n33, s11, s12, s9 t10
smt25 (10,4) s5, n41, n42, n44, s5, s6, s7, s7, s8, s5, t2
smt26 (10,4) s5, n41, n43, n44, s5, s6, s7, s7, s8, s5, t2
smt27 (17,4) s9, s10, n41, n42, n44, s10, s11, s12, s9 t3
smt28 (17,4) s9, s10, n41, n43, n44, s10, s11, s12, s9 t3
smt29 (19,4) s9, s10, s11, s12, n41, n42, n44, s12, s9 t3
smt30 (19,4) s9, s10, s11, s12, n41, n43, n44, s12, s9 t3
smt31 (20,4) s9, s10, s11, s12, s9, n41, n42, n44, s9 t3
smt32 (20,4) s9, s10, s11, s12, s9, n41, n43, n44, s9 t3
smt33 (22,4) s13, n41, n42, n44, s14, s13 t4
smt34 (22,4) s13, n41, n43, n44, s14, s13 t4
Continued on next page
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smt35 (37,4) s1, s2, s3, s7, n41, n42, n44, s7, s8, s5 t7
smt36 (37,4) s1, s2, s3, s7, n41, n43, n44, s7, s8, s5 t7
smt37 (41,4) s5, s6, n41, n42, n44, s6, s9 t8
smt38 (41,4) s5, s6, n41, n43, n44, s6, s9 t8
smt39 (46,4) s5, s6, s14, s13, n41, n42, n44, s13 t9
smt40 (46,4) s5, s6, s14, s13, n41, n43, n44, s13 t9
smt41 (51,4) s5, s6, s7, s8, s11, n41, n42, n44, s11, s12, s9 t10
smt42 (51,4) s5, s6, s7, s8, s11, n41, n43, n44, s11, s12, s9 t10
smt43 (57,4) s5, s6, s7, s8, n41, n42, n44, s8, s13 t11
smt44 (57,4) s5, s6, s7, s8, n41, n43, n44, s8, s13 t11
Table 4.37 indicates tests for the 15 position-failure pairs that fulfill coverage
criteria 4.
188
Table 4.37: Safety Mitigation Tests for Criteria 4
SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt1 (1,1) t1 (no MT added to it) t1
smt2 (7,1) t1 (no MT added to it) t1
smt3 (19,1) t3 (no MT added to it) t3
smt4 (22,1) t4 (no MT added to it) t4
smt5 (25,1) t5 (no MT added to it) t5
smt6 (29,1) t6 (no MT added to it) t6
smt7 (51,1) t10 (no MT added to it) t10
smt8 (10,2) s5, n21, n22, n23, n24 t2
smt9 (37,2) s1, s2, s3, s7, n21, n22, n23, n24 t7
smt10 (46,2) s5, s6, s14, s13, n21, n22, n23, n24 t9
smt11 (57,2) s5, s6, s7, s8, n21, n22, n23, n24 t11
smt12 (16,3) s9, n31, n32, n33, s9, s10, s11, s12, s9 t3
smt13 (17,3) s9, s10, n31, n32, n33, s10, s11, s12, s9 t3
Continued on next page
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Continued from previous page
SMT Covers Explanation BT used
smt14 (41,4) s5, s6, n41, n42, n44, s5, s6, s9 t8
smt15 (41,4) s5, s6, n41, n43, n44, s5, s6, s9 t8
Continued on next page
Criteria 1 would need |I| × |F | minus the zeros entries (not applicable) in Table
4.30. This requires 58 × 4 − 98 = 134 tests which is clearly not desirable. Criteria
2 and 3 have 34 + 10 = 44 tests and Criteria 4 have 15 tests. When deciding which
criteria to use, some other factors might need to be considered:
1. The likelihood that dependencies (that are not transparent in black-box test-
ing) between behavioral states and failure types could expose mitigation de-
fects in some states, but not others (this would require criteria 2 or 3).
2. The likelihood that specific execution history until the point the failure is
applied impacts the probability of uncovering a mitigation defect (this would
require criteria 3).
3. The cost of testing and the risk of missing a mitigation defect. This could
result in applying C1 to some failure types, but not to all. In other words, the
testing criteria are flexible enough to consider them each individually.
Either of those renders criteria 4 inadequate. It would probably also be wise
to consider the severity of a failure not being properly mitigated and using this
knowledge to prioritize tests. However, with FT as a model used in qualitative,
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rather than quantitative analysis, this information is not included in a FT. One
would have to switch to a more quantitative failure “model” such as the information
available in FMECA [119].
End-to-End methodology consists of two phases. In phase 1, we integrated the
behavioral and fault models to produce test cases from the integrated model. This
phase starts with the compatibility transformation step, in which we transformed
the fault trees to become compatible with the behavioral model, followed by model
transformation step. In this step, the fault tree was transformed into GCEFSM
according to the transformation rules. In the model integration step where we
integrate the GCEFSM with the behavioral model according to the integration rules
to produce the ICEFSM model which is then used to produce 14 test paths Table
4.26. This phase also produced the failure type table (Table 4.27) which was used
by the applicability matrix construction procedure (Figure 4.47) along with the test
paths in (Table 4.26) to construct the applicability matrix (Table 4.28). This table
contains 4 failure types with the information that shows which test path the failure
is feasible in. The applicability matrix is taken as an input to phase 2.
In phase 2, our aim is to provide an MBT approach to test proper mitigation
of safety failures in SCSs. We used the applicability matrix to build test criteria
from which we select the position and the type of the failure. The number of the
behavior test paths (without mitigation tests) produced from the behavioral model
is 11 paths and the total number of mitigation tests (MT) that we have is 4. Some
failures require more than one mitigation test paths (2 test paths), such as (f4)
which caused the number of safety mitigation tests (SMTs) to increase. From these
path, we generated SMTs for each criteria. The safety mitigation tests (SMTs) are
44 for criteria 2 and criteria 3. For criteria 4, we have 15 SMTs. The increase of the
number of the test paths with mitigation tests (SMTs) can be considered reasonable.
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Chapter 5
Other Uses for Integrated Model
5.1 Additional Analysis Capabilities through Con-
struction and Analysis of Distributed Processes
(CADP)
5.1.1 Construction and Analysis of Distributed Processes
(CADP)
CADP [142], formerly known as “CAESAR/ALDEBARAN Development Pack-
age”, is a toolbox for communication systems engineering. CADP’s development
started in 1986 by the VASY team of INRIA and the Verimag laboratory with con-
tributions of the PAMPA team of the Institute for Research in IT and Random
Systems (IRISA) and the Formal Methods and Tools (FMT) group at the Univer-
sity of Twente. CADP is a tool for verifying asynchronous concurrent systems. It
consists of 45 tools that offer a set of functionalities that cover the design cycle of
asynchronous systems such as specification, interactive simulation, rapid prototyp-
ing, verification, testing, and performance evaluation [50].
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CADP can be seen as a rich set of powerful, interoperating software components.
All tools are integrated for interactive use via a graphical user-interface (i.e. Euca-
lyptus) and for batch use via a user-friendly scripting language (SVL). CADP can
manage as large as 1010 explicit states and much larger state spaces can be handled
by employing compositional verification techniques on individual processes [50]. Be-
cause the textual file format that was used in the early 90s by most verification tools
is adequate for small graphs, CADP was equipped in 1994 with binary-coded graphs
(BCG), a portable file format for sorting labeled transition systems (LTSs). BCG
is capable of handling large state spaces (up to 108 states and transitions initially,
this limit was raised to 1013 in CADP 2011 for 64-bit machines) [50].
Garavel et al. [51] Explored the distributed state spaces of a large-scale grid
involving several clusters by the distributed verification tools recently added to the
CADP toolbox. These experiments were intended to push the PBG machinery to
its limits to study how this influences performance and scalability. They found
that CADP can handle about 289,130,000 states and 542,000,000 transitions for
a Dijkstra protocol of 4 processes. Compositional verification techniques offered
by CADP is applied by Garavel et. al. [49] a graph of 155,377,200 states and
371,146,000 transitions.
5.1.2 Process
To be able to use CADP to generate test cases, we can enter the ICEFSM
description directly into CADP, converting it to LOTOS or LOTOS NT. This, how-
ever, does not automate the integration process. Hence, we are in the process of
implementing a front-end tool1 that converts the fault tree into GCEFSM in the
1This front-end tool is a collaboration work between the University of Denver and the University
of North Dakota. It is being implemented by Amro Hassan and Mitchell Wright.
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LOTOS format. We are also implementing a tool that takes a CEFSM behavioral
model and converts it into LOTOS format. After the conversion is done, we will be
integrating the models as we described in section 3.1.7. The result of the front-end
component which is an integrated CEFSM (ICEFSM) written in LOTOS is taken
by CADP and transformed into an Labeled Transition System (LTS).
5.1.2.1 Modeling with Labeled Transition Systems (LTSs)
LTSs [80] have been used to precisely represent the semantics of behavioral spec-
ifications. LTSs are used to reason about processes, such as specification, implemen-
tations, and tests. In general, an LTS provides a global monolithic description of
the set of all possible behaviors of the system. It differentiates between internal and
external actions. LTSs are represented by graphs of states and edges. The states
represent configurations of systems, and the edges represent the moves between these
configurations on the occurrence of actions. A labeled transition system (LTS) is a
tuple M = (Q, A, T, q0) where
• Q 6= 0 is a set of states,
• A is a set of actions (machine alphabet),
• T ⊆ Q × A × Q is a transition relation between two states q, q́ ∈ Q, connected
by an action (a label) a ∈ A, denoted (q, a, q́) ∈ T or q a−→ q́ ∈ T, and
• q0 ∈ Q is the initial state.
The elements a ∈ A are the actions of the LTS. They are also referred to as labels.
However, except for the most trivial systems, a visual representation by means
of a tree or a graph is not feasible. Realistic systems would normally have billions
of LTS states, therefore drawing them is not an option [137]. Figure 5.2 shows the











Figure 5.1: BitAlt Sender Protocol EFSM
 
Figure 5.2: BitAlt Sender Protocol LTS (CADP Produced Graph)
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5.1.3 Deadlock
A deadlock for (parallel compositions of) LTSs, or any other systems on which
we can perform reachability analysis is a global state v in the reachability graph
such that there is no transition going out of the state v. Deadlocks are a common
problem in distributed systems. In a communicating processes or a message passing
system, deadlocks might occur due to processes indefinitely waiting for messages
from one another. Since our integrated model ICEFM is a collection of communi-
cating processes, it is necessary to evaluate it for deadlock in order to know that
the system is communicating as it should and no process is waiting for any commu-
nicating message that will never arrive. The deadlock evaluation is done during the
compilation of the model from the LOTOS to LTS and it can be separately on the
LTS model.
In addition to evaluating the whole mode for deadlock, we can use deadlock to
evaluate safety. This property can be used to analyze safety in our integrated model
ICEFSM, i.e. the deadlock state is the state that can not lead to any hazardous
state in the integrated model. In other words, if deadlock occurs in any state at the
fault side of the model, this means that the hazard state cannot be reached from this
state and that indicates that the events lead to this state will not cause a hazard.
Indeed, CADP offers checking this property by exploring a random sequence in the
model until a non-Markovian transition or a deadlock state is found, or it reaches
the maximum values specified by the user, or the simulation is halted by the user.
We used CADP to find whether there is a deadlock state in the example in Figure
5.2, the result was no deadlock states were found (cf Figure 5.3).
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Figure 5.3: CADP Deadlock Screen
5.1.4 Livelock
A livelock property (also called divergence) is when one or more processes enter
an infinite cycle where no progress occurs. It is similar to deadlock, except that
the involved processes exchange messages and change states with regard to one
another while no “useful work” is being done. As for an LTS, a livelock exists
in a state s of an LTS L, if s situated in a loop of internal actions, although it
possibly has other outgoing transitions. Brzeziński et al. define livelock property
for communicating processes as follows: Let C1, C2, ..., Cn be directed cycles in
entities ent1, ent2, ..., ent2 of protocol Pr, respectively. The tuple (C1, C2, ..., Cn)
is called livelock in protocol Pr, iff there exisits a sequence (s1, s2, ..., sr) of reachable
states of protocls Pr such that the following conditions hold:
• For i =1,..., r+1, state si−1 follows si over an edge e1 in ent1, or ent2,..., or
entn. Also states s1 follows sr over an edge er in ent1, or ent2,...., or entn.
• The set of edges {e1, e2, ...., er} constitutes of cycles C1, C2, ..., Cn.
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• the sequence (s1,..., sr) is unacceptable.
A livelock corresponds to a cycle of internal transitions reachable from s us-
ing only internal transitions. It can be considered as a loop of internal actions.
Similar to the deadlocks, livelocks are often considered a faulty behavior. CADP
analyzes livelocks consisting of loops due to internal (unobservable) actions causing
the system to loop forever. This implies that the external observer will not see any
progress in the system. This property can be used to verify whether a GCEFSM (a
gate CEFSM in the fault tree part of the model) receives a message that triggers an
output message (“gate occurred” or “gate not occurred”) or not. If that GCEFSM
has not sent a message, this implies that either it has not received any message or
it has received messages in an order that does not trigger the gate to occur which
implies that the input events to that gate may not contribute in a failure.
Figure 5.4 shows the livelock screen produced by CADP from the example in
Figure 5.2 .
 
Figure 5.4: CADP Livelock Screen
198
5.1.5 Test Generation with Verification (TGV)
The test generator TGV is part of CADP. It is available as command line and as
part of CADP’s graphical environment Eucalyptus. TGV uses the simulation API
provided by the CAESAR compiler of the CADP toolbox. It produces test cases
from the deterministic input-output labeled transition system (IOLTS) behavioral
model. Since the produced IOLTS model is normally big for a reasonable system
[137], we need to describe what can be called a test selection directive. Test selection
directives may be in the form of random test selection, selection based on some kind
of coverage criteria, selection described by test purposes, or mixture of these. The
test selection directives are a description of a targeted behavior that one needs to
test.
IOLTS is a tuple M = (Q, A, T, q0). The difference to LTSs is the distinction
of the actions. IOLTS divides the actions into three subsets, input (visible actions)
AI , output (visible actions) AO , internal (invisible actions) I.
TGV generates abstract test cases that describe the behavior of the system in
terms of input/output interaction between the tester and the implementation under
test (IUT) and the verdicts associated with these behaviors [74]. The produced
test cases are in the form of a graph such as Tree and Tabular Combined Notation
(TTCN) or in one of the graph formats (.aut and .bcg) of the CADP. The algorithm
of TGV can be described as:
1. TGV takes a specification (S) and a test purpose (TP) as inputs.
2. TGV performs a synchronous product (SP) between S and TP, marking the
S ’s behavior accepted or refused by TP. The synchronous product S × TP is
an IOLTS , equipped with two disjoint sets of states AcceptSP and RefuseSP ,
and defined as follows:
199
GivenMS = (QS,AS,T S,qS0 ), M
TP = (QTP ,ATP ,T TP ,qTP0 ), their synchronous
product is an IOLTS MS×TP = (QS×TP ,AS×TP ,T S×TP ,qS×TP0 ) such that :[24]
• qS×TP0 = (qS0 , qTP0 ),




• (qS, qTP ) a−→ (q́ S, q́ TP ) ∈ T S×TP ↔ qS a−→ q́ S ∈ T S
∧
qTP
a−→ q́ TP ∈ T TP .
• AcceptSP and RefuseTP are defined as follows:
AcceptSP = QSP
⋂




The synchronous product marks behaviors of S by Accept and Refuse, and
possibly unfold S, i.e. accepted behaviors of SP are exactly those behaviors of
S which are accepted by TP.
3. The visible behavior is built from SP and then a Complete Test Graph (CTG)
is built by extracting the accepted behaviors. Since IOLTSs differentiate be-
tween the input and output actions, TGV use this differentiation as controlla-
bility options to produce controllable or uncontrollable (complete) test cases.
To be successful, the test cases must be controllable [24]. A test case is said
to be controllable if at any state no choice need to be made between several
outputs or output and inputs. These controllability options are:
• Produce the complete test case: When this option is chosen, TGV pro-
duces the complete test graph without selecting a single test case from
it. Possibly, this test case is not controllable. RGV defines some priority
settings upon which a test case can be generated. The default priority
of TGV is laid on input actions and on actions of the specification with
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the possibility to give priority to test purpose actions or give priority to
output actions. In fact, we wanted to know if there is an effect on the size
of generated test case. We analyzed the effect of changing the priority
settings in an experiment based on the RCCS case study illustrated in
Figure 4.60 using the same combination of specification, test purpose,
and input and output action and just varying the priority setting. Our
experiment has the results for the number of states and transitions in the
generated test cases shown in Table 5.2. From this table, we can induce
that setting the priority only effects the selection of single test cases and
has no effect on the generation of the complete test graph.
• Produce a controllable test case with loops: When this option is chosen,
a single test case possibly containing loops will be generated. We used
the test purpose in Table 5.1 to produce a test case from the example in
Figure 4.60 using this option we obtain the test case shown in Figure 5.5.
• Produce a controllable test case without loops: When this option is cho-
sen, TGV produces a single test case without loops. We used the test
purpose in Table 5.1 also to produce a test case from the example in
Figure 4.60 using this option. We happened to obtain the same test case
as in the previous option test case shown in Figure 5.5.
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des (0, 13, 10)
(0, ”E1 !TRUE !TRUE”, 2)
(2, ”E1 !TRUE !TRUE”, 3)
(3, ”E1 !TRUE !TRUE”, 1)
(0, ”E1 !TRUE !TRUE”, 4)
(4, ”E1 !TRUE !TRUE”, 1)
(2, ”E2 !TRUE !TRUE”, 5)
(5, ”E2 !TRUE !TRUE”, 6)
(6, ”E2 !TRUE !TRUE”, 1)
(2, ”E3 !TRUE !TRUE”, 7)
(7, ”E2 !TRUE !TRUE”, 8)
(8, ”E3 !TRUE !TRUE”, 9)
(9, ”E2 !TRUE !TRUE”, 1)
(1, ”ACCEPT”, 1)
Table 5.1: Test Purpose for the Example in Figure 4.60
Table 5.2: Complete Uncontrollable Test Cases
Priority Setting on Number of states Number of Transitions
specification/input 2851 6168
test purpose/input 2851 6168
specification/output 2851 6168
test purpose/output 2851 6168
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This dissertation proposed an approach for testing of safety-critical systems. It
is based on integrating behavioral (CEFSMs are used to model a system behavior)
and fault models (Fault tree is used to describe a failure). While one might be
tempted to skip FTA and include the fault information ad hoc in the CEFSM
directly, this is unsystematic and error prone. It also fails to provide a proper FTA,
an important part of developing safety-critical systems. Since the behavioral models
are normally designed by software engineer teams and the fault models are designed
by safety engineer teams, some compatibility issues will most likely arise because of
each team’s perspective of the system. Examples of these compatibility issues are
the naming differences of the events, or conditions for event occurrence. The two
models are analyzed for compatibility and necessary changes are identified to make
them compatible.
Due to these compatibility issues, it is necessary to perform a compatibility
transformation to link the events at the behavioral model that contribute to a failure
to those events at the fault tree that have the same meaning although they may have
different naming methodologies. This is done by creating a class diagram for each
entity or event that contributes to the failure. The output of this step is an FT́ ,
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the original FT expressed in terms of the compatible events and their conditions if
any, i.e. BFClass.BFEventCondition.
After the compatibility transformation step is completed, we transform the gates
of the fault tree into what we call gate CEFSM (GCEFSM) according to a set of
transformation rules. We defined a GCEFSM for each fault tree gate such as: AND
gate and OR gate,. . . etc. The fault tree is traversed and transformed gate by gate.
At the end of this step, we obtain a transformed FT in a form of CEFSMs called
GCEFSMs. The complete GCEFSMs is a collection of connected GCEFSMs that is
equivalent to the original fault tree. We do this transformation to be able to integrate
it with the behavioral model which is also in a CEFSM model. The integration is
done by mapping the events from the behavioral model to those have the same
meaning at the fault model. The resultant model is an integrated Communicating
extended finite state machines ICEFSMs that is composed of the the MB and FM.
Several coverage criteria besides those for the conventional graph where it is treated
sequentially [4], are proposed for the integrated model. These criteria are meant
to deal with the so-called rendezvous graph [151] of communicating processes. The
rendezvous graph is the graph that contains the nodes involved in the communication
between the communicating processes. These criteria focus on the global view of
the integrated model.
Integrating mitigation models into ICEFSM in order to be used for testing proper
mitigation is impractical. Clearly, it is hard to determine in which state the system
is when the failure occurs. In other words, an event at state si may contribute in a
failure, but the failure shows up when the system is in another state Sj. For that
reason, we found that integrating mitigation models in every suspected state would
produce a very large and complex system and hence we proposed using our approach
as the first phase of an End-to-End safety-critical system testing methodology [6]
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in which we can test proper safety mitigations. The first phase which is part of this
dissertation, produces test cases from the integrated model that are then used to
construct the applicability matrix. The applicability matrix is a two dimensional
array where each row is a different failure type and each column is a behavioral
state of the system. When a failure fi occurs or is applicable in a state sj, we put
1 in the position (fi, sj) and the rest of the matrix is filled with zeros. The second
phase, which is part of the dissertation of Mrs. Salwa Elakeili, uses the applicability
matrix to generate test cases for proper mitigation of failure according to several
coverage criteria.
Model scalability is also investigated. To this end we developed a tool that es-
timates the number of states and transitions both for our approach and Sánchez
et al.’s approach [127]. This tool integrates different behavioral model sizes with
different fault trees sizes. We fed the tool with a variety of behavioral and fault
models from relatively small models to big ones and let the tool compute the size of
the integrated models. We then compared model sizes and investigated scalability.
The variation of the model size gave us a clear idea of the growth of the integrated
models for both approaches. We clearly showed that our approach is more scalable
for all model sizes.
In this dissertation, we conducted three case studies with different sizes and
from different application domains. The rationale behind choosing different model
sizes from different domain is to show the applicability of our approach. We used a
gas burner system (GBS), a relatively small example. The railroad crossing control
system (RCCS) case study, a reasonably sized system, is also used. The third
case study is a launch vehicle system (LVS) in which we integrated multiple fault
trees. In these case studies we illustrated our approach step by step including the
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compatibility transformation, model transformation, model integration, and test
case generation.
CADP, a collection of analysis and testing tools, is used to analyze the integrated
model. The integrated model is transformed into LOTOS format to be used as an
input for CADP. Another tool was implemented to transform the integrated model
into LOTOS. The tool transforms the behavioral model into LOTOS, transforms the
fault tree into LOTOS and then integrates the two LOTOS models. The integrated
LOTOS model is then given to CADP. CADP transforms the LOTOS into labeled
transition systems (LTSs). Test generation with verification technology (TGV),
a tool integrated to CADP, is used to generate test cases based on test purpose,
coverage criteria, or mixture of both from the LTSs. The test cases can be presented
in a form of a complete test graph (CTG). However, due to the huge number of the
produced test cases in a reasonable system, displaying the CTG may not be feasible.
CADP uses reachability analysis to find deadlock and live lock states in the model.
Deadlock and livelock properties can be used to analyze the model.
The advantages of the proposed approach over those that deal with model inte-
gration are:
• This approach is capable of integrating more than one fault model with a
behavioral model that contains a collection of processes.
• This approach is systematic as opposed to ad hoc.
• This approach is automated since it is algorithmic. We can build a tool that
takes the behavioral model and fault models and does the integration. More-
over, the integrated model can be given to a tool to produce test cases.
• The integrated model is very concise compared to the EFSM approach [127]
(cf section 4.1.1).
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• Unlike the EFSM approach [127], this approach has the ability to model the
whole model at once and does not need the minimum cut set.
• It uses explicit communicating edges, which makes it suitable for testing.
Other approaches [41, 40, 82, 111] use implicit communication edges which
makes them suitable for analysis not testing.
In summary we successfully provided a novel approach to test failures in safety
critical systems that
• allows for systematic modeling and analysis for both functional and safety
critical aspects of a system,
• fits into existing life cycles for developing SCSs,
• handles multiple Fault Trees,
• can be used as part of an end-to-end testing methodology,
• can be used with all existing test generation approach for CEFSMs, including
[16, 86, 33, 68]
• can be used for model checking including deadlock and livelock,
• compares favorably to existing approaches whose scalability is limited, and




This work can be extended in a variety of ways:
• Generalizability to other types of behavioral models:
We will investigate applying the integration approach for some other be-
havioral models that have the ability to describe communicating processes.
Examples of such models are UML sequence and activity diagrams, Petri Nets.
We think that integrating such models with failure models is straightforward
since we have already defined the compatibility transformation between the
behavioral and fault models in this approach and since these targeted mod-
els have the capability of modeling communicating processes. Generalizing
this approach to other modeling languages will be of a great benefits since
these modeling languages are used in other application domains, e. g. medical
systems, robotic devices, and flight control systems.
• Generalizability to other types of fault models:
In this approach we used fault trees as our fault model. However, using
some other models that are used to model failure such as Event Tree Analysis
(ET), Fault Hazard Analysis (FHA), and Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality
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Analysis (FMECA) will be investigated. Some of these models can be used to
determine the faults while other can be used for test case prioritization.
• Application of the methodology to complex intelligent agents like
unmanned vehicles and robots:
In this dissertation, we have shown that this approach works well for inte-
grating communicating processes. We would like to apply this methodology in
more complex intelligent agents where multiple independent agents are com-
municating to perform a certain task. The applications of intelligent agents
have been used in safety-critical systems such as unmanned vehicle, unmanned
planes, and robots in rescue missions in which the failure of the cooperation
between a collection of robots may be catastrophic. Therefore, testing safety-
critical behavior for such systems is essential. A failure that results from agent
or communication malfunction can be described by a fault tree. Applying this
approach for unmanned vehicle and multi-agent systems will give us more con-
fidence that our approach is not only capable of handling complex systems,
but it also shows further generalizability of the approach. For the unmanned
vehicle, this research group is working towards modeling the environment and
testing this system using CEFSMs1. Therefore, integrating fault models into
such systems in order to test safety will be an important step to make these
systems safer.
• Experimental evaluation of the effectiveness of this approach: At this
point, our approach can be used to generate tests with a variety of existing
test generation techniques such as [68, 16, 86] since the integrated models
that our approach produces are CEFSMs that these techniques are capable of
1The Ph.D. dissertation of Mr. Mahmoud Abdelgawad.
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testing. Hence, it is as effective as these techniques are. The effectiveness of
this approach can be evaluated by producing concrete test cases from a model
and execute them. Experiments can be designed to be used the proposed
coverage criteria especially those that target the fault part of the model to see
how effective our approach is.
Input space partitioning criteria [4] can also be used in conjunction with
the proposed criteria for the existing testing techniques. The idea of fault
injection can also be used to inject events as well as manipulating sensor
values in order to target safety breaches. The test suite size, the percentage
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